Abstracts of papers submitted to the International Conference on Philosophy of Life
In the History of of Life An Introduction to the History of the Absence and Presence Philosophy
Masoud Omid
Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Tabriz
Extended Abstract
It is a historical introduction and philosophicaland philosophical entry for the term life investigations on life in three periods of its absence, attention, and presence. Considering the necessity of the centrality of life in philosophical thinking and the necessity of philosophical life thinking, this research seeks to raise three different and important in the history of philosophy: First, what has been the course of the life bout questions ahistorical absence and presence of life, as a very important and fateful subject, in the history of philosophy? (Questioning the historical course of philosophical life ) d, what are the causes and reasons for this historical absence and presenceSecon? (Questioning the grounds for its absence and presence) and Third, what has been the philosophical presence of life in the history of philosophy and in the last century? (ng its philosophical content and valueQuestioni) These three questions can be considered at three levels: historical (first question) , analytical (second question) and philosophical (third question) The answer to the first question, which is historical, is that: of neglect or absence e history of philosophical biologism has three stages: the stage thThe answer to the second question, of presence. , and the stage of attention the stage kgrounds which is analytical, is that: the mythical, religious, and even philosophical bacthat have had a negative charge towards life have been effective in ignoring and neglecting deep philosophical biologism in the history of philosophy. This negative impact principle of has been mainly through undervaluing or devaluing life, in an absolute (thelife) or relative (in the relationship between life in this world and life after death or the afterlife). On the other hand, objective (historical) backgrounds such as world wars, the osophical backgrounds such as Corona crisis, etc., as well as epistemological, i.e. philthe formation of the philosophy of life movement in the ۱۹th and ۲۰th centuries, have been effective in taking life into account and then its presence in the context of philosophical, is that: Given the philosophical thought. The answer to the third question, course of the history of philosophy, life has had the capacity to have, in addition to its empirical (biological) empirical (social and political), and metaphorical (literary, etc.) cept and level (of course, taking into account meaning and concept, a philosophical conthe various and innovative approaches and meanings regarding life and determining the path and purpose of the philosopher) and even to be elevated to the level of a subject philosophy of lifeof for philosophizing (as the field . In the following, and considering the three levels of claims, it is suggested that critical considerations about this article be considered at three levels: ۱. Historical claim ۲. Analytical claim ۳. Philosophical claim
But the main purpose of this article and the raising of such questions is to call the studies of philosophical and contemporary history towards an important subject and issue, questions has namely life. In the meantime, in this article, an initial answer to these three been prepared, which can be a starting point for further detailed research. But the main
purpose is more to raise new questions on the axis of life than to provide comprehensive free answers to the questions raised-and obstacle
philosophy has been and is the field of absence and then gradual presence The history ofof philosophical topics (becoming, actuality, existence, essence, causality, etc . ) and related philosophical discussions, as well as the field of philosophical testing and the way is also one of the neglected life hey are philosophically present. In the meantime, tphilosophical topics that it is necessary to search for its absence and presence, as well beginning as the way it is philosophically present in the history of philosophy. At the veryand considering the distinction between biologism in the general sense and in the specific sense , is related specific philosophical biologism it should be said that the emergence of ample, we can distinguish only to the recent period and the contemporary century. For ex۱. The five different aspects and levels regarding the topic of life and related topics: elements and components of life or the principles of life (such as praxis, phronesis, intuition, power, etc . ) ۲ . The conditions of life (ed experience, living in the world, being livin the world, etc . ) ۳ . The accessories and necessities of life (death, etc) ۴ The types and forms of life (moral, political, religious, ideological, etc . ) and ۵. Life itself. In the history of philosophical biologism that is solely sm in a specific sense, that is, philosophy, biologicentered on life ( Life as Life ) etc., has been delayed and has only shown its presence explicitly and transparently in the recent period. But biologism in the general sense, i.e., philosophical biologism-nno (political, social, legal, etc . ) or philosophical, and based on the centrality of its principles, aspects, types, and accessories, etc., has been present s article is that more or less since the Greek period until the last century. The claim of thithe specific meaning of biologism has not been considered in the Greek period, the Middle Ages, and even the modern period. Life (and not its types, principles, etc) has not been considered as a point of departure and philosophical subject for philosophical studies and research (like being and existence). It is only in the recent and contemporary period is article is that in relation that some efforts have been made in this regard. The issue of thto the subjectivity of life itself and its consideration as a philosophical point of departure for philosophy and the overall formation of a branch called philosophical biologism in the stages can be considered: the period of neglect and history of philosophy, three historicaloblivion, the period of attention and approach, and the period of presence and philosophical subjectivity of life .
raises Kantin his allegory of the cave . of the ideal speaks of the forgetfulness Platoin the history of philosophy and criticizes metaphysical dogma the issue of the neglect of of the Heidegger speaksthe Dionysian life , and refers to the neglect of Nietzscheit. of his philosophy. But Socratic period to the birth -from the postexistence forgetfulness of it seems that the great neglect and the greatest forgetfulness in the history of philosophy, which includes both Plato and Kant and even extends to Nietzsche and Heidegger, is of philosophy ce for the knowledge related to the neglect of life due to its lack of relevanthe and its being ignored as a point of departure and philosophical movement for to form his philosophical complex. Since our justified philosophical philosopher to life in the history of expectation regarding the philosophical giving of relevancephilosophy has not been fulfilled until the last century , we can speak of a kind of widespread neglect and forgetfulness towards detailed and precise philosophical ophy, one can find numerous biography in the history of philosophy. In the history of philosphilosophical discussions, issues, thoughts, and points about life, but neither its
existence, becoming, -for philosophies in the level of being, existence, nonsubjectivity ture from life. Looking at the history causality, subject, Dasein, nor the philosophical deparof philosophies, philosophical dictionaries, thematic history of philosophies, the history of philosophical entries, one cannot find any indication of life as a chapter, entry, or title, or -is not at the level of titles such as existence, essence, nonif such a title exists, it existence, causality, necessity, subjectivity, existence, etc.! In the history of philosophy, in the issue of the subjectivity of life for philosophy, three distinct periods can be and considered: ۱ distinguished . Negligence ۲ . Attention ۳ . Presence . Explanation :
۱ of neglect From the classical period to the ۱۹th century, we can consider the period of biophysics in a special sense. It seems that in the case of this period of neglect and lack centrality of life for philosophical thinking, we can refer to the causes of (historical context)and reasons (metaphysical, logical, epistemological and cognitive science) as an philosophical cause and in terms of historical context and as-appropriate. As a noneffective context for philosophizing, we can refer to the prominence of the negative mythical and religious view (especially Christianity) towards life. However, in terms of philosophical reasons, we can say that firstly, the title of life from the perspective of classical thinking, like the subject of metaphysics, that is, being and existence, does not h as obviousness, centrality, inclusiveness, nobility have philosophical characteristics sucand regulation compared to other philosophical topics. Second, the topics of life did not have logical characteristics such as necessity, universality, durability and universality (pter of proofconditions of the cha). Thirdly, life in previous philosophical periods was merely a practical concept. Fourth, the concept of life has not gone beyond the first reasonable level (biological concept)and the valid concept (social and political) in terms logy. It may seem that in this period, just as many of the titles and topics of of epistemolater philosophies cannot be found in this period and in previous philosophies in general, tailed we should consider life as one of them; and therefore, there is no need for such a deis not a concept that is life study in this matter! But the problem and difficulty is that, first, philosophical concepts, but rather -like and on another level than philosophical and nonpoint is that one of the it is above and very important than all of them. The importantgreatest and most important philosophical titles of the human world, namely life as a philosophical concept, does not appear in the works of this period and has not been the e that, without providing subject of philosophical analysis. Second, is it possibldocumentation and detailed research, the claim of this article that the topic of life is absent in previous philosophies, is so easily accepted by some enthusiasts and admirers en faced with the questions, answers, of classical philosophical periods?! It seems that whand evidence presented in this article, the first reaction that will be made is to cling to the -interpretation and interpretation of philosophies and resort to mind reading and des, rather than to easily accept the claim. Third, presupposition of previous philosophereven assuming that the claim is accepted by philosophers , the important question still remains: for what historical and philosophical reasons has such a lack occurred in ioning that a distinction should be made between two is also worth mentphilosophies? It categories of rare philosophical matters among the discussions of ancient and classical philosophies: First, there are discussions that are fundamentally outside the philosophical cal space of that period and there is no philosophical and capacity and philosophiscientific expectation to understand and propose them, such as the issue of Kant's subjectivity or Einstein's relativity. But the second category consists of topics that, due to
re and importance, as well as the relative involvement of philosophical their specific natuthinkers of that period (or similar ones) in those periods, are topics that philosophical expectations for entering into are justified. Philosophical analytical biography is included n the second categoryi .
۲. This period is the result of the historical turn of philosophy from of attention The period ontology to epistemology, which begins with the flow of rationalism (Descartes)and empiricism (Hume) pragmatic ially with the work of and reaches its peak with Kant, espec. Hegel plays an important role in this period by highlighting history and the anthropology organic -philosophical view of history. Attention to three meanings: empirical, theoreticalis evident in Hegel's philosophy and to some extent metaphorical of life, .
۳The presence of life in the text of philosophy and as a specific The period of presence. and central topic for it has gradually begun in the last century and with the second and With the turn from epistemology to different greater turn in the history of philosophy.fields, namely to the field of life (Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Dilthey, Bergson and Camus) , practical wisdom (James, Peirce, Dewey, Rorty) , language (Wittgenstein) and especially existential matters (Sartre, HeideggerJaspers, ). Also to these fundamental changes, one should add the presentation of some important discussions about life by the young Heidegger and the phenomenologists (Ponty-Husserl, Levinas and Merleau) and some hermeneuticsians (eurGadamer and Rico). And even the entry of some analytical philosophers (Nigel) as well as some members of the Frankfurt School (Habermas) and some others such as Agamben, Kiszk and Badiou into the field of life. Among them, the research has been conducted by most important and prominent philosophicalphilosophers who have specifically targeted life itself and made it the subject of their philosophical thinking (and Hans the Phenomenology of Life such as Michel Henri in , etcPhilosophical Biology Jonas in . ). mentioning that in contemporary Iran, It is worththere are also a few thinkers who are in the mood for philosophical thinking about life, such as Mohammad Taghi Jafari ( Reasonable Life) and Mostafa Malekian (The Meaning of Life ). irstly, it seems that philosophical biologism is But overall, it can be said that fgrowing, changing, and evolving. Secondly, despite the numerous philosophical discussions about life, three prominent philosophical events are not visible: firstly, a biologism movement has not yet formed; strong current called the philosophical secondly, a philosophy or philosophies that are prominent, comprehensive, and impressive have not been formed on the axis of life. Third, the point of departure of most tional issues of life and minor issues about philosophers is still mainly related to the addilife (such as situation, meaning, ethics, model, etc . ) or more than that, it is related to rather than life itself as a central concept with purely anthropological issues , philosophical richness ( Life as Life or human life or human in terms of life (or human in the meaning and as life( human as life or life as life) .
In general, the relationship of the conventional periods of the history of philosophy to life can be considered as follows: ۱. The period of Greek philosophy: the period of vitalism (the tendency to raise issues and debates related to life) e biography, not and prescriptivphilosophical biography. ۲. The period of medieval philosophy: the period of -descriptivephilosophical biography. -prescriptive biography, not descriptive-religiosity and religious۳ . escriptive biography, not The period of Renaissance: the period of humanism and prphilosophical biography. ۴. The modern period: the period of vitalism and -descriptive
philosophical biography-prescriptive biography, not descriptive . ۵. The contemporary analytical, descriptive, and period: the period of vitalism and philosophical biography:prescriptive .
But the difficult question is, how can we escape and be freed from this forgetfulness and absence of philosophical biography and the lack of subjectivity of life for philosophizing , and through active relation to life itself first, in today? Two paths can be taken: to enter into the subject of life participation in life itself and establishing ourselves as biography and philosophical understanding life. In other words, focusing on the act of ition to practicing subjectivity towards living itself as the subject of life. living itself, in addcentered reading, -, and through a liferelation to the history of philosophy Second, in narration, and interpretation of it, considering the capacities of understanding life andbiography contained in it, and not necessarily through its destruction or forced appropriation. In any case, the history of philosophy until the last century has not been, l sense; in the strict sense of the word, the history of philosophical biography in a speciawhile the existence of such a philosophical movement has been both possible and desirable; and now it is up to us to think of a solution to this .
But the general framework and proposal of this article in the stage of transition from ention and then the presence of life in the history of philosophy has been as neglect to attof follows: First, an invitation to pay attention to the subject based on the principle a and deal with the claims of the writing in is to consider The first step understanding insimple and initial way, with regard to signs and analyses. Second, the punitive and admonishing approach of the writing regarding this neglect and absence, and then, paying attention and valuing the passage of this neglect in the next two stages, namely the stage of attention and presence of life. Third, adopting a special methodology in it, which consists of directly referring to the works with a formal approach and also, to some ing of extent, with regard to the content of the works and the philosophical thinkphilosophers to discover directional and meaningful signs in confirming the claim. Fourth, that at least leads to persuasive symmetry securing the claim of the writing through confirmation (and not necessarily proof) of the claim .
Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Life: Wonder, Therapy, Pedagogy, and the Ethical Form of Living
Michael A. Peters
Distinguished Visiting Professor, Tsinghua University; Philosophy Research Assoc. Waikato University
Abstract
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s reported last words—“Tell them I’ve had a wonderful life”—appear to conflict with a biography marked by family tragedy, war, depression, vocational rupture, moral severity, and terminal illness. This paper argues that the apparent contradiction arises from treating “wonderful” as an empirical summary of fortunate events rather than as an ethical expression whose sense belongs to a life considered as a whole. Drawing on the Notebooks ۱۹۱۴–۱۹۱۶, the Tractatus, the “Lecture on Ethics,” Philosophical Investigations, and Culture and Value, it reconstructs a philosophy of life organised around four connected motifs: seeing the world sub specie aeterni; the distinction between facts and value; philosophical therapy as work on oneself; and education as initiation into language-games and forms of life. Freud provides a productive contrast. Both thinkers diagnose human captivity and employ therapeutic redescriptions, but Freud explains suffering through a metapsychology of instinct, repression, and civilisation, whereas Wittgenstein resists a comprehensive causal theory and seeks perspicuous representation, acknowledgement, and peace in thought. My work on Wittgensteinian pedagogics supplies the paper’s decisive extension: a philosophy of life is not only contemplated but learned in scenes of instruction, in the acquisition of a voice, and in the ethical labour of learning how to “go on” with others. On this reading, Wittgenstein’s final words are neither a denial of suffering nor a ledger in which friendship and achievement outweigh pain. They are an act of gratitude addressed to friends and an avowal of life under the aspect of wonder. The paper concludes that Wittgenstein offers no doctrine of the good life. He offers a pedagogical and therapeutic practice through which a human being may become answerable for the words, relations, and forms of life that make a life intelligible.
Keywords: Wittgenstein; philosophy of life; wonder; forms of life; philosophical therapy; pedagogy; Freud
Leading the Care-Full Life
Maurice Hamington
Professor of Philosophy, Affiliate Faculty in Women, Gender, and Sexuality Studies-Portland State University- USA
Abstract
Grounded in feminist care ethics and the embodied, practice-based account of care, this presentation argues that a care-full life, thoroughly saturated with attentive concern for both close and unfamiliar others, is the substance of human flourishing, both personally and politically. The argument begins in antiquity, showing that the case for care as central to a well-lived life is not a recent feminist invention but an ancient thread in moral philosophy. In particular, a caring narrative resonates with Aristotle’s account of habituated virtue and Ibn Miskawayh’s treatment of friendship as constitutive of character, as well as Saadi’s insistence that human beings share a single body of feeling. Moving to the present, the paper traces feminist care ethics from Carol Gilligan and Nel Noddings to its current interdisciplinary reach. It examines the specific skills of good care, including humble inquiry, inclusive connection, and responsive action, through which caring competence is practiced and improvised rather than merely felt. It argues that this improvisational openness can produces moral epiphanies and that empirical research on perspective-taking and political empathy demonstrate how a personal disposition of care can scale into a political imagination that extends concern to unfamiliar others. The essay concludes that the modernist ideal of being “carefree” misdiagnoses human flourishing and that a world destabilized by inequality and xenophobia needs, instead, many more people willing to lead care-full lives.
‘Stepping out into the spiritual daylight of the present' – Hegel and the Essence of Life.
David Proud
Institute of Irish Studies. University of Liverpool. UK
Abstract.
Lebensphilosophie, the philosophy of life, was a ۱۹th-century intellectual movement, initiated by Wilhelm Dilthey, a reaction against neo-Kantian transcendental idealism, in which the mind constructs reality through a priori concepts of the understanding, and positivism, in which all genuine knowledge is either true by definition, or positive, that is to say, a posteriori facts derived by reason and logic from sensory experience. Alternative modes of cognition, such as intuition, introspection or religious faith are ruled out, or considered to be meaningless. Positivism established itself as the dominant form of scientific inquiry, while disregarding the wholeness of life, its unfolding nature, reducing everything to a certain rationality, taking concepts and logic as representative of the limit of what matters within the sciences, and dispensing with viewing human beings, and their lives and existence, as a whole. The philosophy of life offered a contrasting account. Focussing principally upon what Dilthey referred to as encompassing life, it sought to bring the non-rational, as well as creative and dynamic elements, into the picture. With this intent, Dilthey espoused a historical procedure for determining the essence of philosophy, and yet what is really required prior to this would be a determining of the essence of life. For this we can turn to a philosopher of a kind that the philosophy of life was supposedly reacting against. Hegel, in the Phenomenology of Spirit, deals with the essence of life in the transitional stage of consciousness to self-consciousness. Consciousness sought truth through an understanding of the physical forces of this world, but this devolved into so many fleeting moments of appearance that are devoid of truth (which is eternal and unchanging). Understanding therefore had to posit another (Platonic super-semsible) world of fixed laws as the possible essence of the mundane world of physical forces, but the two worlds can only be combined into a more universal structure that is called an explanation. A dynamic force is explained precisely through knowing the abstract law associated with it (for instance, the force of gravity and the law of gravity). And yet the fixed and motionless laws of the (Platonic) realm that is totally devoid of change. and is beyond everything, is met by a second (Platonic) realm which reduplicated everything in the first (Platonic) realm of laws, but in inverted form that reveals the stable principles of law to be as unstable as the flux of forces they were meant to ground. Consciousness recognises the inverted world as a mirror of the world it inhabits, and it recognise the truth about itself revealed in this mirror of sorts. The world in which it dwells is the truly infinite, which is not an impersonal force (like gravity) but a power that succeeds in becoming conscious of itself. This truly infinite self-conscious force is me, and when I discover the infinite within myself.
Life is discovering the infinite within oneself.
I move on from being a detached conscious observer to a self-consciousness that has desires, intentions, and that acts. The infinite force is the one that becomes alive. The unfolding of life that Dilthey lamented as being absent in prior rationalist philosophy is there in Hegel, and having achieved self-consciousness through discovering the infinite in itself, self-consciousness exists in self-recognition, it desires another independent self-consciousness, the unity of the independent self-consciousnesses is the I that is We and We that is I, and with the emergence of life both sensible appearance and the super-sensible beyond is left behind as self-consciousness ‘steps into the spiritual daylight of the present’.
Maya, Mass, and the Body of God: Vedāntic Ontology, Yogic Performance, and the Post-Einsteinian Life-World in Paramahansa Yogananda's Autobiography of a Yogi
Sumit Mondal
Ph.D. Scholar (UGC-JRF), Centre for Theatre and Performance Studies,
School of Arts and Aesthetics, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi, India
Anwesha Roy
Graduate Student, Department of Comparative Literature, Jadavpur University
PDM Scholar, Indian School of Public Policy
Abstract
Spirituality's claim to a life beyond matter has never been made from outside matter: it is staged, embodied, and witnessed even as it asserts its own transcendence of the body that stages it. This paper examines that dialectic through Paramahansa Yogananda (۱۸۹۳–۱۹۵۲), the Indian yogi who introduced kriyā yoga to the West and founded the Self-Realization Fellowship in the United States in ۱۹۲۰. His Autobiography of a Yogi (۱۹۴۶) remains one of the most widely circulated texts of modern Hindu spirituality outside India: a first-person narrative recounting Yogananda's own formation alongside encounters with saints who reportedly perform siddhis — materialization, levitation, bilocation, bodily transcendence — offered as evidence of a reality beyond ordinary matter. Taking the book as a philosophically serious case, this paper asks a question sharper than whether a generic matter/spirit binary holds in it: which indigenous Vedāntic ontological register does Yogananda actually mobilize, where, and for whom — and what does his movement between registers reveal about life as a category irreducible to either pure being or pure biology? Why does his rhetoric of miracles invoke an Advaitic vocabulary of māyā — the world dissolved into light and consciousness, after Śaṅkara — while his lived practice of kriyā yoga, guru-sevā, and embodied grief and touch operates on a more Rāmānujan logic in which matter is real and relationally constitutive rather than illusory?
I argue that Yogananda performs a strategic double movement across two classical Vedāntic frameworks rather than inhabiting either consistently. In "The Law of Miracles" (Chapter ۳۰), he explains siddhis through an Advaitic idiom of māyā, reinforced by his own citation of Einstein's mass-energy equivalence and Eddington's account of the atom as "mind-stuff": matter dissolves into light and infinite mass, pitched to a post-Einsteinian Western readership he is courting into scientific legitimacy. But this is not where the text's spiritual life actually happens. Its practical center — kriyā yoga as a daily embodied discipline linking the individual self (jīvātman) to the supreme self (paramātman) — operates on a logic closer to Rāmānuja's Viśiṣṭādvaita, or qualified non-dualism, where the material world is not māyā but śarīra, the real body through which Brahman is approached, and self and other remain genuinely distinct while organically bound. The resurrection of Sri Yukteswar makes this tension visible in one scene: Yogananda embraces his guru's astral form as proof of continued relational reality — a Viśiṣṭādvaitic gesture, the body still registering pain — even as surrounding chapters insist the body was always illusion. The text's ontological claim is thus not argued from one doctrine but performed across the friction between two: an Advaitic rhetoric of transcendence for scientific legitimation, and a Viśiṣṭādvaitic practice of embodied relationality for the actual, daily conduct of a spiritual life among others.
The paper works between classical Vedānta (Śaṅkara's Advaita; Rāmānuja's śarīra-śarīrī model of the universe as God's body), modern yoga studies on the yogic body as a site of negotiation between indigenous and colonial-scientific epistemologies (Alter, De Michelis), and performance studies on ritual efficacy and embodied liminality (Turner, Schechner). Against readings that flatten the text into devotional hagiography or crypto-scientific apologetics, it insists the philosophical interest lies exactly in the inconsistency between registers — a deliberate syncretism, not confusion — and connects this to the conference's founding question of why life has rarely been treated as an autonomous philosophical problem. Yogananda's text offers a model in which life is neither dissolution into pure being nor mere biology, but the practiced, daily, relational space between paramātman and mundane self-and-other — a space that can only be inhabited, not resolved.
Keywords: spirituality, materiality, performativity, Vedānta, Advaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita, yogic embodiment, Paramahansa Yogananda
Life and the Organicist Worldview
Robert Hanna
University of Colorado- USA
Abstract
Since ۱۹۰۰, the predominant worldview has been the mechanistic worldview, centered on the root metaphor of the machine (for example, a steam engine or a digital computer) which says that everything in the world is fundamentally either a formal automaton or a natural automaton, operating according to Turing-computable algorithms and/or time-reversible or time-symmetric deterministic or indeterministic laws of nature, especially the Conservation Laws (including the ۱st Law of Thermodynamics) and the ۲nd Law of Thermodynamics, which also imposes always-increasing entropy—i.e., the always-increasing unavailability of any system’s thermal energy for conversion into mechanical action or work—on all natural mechanisms, until a total equilibrium state of the natural universe is finally reached. Diametrically opposed to the the mechanistic worldview is the organicist worldview, centered on the root metaphor of the living organism (for example, a plant or an animal), which says that everything in the world is essentially or fundamentally uncomputable, processual, purposive, self-organizing, time-irreversible or time–asymmetric, non-equilibrium thermodynamic, and negentropic, and that there is a basic metaphysical and ontological continuity, running from the Big Bang singularity to uncomputable, time-asymmetric, non-equilibrium thermodynamic energy flows, to living organisms, to conscious minded animals, to rational, self-conscious minded animals with free will and practical agency, and finally to social institutions of all kinds. In short, if the organicist worldview is true, then we’re no less than real persons who are innately endowed with conscious, rational, self-conscious rational animal minds and free agency, and not moist robots. In my opinion, the mechanistic worldview is damnably false and the organicist worldview is decisively true; and the revolutionary individual and social comprehension of this worldshaking dual fact is what I call the turn away from the mechanistic worldview to the organicist worldview, or for short, the organicist turn. The organicist turn, whether in philosophy, the formal and natural sciences, the fine and applied arts, religion and spirituality, or morality and sociopolitics, has two basic parts. Fully recognizing, understanding, and indeed internalizing the two basic parts of the organicist turn is the key to the genuine progress and salvation of humankind, of the Earth including all its ecosystems and living organismic systems, and of the rest of the larger and all-encompassing natural universe, aka the cosmos. Therefore, the organicist turn provides us with a comprehensive philosophy of life.
The importance of emotions in life
Liz Jackson
Karen Lo Eugene Chuang Professor in Diversity and Equity, University of Hong Kong
Globally educational systems may be oriented to national development or global political economy. But for those of us involved with education, these are merely instrumental ends. Such ends may be useful to forward intrinsic educational aims, related to well-being, joy, happiness, flourishing, and related positive emotional states and dispositions. We all want good lives. Our emotions are an important part of good living.
But do we know what emotions are—which ones are ‘positive’ and how to cultivate them? On the contrary, our assumptions about emotions can often lead us astray. We may define our emotions in overly narrow and rigid, caricatured ways. We may feel pressure, in schools and other workplaces, to perform emotions, which can lead paradoxically to less joy, happiness, or well-being. Schools around the world see emotional well-being as vital, but often schools are the cause of needless unhappiness and suffering.
This presentation discusses emotional states associated with the good life, including happiness, joy, well-being, and inspiration. It shows that these concepts are understood in diverse ways across traditions and disciplines. Meanwhile, they tend to be narrowly framed by schools in unhelpful ways, leading students to demonstrate positivity and optimism rather than to reflect more deeply on what matters in their lives. A final problem is the individualization of emotion. Students are taught they are responsible for their emotions, but this is not true. Our emotions are shaped by the world and others around us that matter to us. Thus, understanding and building on these relations, rather than obscuring them, is essential. This presentation challenges us to think differently about the role of emotions in life, including views of positive and negative emotions and how we can cultivate emotions to enhance our own lives as well as those of others around us.
Givenness Without a Giver: Biological Opacity, Somatic Contingency, and the Impersonal Autonomy of Life
Paulo Alexandre e Castro
ESTGL-Polytechnic University of Viseu- IEF-University of Coimbra- Portugal
Abstract
Throughout the history of Western thought, life has consistently been subordinated to extrinsic frameworks: reduced to a mechanical substrate, governed as a socio-political apparatus, or absorbed into a metaphysical enquiry concerning Being. Even when contemporary philosophy isolates life as an independent category, it frequently falls into teleological optimism by treating existence as a project of self-creation, subjective care, or narrative coherence. This paper proposes a radical departure from these paradigms by formulating a philosophy of life anchored in its most unsettling dimension: life as a pure, opaque facticity, a givenness without a giver.
Empirically, this autonomy is most glaringly evident in modern physiology, neurobiology, and cellular biology. Phenomena such as stochastic gene expression, somatic mutations, autonomic neural regulation, and autoimmune breakdown reveal an organic domain operating entirely outside conscious agency or intentional design. The human subject does not direct cellular mitosis, nor can it govern the neuro-somatic pathways that mediate pain, degeneration, or homeostatic flux. The body functions according to a recalcitrant biological logic, an intricate mechanism of survival and decay that the self-inhabits, yet never truly commands.
Philosophically, this empirical reality finds profound resonance across French phenomenology and the philosophy of science. Georges Canguilhem’s critique of biological mechanism demonstrates how organic life asserts its own unpredictable normativity precisely through pathology and physiological deviation. This somatic unpredictability mirrors Jean-Luc Nancy’s ontology of the intrusive body (L’Intrus), wherein bodily vulnerability and organic failure confront the self as an irreducible, uninvited foreignness operating from within. To conceptualise this pre-individual vitality, Gilles Deleuze’s final formulation of une vie (a life) provides a neutral, non-subjective immanence that precedes both conscious identity and transcendent purpose. This immanence is further articulated by drawing upon Michel Henry’s phenomenology of radical auto-affection and secularising Jean-Luc Marion’s concept of givenness (donation). Stripping the “saturated phenomenon” of its theological scaffolding allows us to understand biological life as an overwhelming, unmediated immediacy that presents itself entirely without a divine architect or human origin.
By synthesising empirical insights from neuro-somatic pathology with phenomenological critique, this paper contends that life achieves genuine philosophical autonomy not when it is integrated into human projects of meaning, but when its fundamental opacity is acknowledged. Life is neither a divine dispensation nor a manageable technological asset; it is an impersonal, non-teleological event to which the subject remains perpetually exposed.
Keywords: Givenness, Biological Opacity, Somatic Contingency, Immanence, Phenomenological Autonomy
The Language of Fear: Toward a Philosophy of Linguistically Mediated Life
Dr. Victoria Akopova
Independent Researcher and Lecturer in English Literature, Tbilisi, Georgia
Abstract
This article addresses a problem that has been curiously absent from the history of philosophy: the treatment of life itself as an autonomous philosophical concept. Life has traditionally been approached indirectly, refracted through categories such as being, substance, ethics, politics, or biology, rather than examined as a philosophical problem in its own right. This article contributes to the contemporary project of establishing life as such a concept by approaching it through a single, deliberately narrow phenomenon: fear. The central question is twofold — what does fear reveal about the nature of lived life, and how does language participate in transforming embodied fear into meaningful human experience? The article's method is conceptual and phenomenological rather than empirical. It combines four complementary theoretical resources. From phenomenology, it draws on Merleau-Ponty's account of the lived body and Heidegger's analysis of being-in-the-world and temporality, in order to distinguish the objective body, which can be measured from the outside, from the lived body, through which a subject inhabits a meaningful world. From cognitive linguistics, it draws on Lakoff and Johnson's theory of conceptual metaphor to show that fear is not merely described metaphorically but is structured through recurrent embodied patterns — confinement, pressure, distance, falling, darkness, and loss of control. From hermeneutics, it draws on Ricoeur's theory of narrative identity to explain how a frightening episode, once articulated, becomes integrated into memory and into a person's understanding of who they are. From the philosophy of symbolic forms, it draws on Cassirer's account of human beings as symbolic beings, for whom experience becomes intelligible only through language, myth, art, and other symbolic structures.
The Difference Between Being Alive and Living:
An Engineer’s Testimony
S. Massoud Amin, D.Sc.
Professor Emeritus, University of Minnesota, USA
Professor Emeritus, University of Minnesota, USA Prepared for the International Conference on Philosophy of Life
Faculty of Literature, Philosophy and Languages, University of Tabriz, Iran,
in collaboration with the Faculty of Philosophy, Pontifical Antonianum University, Rome, Italy
۲۰ November ۲۰۲۶
Abstract
As a child in the late ۱۹۶۰s and early ۱۹۷۰s, I saw villages outside Tabriz without electricity. The people there were alive. There was no light to read by at night, no refrigeration for medicine, no pump for clean water. What was missing was not biology; it was the conditions of a livable life. This paper argues, from more than four decades of engineering practice, that infrastructure is a material constituent of the life-world — Husserl’s Lebenswelt — not its background. The philosophical roots are old. Aristotle wrote that the polis comes into being for the sake of life and exists for the sake of the good life. Heidegger showed that equipment goes unnoticed until it breaks; infrastructure is the same — visible only in failure. Agamben’s distinction between bare life and qualified life, Arendt’s conditions of human activity, and Sen’s capability approach name, in different vocabularies, what an engineer sees in the field: when the systems carrying water, power, and communication fail, what is lost is not the living but living itself. What is new here is the standpoint. Philosophy has examined bare life and the life-world at length, but rarely from the side of those who build and repair their material conditions. The paper offers testimony, systems analysis of how engineered networks constitute forms of life, and a proposal: that philosophy of life admit the built world into its account — as condition, not backdrop.
Keywords: philosophy of life; life-world; infrastructure; being alive and living; resilience; capability; testimony
The Meaning of Life and the Simulacrum of Fulfilment: Promise, Deferral, and the Technological Order
Mario Lupoli
Pontificia Università Antonianum - Italy
Abstract
We say of a death that it came too early, or of a life that it went unfulfilled. Judgments of this kind are argued over, not merely felt, and none can be drawn from biology, which records that a life ended, and when, but cannot say that the end came too soon. Such a judgment measures a life against something the living were owed. Where can a claim of that sort reside? Not in the vital processes; and not in history either, since the philosophies of history repaid the individual with the achievements of later generations, and yet no better society compensates suffering already endured. What is owed is owed to the living themselves, in their bodies, and only a promise can have that form. In the biblical vocabulary, the Italian theologian Sergio Quinzio recovers a notion of truth as fidelity to a promise, and of falsity as a promise betrayed. A promise reinterpreted until no event can refute it has no room left: it has been cancelled, because what can no longer be broken can no longer be kept. Medieval and early modern thought on the Antichrist had already described a falsehood of this kind, which consists less in mere lying than in taking the place of the true while preserving its form: the adversary occupies the temple instead of destroying it. The same operation proceeds today without theology. A technological order improves whatever can be measured, counted and calculated, while every single death remains without an answer of redemption, and with those deaths all the lives lived until now. Two things do not yield to it: the body that suffers, and hope for what has not yet come. Fidelity to a promise of salvation still unfulfilled is what preserves a space of significance for life, precisely in the never-satisfied uncertainty of the not-yet.
AI & The New Philosophy of Man or Philosophical Anthropology
J.L.M. Dassen
Researcher, Anthroopos Foundation Amsterdam, International Member of the Dutch Research School of Philosophy of the University of Leiden in the Netherlands (۲۰۲۰-۲۰۲۴)
Abstract
Historically, philosophical anthropology has sought the answer: What is human being? Today, artificial intelligence demands a radical re-examination of this question. We are moving beyond asking what humans create, to asking how what we create redefines our nature, agency, and consciousness. Re-defining Agency and Intensionality: Classical definitions of human action often rely on conscious intent. AI algorithms simulate decision-making, forcing us to draw new philosophical boundaries between mechanical output and true human volition. The Extended Mind: As AI integrates seamlessly into our daily existence, the boundary between human cognition and machine processing blurs. AI functions as an extension of the human mind, altering how we remember, learn and perceive reality. Ethics and Existential Identity: The advent of artificial general intelligence forces us to reflect on morality. If machines can process ethical frameworks, does our unique status as moral agents change? The rich tradition of Iranian philosophy – from Avicenna’s theories of the soul to Mulla Sadra’s transcendent theosophy – offers a robust framework to understand these shifts. Mulla Sadra’s concept of Harakat-e-Jawhari (substantial motion) posits that beings are in constant flux and evolution. We can view AI not as a static, alien entity, but as a continuation of humanity’s substantial motion – a tool through which our intellectual capacities are actively expanding and transforming in real-time. This dialogue between ancient wisdom and modern technology is actively being explored in academic discourses, such as those published in the University’s Journal of Philosophical Investigations. Ultimately, artificial intelligence does not diminish philosophical anthropology; it enriches it. AI highlights the uniqueness of human emotion, our capacity for existential dread, and our search for meaning. While AI can calculate, it cannot experience the depth of Dasein (being-in-the-world). The future of philosophy lies in guiding this technological evolution, ensuring that AI serves to elevate, rather than eclipse, the human spirit.
Keywords: Artficial intelligence, philosophy, anthropology, humanism, domain unto itself, interdisciplinary, reflection
AI: A new Narrative of Human Life
Prof. Andrea Bizzozero, PhD; PhD
Prof.ssa Carlotta Ciarrapica, PhD
Abstract
Reality is understood through a process of appropriation, the nature of which depends on how rationality is understood and defined. It follows that knowledge takes on the character of a genuine narrative of reality, thereby shaping it and causing it to be in that way, precisely by virtue of the prevailing paradigm of reason. This paper aims to examine certain characteristic elements of the narration of reality in the age of computational technical systems, in order to explore the transformations in the way we conceive of reality and of humanity itself.
From philosophy of life to philosophical living
The public vocation of philosophical practitioners
Rodney King
Department of Philosophy, Rhodes University, Makhanda, South Africa
Abstract
A philosophy that seeks to inform how people live raises a question of public responsibility: who makes philosophical inquiry available within ordinary life, and under what conditions can that work continue? This article argues that philosophical practitioners should become a recognisable and accessible part of public life, with conditions that enable competent practitioners to earn a decent living. It distinguishes life as a philosophical object from philosophy as a way of life, drawing on Pierre Hadot without assuming that the lived philosopher has disappeared. An account of philosophical guidance then explains how concepts, reasons and experience can inform and correct one another within a life. The contemporary significance of this work concerns the difference between encountering accounts of worthwhile living and having opportunities to examine and live them. Across consultation, education, public writing, groups and organisations, practitioners can help create those opportunities. The article argues that public recognition, collective cooperation and adequate remuneration belong within the practical ambitions of a philosophy of life. Accountability is treated as a condition of trustworthy guidance, while philosophical living remains a possibility that extends beyond any profession.
Keywords: philosophy of life; philosophical practice; Pierre Hadot; philosophical guidance; public vocation
COSMIC & PERSONAL DEATH & REBIRTH: Kyoto School and Christian explorations of the meaning of life
Curtis Rigsby
Associate Professor of Philosophy at Hiroshima University- Japan
The Kyoto School of modern Japanese philosophy emerged from dialogues surrounding the ideas of Kitarō Nishida, and drew upon both Asian as well as Western traditons. Drawing upon Medieval conceptions of God as ultimate Being, and Buddhistic conceptions of Universal Law or Dharma, Nishida provocatively termed the all-encompassing reality of the cosmos which interfaces with each individual self, an “Absolute Nothingness,” in order to highlight the infinite possibilities of the universal creative and unitive power that cannot be reduced to any one particular form or being. Kyoto School associates expressed the meaning-conferring activity of Abolute Nothingness in each individual as a “self-realization,” which Nishida’s successor, Hajime Tanabe, characterized by the Christian term metanoesis—literally the transformation of one's mind, or in theological terms, repentance. For Tanabe, it is only by continually and self-critically examining the various options for life meaning or explanation in general, that we are able to learn and mature, and to avoid myopic narrowness and fatal bias, and ultimately to avoid error. This life-transformative activity both signifies and is signified by the Absolute Nothingness. Nishida’s student Takizawa Katsumi added that in our very existence and in our search for meaning, we depend completely upon the Absolute Nothingness, but It does not conversely depend upon us in our finitude and fallibility. Whereas we are prone to err, this divine fount of meaning and life does not err. I myself appeal to Aristotle’s ideas on change in order to characterize this encounter with the Divine as a radical transformation akin to chemical changes in chemistry and metamorphosis in biology, yet involving our will and essence in a way that mere automatic or accidental change does not. In the manner of Kyoto School dialectic and Christian theology, I consider this meaning-conferring transformation in terms of a “death and rebirth.”
Tillich’s Courage as a Response to The Human Predicament
Joshua Jose R. Ocon
University of the Philippines Diliman Department of Philosophy
Abstract
In The Human Predicament: A Candid Guide to Life’s Biggest Questions, David Benatar presents an uncompromising articulation of philosophical pessimism: to exist consciously is to be harmed since life is pervaded by suffering and cosmic insignificance. Any search for meaning turns out illusory, and the awareness of humanity’s inevitable extinction only makes it tragic. Benatar’s position, however, is not a resignation but a “clear-eyed confrontation with reality’s bleakness. The only authenticity then is the acceptance of meaninglessness.
In response, I draw from Paul Tillich’s The Courage to Be, which begins from the same existential awareness of human finitude but moves in a different direction. Tillich understands the ‘anxiety of nonbeing,’ death, guilt, and meaninglessness, not as a confirmation of the futility of life but as a manifestation of its ontological depth. Courage is nothing less than the affirmation of one’s being despite nonbeing, which is ultimately made possible by participation in ‘Being-itself,’ the ground of all reality.
Firstly, I will outline Benatar’s diagnosis of the human predicament by focusing on how his claim that life is objectively bad depends on an implicit ideal of nonexistence. Then, I will present Tillich’s “courage to be” as an ontological act, situating it as a response to the same conditions of finitude described by Benatar. Finally, I argue that Tillich’s framework reinterprets Benatar’s “human predicament” as the locus where meaning emerges. By reading The Human Predicament through a Tillichian standpoint, I argue that the experience of despair is not necessarily the end of meaning but its threshold. Against Benatar’s pessimism, Tillich’s courage transforms despair into ontological participation, showing how the question of meaning persists even when meaning appears to be impossible, that is, in the courage to be.
Keywords: being, courage, despair, existence and meaning
Beyond Biological Reductionism: 'Concrete Life' And The Polar Structure In Romano Guardini Towards A New Philosophy Of The Living
Giuseppe Rinaldi
PhD Candidate in Philosophy
Pontifical University Antonianum – Italy
giuseppe.rinaldi@icpadula.edu.it
This paper aims to explore the concept of "Life" as an autonomous philosophical and existential category, freed both from biological-functional reductions and from notionistic hyper-specialization. Drawing from Romano Guardini's insights in Der Gegensatz. Versuche zu einer Philosophie des Lebendigkonkreten (۱۹۲۵), the study demonstrates how the "living-concrete" is structured according to an architecture of polar oppositions that cannot be reduced merely to laws of causality or the accumulation of knowledge. The analysis highlights how Guardini’s ontology of life translates into a radical critique of contemporary man's "impoverishment of the self" in the face of the excesses brought about by the advent of the artificial and of power. For Guardini, personal life is a never-ending process, marked by finitude and the dynamics of encountering the Other. This approach establishes a fruitful theoretical bridge with Edgar Morin's philosophy of complexity and his manifesto Teaching to Live. Both thinkers converge on the necessity of an "ethos of limitation" that overcomes all cognitive monism in order to educate toward the inexhaustibility of reality and the autonomy of the mind. Thus, the paper intends to demonstrate that "Life"—understood as a polar and complex dynamic—constitutes the indispensable primitive foundation for refounding education (Bildung) and personal responsibility in the contemporary world.
How Is Space Lived? The Lifeworld in Dialogue with Contemporary Psychoanalysis and Architecture
Sahar Aalayi,
Psychology graduate, University of Aberdeen, Scotland
Abstract
The concept of the lifeworld refers to the world in which human beings find themselves prior to theoretical or scientific reflection and within which everyday life unfolds. This world cannot be reduced to the physical environment. Yet human life is always spatially situated, taking place in relation to places, objects, bodies, distances, and boundaries. This article begins from this relation and asks: What role does architectural space play in the spatiality of the lifeworld, and what can contemporary psychoanalysis contribute to our understanding of this relation?
Adopting an interdisciplinary approach, the article brings the phenomenological concept of the lifeworld into dialogue with architectural accounts of lived space and contemporary psychoanalytic approaches to the relation between material and psychic space. To avoid conceptual conflation, it distinguishes among lifeworld, architectural space, and lived space. The lifeworld designates the encompassing horizon of everyday experience; architectural space refers to the material and spatial organization of the built environment; and lived space refers to space as it is experienced by the subject. Architectural space, therefore, is neither identical with the lifeworld nor sufficient in itself to determine how space is lived.
The psychoanalytic point of departure is Cosimo Schinaia’s work on psychoanalysis and architecture, particularly his insistence on thinking together inside and outside, psychic reality and material reality. This perspective is brought into conversation with contemporary work on the relation between structural and psychic space. On the one hand, the material organization of space affords and constrains possibilities for movement, distance, proximity, privacy, encounter, and communication. On the other, space is experienced and invested with meaning in relation to the subject’s body, memory, affect, fantasy, and psychic history. Architecture therefore cannot be reduced to a metaphor or projection of psychic life, just as spatial experience cannot be inferred directly from the physical properties of the built environment.
The article further examines the relation between inside and outside. Architectural elements such as walls, doors, windows, and thresholds do more than separate spaces; they also organize the forms of connection between them. Psychoanalysis allows the other side of this relation to be examined: how the distinction between inside and outside acquires meaning in subjective experience and participates in the subject’s relation to the environment.
The article argues that architectural space constitutes one of the material conditions of the spatiality of the lifeworld, while its emergence as lived space takes shape through the relation between the material properties of the environment and the subject’s psychic experience. This formulation makes it possible to examine material and psychic reality together without reducing architecture to the psyche or the psyche to its environment. From this perspective, the question “What makes a space a place in which one can live?” becomes a question concerning one of the fundamental dimensions of the lifeworld itself.
Keywords: Lifeworld; spatiality; lived space; architectural space; contemporary psychoanalysis; architecture; Cosimo Schinaia
The Orthogonal Manifold of Life: Autopoiesis, Intentional Distance, and the Complex State-Space of Living Agency
Amir Noferesti
Independent Researcher, Philosophy of Mind & Computational Cognitive Science- France
Abstract:
Conventional physicalist theories often depict living systems as passive automata traversing deterministic, real-valued state spaces. This perspective carries a fundamental limitation: it collapses intentional distance, the cognitive gap that allows an agent to detach from immediate sensory impacts and contemplate counterfactual possibilities (what could be) into sheer mechanical impaction. To establish Life as an autonomous reality without appealing to mystical vital forces élan vital or reducing consciousness to blind mechanical reactions, this paper proposes an orthogonal state-space model grounded in non-equilibrium thermodynamics and active inference.
We demonstrate that an embodied living agent bounded by an informational boundary (a Markov blanket) does not merely slide down an energy slope. Instead, its underlying dynamics split into two intrinsically perpendicular modes:
The Dissipative Stabilizing Mode: Continual metabolic work that contracts the system toward an autopoietic boundary, preventing structural decay. This demarcates the vegetative baseline of being alive homeostatic persistence.
The Orthogonal Solenoidal Mode: Once this homeostatic boundary is secured, the thermodynamic gradient falls to zero, leaving a sustained, non-dissipative carrier rotation. Moving perpendicular to energetic decay, this mode consumes no extra thermodynamic work and requires no violation of physical laws. It serves as an internal clockwork simulator, projecting prospective scenarios and sustaining the condition of living (deliberative agency and intentional distance.
This architecture provides a naturalized foundation for internal time-consciousness, unifying the retention of the past with the open horizon of anticipation. Life is thus revealed not as an immaterial ghost intervening in matter, nor as a lifeless machine, but as an elegant geometric manifold capable of counterfactual projection within physical reality.
Keywords: Philosophy of Life; Intentional Distance; Autopoiesis; Active Inference; Markov Blanket; Time-Consciousness; Being Alive vs. Living; Naturalized Agency; Teleonomy.
The intelligent matrix: Embodied life, somatic memory and decolonial resistance
Maddalena Celano
Ph.D. Student in Philosophy (Historical-Theoretical Curriculum),
Pontifical University Antonianum (PUA), Rome, Italy.
E-mail: maddalenacelano@gmail.com
This theoretical essay reconsiders the concept of "Life" and matter, liberating them from any mechanistic, passive, or reductionist frameworks. The primary objective is to overcome Cartesian dualism and the categories imposed by patriarchal and colonial modernity, which have historically reduced nature and bodies to mere instruments of extraction and domination. To achieve this epistemological rupture, the text establishes a rigorous dialogue among several foundational critical perspectives. On one hand, the analysis builds upon Daniela Pellegrini’s reflections regarding the "wisdom of matter" and the third way of partialities against phallogentric binarisms; on the other hand, it integrates the political anthropology of Rita Segato, who deconstructs the body as the primary territory of conquest and the target of a structural pedagogy of cruelty. Completing this critical framework are Mary Daly’s radical ecofeminism and spiritual ecology, centered on the opposition between biophilic energy and systemic necrophilia, alongside the indigenous decolonial cosmovision mediated through the thought of Francesca Gargallo Celentani, wherein human beings, corporeality, and the earth form a single living, relational matrix. The most innovative aspect of this journey lies in its continuous engagement with the most advanced contemporary scientific frontiers. Epigenetics, neuroscience, plant biology, and theoretical physics rigorously demonstrate that matter and somatic tissues are not inert, but rather endowed with a biological archive, transgenerational memory, and autonomous bodily intelligence. These scientific findings find deep resonance within depth psychology, particularly through the Jungian concepts of unus mundus and James Hillman's intuition of the Anima Mundi. Ultimately, by healing the split between spirit and matter, this work reconceptualizes the philosophy of life not as abstract ontological speculation, but as an embodied, collective, and irreducibly lived praxis of decolonial resistance and the ontological sovereignty of bodies and the earth.
Philosophical Lifism (Life-Centric Philosophy):
A Philosophical Possibility for the Post-Classical and Post-War Era in Contemporary Iranian Philosophy
Masoud Omid
Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Tabriz
Abstract
Contemporary Iranian philosophy, viewed as a collection of philosophical potentials defined through its encounter with modernity, encompasses numerous and diverse philosophical currents. This situation implies that contemporary Iran is creating space for new philosophical ideas—and even entirely new philosophies—while simultaneously tempering the classical, exclusive approach to philosophy and shifting its overall philosophical atmosphere. In this context, and in tune with this evolving atmosphere, the present article calls for an exploration of new horizons and the opening of an alternative philosophical path within the post-classical era of contemporary philosophy. The proposed horizon and philosophical framework is termed "Philosophy of Life" or "Philosophical Lifism" (also referred to as *Lifeism*, *Metaphysics of Life*, or *Metalife*). Contemporary Iranian philosophy comprises six philosophical currents—one being the academic current, under which the approach proposed here falls. Considering the history of contemporary philosophy alongside the issues, concerns, and philosophical potential of contemporary Iran, one can engage with the concept of "Philosophical Investigations on Life," "Philosophical Lifism" (Lifism), or the "Philosophy of Life." The distinction between the subject matter of the philosophy of life and the themes of classical philosophy lies in the fact that the former does not focus on concepts such as *materia prima* (primal matter), *physis*, *cosmos*, *ens* (being/entity), *esse* (existence), *potentia* (potentiality), or *possibilitas* (possibility); rather, its point of departure and central subject is life itself. Furthermore, it differs from the themes and focal points of modern philosophy in that it does not correspond precisely to concepts such as the subject, subjectivity, existence, or *Dasein*; rather, it addresses the subject of life.
Keywords: Contemporary Iranian philosophy, philosophical currents and tendencies, academic philosophical movement, philosophical "lifelogy" (philosophy of life).
The Meaning of Life
Mahmoud Navali
Professor of Philosophy, University of Tabriz
Abstract
We human beings are alive because our presence in the world is accompanied by a particular kind of movement and by a sense of situatedness. At the same time, we are endowed with the capacity to understand and infer, and we exist within a realm of possibilities. We are also influenced by time, development, and transformation; in other words, we are historical beings. The whole of the past—including culture, tradition, and our awareness of them—provides us with a sense of situatedness. We are likewise influenced by our goals, which are oriented toward the future. Therefore, all our movements and behaviors can be understood with reference to the future, that is, to our goals. The present, too, consists of our speech and action. Do this sense of situatedness, understanding and inference, and ultimately speech and action, possess meaning? Our answer is affirmative. But what, then, is meaning? For the time being, we may say that meaning is the result of signification and orientation. However, meaning is not something that appears prior to our sense of situatedness or in advance of understanding, inference, expression, and action. In other words, there is no pre-given logical meaning of life.
It is we who, under the influence of the past, the future, and time, confer meaning upon events. Even in the case of unwanted events, we create meaning through our own particular movement and sensibility. This is why events acquire different meanings for different individuals. Likewise, occurrences that take place without our will can have a particular meaning for each person. It is also important to note that if an event appears beneficial or harmful to my being—or, in other words, to my sense of “self”—the meaning I attribute to that event will accordingly be regarded as desirable or undesirable. Ultimately, within the conditions of existence, human beings possess, through their capacity for understanding and inference, an opening toward freedom and nothingness; consequently, they acquire the power to construct and create meaning. To live is nothing other than the desire for meaning; the desire for meaning is another name for living and for life.
Keywords: Meaning of Life; Philosophy; Human Being; Time.
The Flirtation of Death and Life
Khosrow Bagheri Noaparast
Professor at University of Tehran
Abstract
At the ultimate point of paradox lies the relationship between death and life. The mother of all fears is the fear of death, and living beings that fear death desire life. At first glance, an irreconcilable opposition seems to arise between death and life. Yet, from a deeper perspective, the relationship between death and life resembles an extended and winding flirtation, at the end of which it is life that draws its pleasure from death. The relationship between death and life appears as the relationship between a couple. One cannot think of death without life, just as one cannot think of life without death. What takes place between these two partners—their estrangement and affection—should be understood as an intricate and protracted flirtation. This dynamic unfolds in three stages. In the first stage, estrangement and coyness prevail. Death flees from life, and life turns its face away from death. Accordingly, in order to live, one must flee from death, and in order to die, one must bid farewell to life. At this stage, the law of separation prevails. This law is evident in biological life and operates even in the lives of plants and animals. If this estrangement from, and flight from, death did not exist, life would not survive. This law also governs our human lives. In the first stage, too, we fear death and seek life by fleeing from it. This is why we flee from a predatory animal and fear falling into a ravine. In the second stage, confrontation and encounter emerge. Here, death and life no longer flee from one another; rather, they face each other and look directly into each other’s eyes. In this way, death and life become acquainted with one another. Now, living does not come about by closing one’s eyes to death, but by gazing into the eyes of death. At this stage, those who are more familiar with death are more alive, while those who disregard death are deprived of genuine life. To remember death now gives us a more human form of life: it uproots the decayed tooth of greed and avarice and brings generosity and fellowship with others as its gifts. Forgetting death, by contrast, makes us acquisitive and selfish and deprives us of a truly human life. Here, life reveals itself not in its biological dimension, but in its ethical and human dimension. In the third stage, the duality is overcome: death perishes within life and itself becomes life. Now, living consists neither in fleeing from death nor in turning toward it. Rather, life is attained by appropriating death, and life seeks to make death its own. This is what pure life means: a form of life in which the opposition between death and life is transformed, in some manner, into unity. It is in the third stage that the authenticity of life within the whole of existence becomes manifest. It is no longer merely that the fear of death fades, nor merely that familiarity with death is attained; rather, the individual becomes prepared even to desire death in order to attain a deeper life. When one realizes that one is living a “dead life,” one will desire a “living death.” At this third stage, one should say: death does not lie in wait for life; rather, it lies in its bow.
From the Impossibility of “Pure Philosophy” to the Necessity of a “Philosophy of Life”
Majid Sadrmajles
Associate Professor of Philosophy,
Department of Philosophy, University of Tabriz
Abstract
This paper seeks to take the reader on an intellectual journey toward the conclusion that there is no philosopher who has not, either directly or indirectly, reflected upon and thought about human life. The starting point of this intellectual journey is a simple yet fundamental epistemological principle inherited from Parmenides: “What is not cannot be known or expressed.” In other words, knowing is always knowing something. This idea is addressed today under the notion of intentionality. Philosophy is a form of knowledge, and if this is so, then the expression “pure philosophy,” or “philosophy” without reference to something else, is meaningless. It is meaningless because it does not intend any object and, consequently, cannot be thought. Thus, “pure philosophy” is impossible.Accordingly, we are concerned with philosophy in the sense of “knowledge of ….” We encounter ontology, epistemology, and so forth. In this broad sense, philosophy may therefore be understood as knowledge of being and of the conditions and states of human beings, the world, and God.The second point is that, even if the foregoing claim is not incorrect, it is nevertheless incomplete. Intentionality requires not only a known object (object) but also a knowing subject (subject). Therefore, it may be said that philosophy is “life accompanied by knowledge of ….” I must confess that, concerning the realm of the world and God, I do not know what takes place! I do not know whether beings—whether God or other non-human entities—ask questions about themselves and their own conditions. But I do know that questioning oneself and reflecting upon one’s own condition is a distinctly human activity.Thus, the path into the realm of the world and God, and into questions concerning their existence and existential conditions, passes through only one “door”: the door of our own existence and existential condition. What else could understanding our own existence and existential condition, comprehending the future, and envisioning a condition different from the present be other than human life itself? As the Latin maxim puts it: “First live, then philosophize” (Primum vivere, deinde philosophari).Consequently, questions and answers concerning the world and God are inevitably possible only when human life is presupposed or examined, and when we possess some conception and understanding of both dimensions involved here: the human being and human life. The conclusion, therefore, is that philosophers who apparently have not addressed human life or such questions as the nature of the human being and human life, human freedom and the future, the purpose and meaning of life, evil and suffering—both one’s own and that of others—the existence of others, and the transcendent, should be questioned and called upon to speak; and, after listening to them, we should reconstruct their philosophy of life.Even if we pose philosophical questions to an ordinary person who has nothing to say about epistemology, ontology, or related philosophical subjects, that person nevertheless possesses some kind of philosophy of life. At the very least, they can formulate, in the form of questions and answers, general beliefs concerning themselves, their circumstances, and their future.
Keywords: human beings and human life; pure philosophy; philosophy of life; knowledge; human freedom and the future
Examining and Reconstructing the “Philosophy of Life” in Khwaja Nizam al-Mulk’s Siyasatnama
Majid Sadrmajles
Associate Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, University of Tabriz
Abstract
Abu Ali Hasan, better known as Khwaja Nizam al-Mulk Tusi, was a statesman and vizier to two Seljuk rulers, Alp Arslan and Malik Shah. Born in Tus in ۴۰۸ AH, he became a victim of political intrigue and was assassinated in ۴۸۵ AH. Among his notable innovations was the establishment of the famous Nizamiyya schools, with various curricula and courses, in several parts of the Islamic world, including the Nizamiyya schools of Baghdad and Rayy. He served as vizier for nearly thirty years and recorded his governmental and political experiences in a work entitled Siyasatnama (The Book of Government) or Siyar al-Muluk (The Conduct of Kings). The work consists of fifty chapters and, through various subjects and stories, examines the relations of power among the ruler, government officials, and the people. In other words, Khwaja Nizam al-Mulk seeks to explain and rectify human life through the framework of social relations among different classes of society. This paper seeks to extract and infer the theoretical foundations of Khwaja Nizam al-Mulk’s thought by examining the relationships among the ruler, government officials, and the people, as well as the means of correcting these relationships. These considerations directly reveal his views on individual and social life, the necessity of education and upbringing, the development of military and scientific-technical capabilities, envisioning a different future, improving people’s affairs, confronting injustice, and benefiting from religious faith. From this perspective, it can be seen that statesmen such as Khwaja Nizam al-Mulk, who occupy an intermediary social position between the ruler and the people, possess, in a precise sense, a kind of tangible and practicable “philosophy of life”—that is, a body of socio-political ideas concerned with human life and the practical solutions associated with it. Such figures could also serve as the principal organizers and regulators of the relationship between the ruler and the people.
Keywords: Khwaja Nizam al-Mulk; power relations between the ruler and the people; just life; education and upbringing; improving future conditions.
Philosophy of Life in Dilthey’s Thought
Manouchehr Sanei Dareh Bidi
Professor of Philosophy, Shahid Beheshti University
Abstract
From approximately the second half of the nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth century, three versions of the “philosophy of life” (Lebensphilosophie) emerged in Europe: in the philosophies of Nietzsche, Bergson, and Dilthey. These three versions differ from one another. For Bergson, the fundamental principle of existence is a “vital impetus” (élan vital). For Nietzsche, the essential nature of human life is emotional or affective, rather than rational. Reason—and the rational culture of the West from Plato to the modern period—occupies a secondary position in relation to emotions, feelings, passions, impulses, and desires. Dilthey’s account of the philosophy of life, however, is a different story. For him, the human being is an empirical-cultural being. Experiences become crystallized in the mind and constitute the structure of reason. This reflective structure gives rise in the mind to what may be called “lived experience” (Erlebnis). Human spiritual life—not merely biological life—is a totality of these lived experiences. These reflections are creations of the mind, and their highest forms are found in the lived experiences of cultivated individuals, artists, thinkers, and other cultural figures. Among lived experiences, artistic experiences, particularly the experiences and creations of poets, occupy a particularly elevated position and serve as an exemplary expression of human culture. For example, in order to understand the national character and the spiritual disposition of Iranians, the study of the works of Ferdowsi, Saadi, Hafez, and others is one of the best means available. From Dilthey’s perspective, the essential task of philosophy is to study the works of artists—especially poets—and, through these works, to understand their spiritual life and outlook. The foundation of philosophy is knowledge, and the foundation of knowledge is life; life, in turn, is most profoundly manifested in the lives and works of poets.
An Ontological Reading of Dewey's Proposition on the Identity of Education with Life
Hamid Ahmadi Hedayat
Assistant Professor, Department of Educational Sciences, Farhangian University
Abstract
John Dewey's statement that education is not preparation for life, but life itself, is considered a cornerstone of contemporary pedagogy. However, it can be said that dominant readings have largely reduced this radical proposition and formulated it under epistemological, psychological, and functionalist frameworks. Relying on naturalism, Dewey defined life essentially as the give-and-take of an organism with its socio-physical environment, but in contemporary education, this formulation has inadvertently paved the way for a kind of technocratic reductionism in which education is reduced to the instrumental acquisition of market-oriented competencies and functional efficiency. The present study aims to provide a precise philosophical reinterpretation of Dewey's proposition within the horizon of fundamental ontology, existential phenomenology, and hermeneutic philosophy of life. To achieve this goal, conceptual-hermeneutic methodology was used and three main findings were obtained. The first finding is that classical pragmatism, by mixing the ontological development of existence and biological equilibrium, faces a kind of inherent vulnerability that largely silences existential dimensions such as finitude, existential anxiety, and the tragic. The second finding is that Dewey's proposition of identity, after being freed from biological reductionism, actually redefines education not as a tool in the service of social efficiency, but as an ontological event of inhabiting the context of vulnerability and openness of the world. And the third finding is that Dewey's insistence on the principle of growth is critically refined from the concept of quantitative development and reconstructed as a hermeneutic-narrative movement for moral self-creation, giving meaning to life, and taking responsibility for the other. Finally, the conclusion is that this identity of education and upbringing with life for Dewey remains a fundamental and unique compass; provided that life is reclaimed as an existential and ontological truth. Authentic education and upbringing, far beyond a tool for socio-economic adaptation, is a fundamental shelter and space for settling in, in which humans actually learn how to live meaningfully and responsibly in a finite and shared world.
Keywords: John Dewey, education and upbringing, philosophy of life, naturalism, educational instrumentalism
Saadi and Everyday Life
Rouholah Eslami
Associate Professor of Political Science
Department of Political Science,
Faculty of Law and Political Science,
Ferdowsi University of Mashhad, Mashhad, Iran
Research Visitor
Faculty of Social Sciences,
TU Dortmund University, Dortmund, Germany
Abstract
Saadi’s political thought can be reconsidered from a perspective different from the conventional understanding of politics as government, the state, and the pursuit of political power. From this perspective, Saadi analyzes the rules of the political game not primarily through formal governmental structures, but through everyday life, social relations, and individuals’ encounters with various forms of power. In the Gulistan, Saadi warns against direct and costly involvement in governmental politics and portrays politics understood as governing and exercising state power as an inherently dangerous domain. In his metaphorical logic, politics is like fire, whose very nature is to burn, and like a scorpion, whose nature is to sting; consequently, keeping one’s distance from it may be more rational for preserving one’s life and securing the order of everyday existence than becoming directly entangled in it. Yet this distance from governmental politics does not imply a complete withdrawal from politics. Rather, it represents a shift in the locus of politics from “governing” to “how to live.” From this perspective, the Gulistan can be understood as a popular form of political counsel in which Saadi uses short narratives and dramatic situations to reveal the mechanisms of power, wealth, pleasure, and religious authority in everyday life. He demonstrates how these structures shape individual choices, social relations, status, and possibilities for action, and how, under particular conditions, they may generate domination, deception, dependency, violence, and suffering. In response, Saadi offers neither a political utopia nor a revolutionary program for transforming the existing order. Instead, he emphasizes prudence, moderation, situational awareness, caution, and the rational regulation of conduct. His stories may therefore be read as accounts of the lived experience of politics in everyday life, through which the practical rules and modes of dealing with power become visible. The distinctive feature of Saadi’s approach, in this reading, lies in the combination of political realism and practical ethics: a realism that understands politics, before it becomes a question of capturing governmental power, as the problem of intelligently managing life in a world structured by multiple forms of power.
Keywords: Saadi; Everyday Life; Power
Life’s Turn: From “Readiness for Life” to “Living in the Now”; Rethinking the University’s Educational Philosophy
Yousef Rezapour
Assistant Professor, Department of Educational Sciences, Faculty of Educational Sciences and Psychology, University of Tabriz, Tabriz, Iran.
Abstract
Education, especially in its institutional and modern form, is often understood with a future horizon. School and university are supposed to prepare people for life; for work, social responsibility, citizenship, profession, and facing the future. This perception is necessary in its essence; but when “readiness for life” becomes the dominant logic of education, a fundamental question emerges: If a person is living throughout his education, what is the place of his life in the present? Is it possible that education, which is supposed to prepare a person for life, unintentionally postpones his life itself to the future? The present article, with a philosophical-analytical approach, proposes the concept of “life’s turn” to rethink the relationship between life and education in universities. The main claim of the article is that “preparation for life” has a truly educational meaning when it is itself a form of living; therefore, the university should not be considered merely a place of preparing people for future life, but rather one of the main fields of realizing life in the present. To develop this claim, the article examines the various dimensions of experience, temporality, initiation, human relationship, power, and participation in dialogue with the views of Dewey, Heidegger, Arendt, Jaspers, Foucault, and Freire. The result of this dialogue is that living in the present does not mean presentism or disregard for the future, but rather the possibility of experiencing, giving meaning, being present in one’s own time, entering into relationships with others, choosing and initiating, and participating in the common world. Accordingly, the educational philosophy of the university requires a shift in focus from “preparation for life” to “providing the possibility of living in the process of education.”
Keywords: Life's turn, educational philosophy, university, living in the present, preparation for life, experience, temporality, initiation, life.
What does it mean to live well? A philosophical introduction to the concept of a good life
Hamidreza Khademi
Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy and Theology, Humanities Research and Development Institute
Abstract
"A good life" is a concept that is often measured in everyday language by having desirable conditions such as well-being, health, success, satisfaction, and security; however, having such conditions does not necessarily mean "living well." The main issue of this article is that if we distinguish living well from having a desirable life, what criteria can be presented to recognize and evaluate it? Is living well simply a matter of personal preferences and satisfaction, or can a criterion beyond individual desires be considered for it, without imposing a predetermined model for a desirable life? The present article examines this issue with an analytical-critical approach and shows that reducing the good life to pleasure, well-being, success or personal satisfaction, although it explains part of the problem, is not sufficient to explain the value of the human way of life. On the other hand, defining the good life based on completely external criteria is also incompatible with the role of choice, evaluation and personal responsibility in human life. Accordingly, the article defends the view that “living well” should be understood not simply as a desirable state, but as a quality in the way of life in which a reasonable and defensible relationship is established between the desires and choices of the individual, the values according to which he organizes his life, and the consequences of these choices. In the following, this view is examined in the light of some important philosophical views on happiness, virtue, goodness and the meaning of life, and the capacity of the concept of “happiness” in the philosophical tradition, especially in the thought of Al-Farabi and Mulla Sadra, to face the contemporary problem of living well is evaluated. The purpose of the article is not to provide a final and uniform definition of the good life, but rather to clarify the foundations and criteria on the basis of which one can think more philosophically about the good or badness of a way of life.
Keywords: good life; living well; happiness; goodness; satisfaction; choice; meaning of life.
Structural Evil and the Crisis of Meaning in Life
Qodratullah Qorbani
Professor, Department of Philosophy, Kharazmi University, Tehran, Iran
Abstract
Structural evil, in its various forms, threatens the overall meaning of human life. Structural evil is not an evil created by particular individuals; rather, it results from the dysfunctional operation of a combination of a society’s social, political, religious, cultural, economic, and class structures and manifests itself in forms such as injustice, violence, discrimination, inefficiency, unequal distribution, corruption, and oppression. An important point is that the agents responsible for reproducing structural evil are not individuals themselves; rather, the mechanisms of governing structures, laws, social relations, and the interests of ruling classes gradually give rise to such undesirable conditions. Structural evil, in the form of moral and natural evils, is among the most important factors that deprive human life of meaning. A society afflicted by structural evil gradually loses its inclination and enthusiasm toward the components that confer meaning on life. These include belief in God Almighty, the superior status of human beings as the noblest of creatures, transcendent moral values, a higher purpose of life, belief in ultimate felicity in the hereafter, rational principles, aesthetic values, and the like. The meaninglessness of these components, which results from the predominance of structural evil in human life, means that they no longer have an effective function in human existence, do not bestow transcendent value upon life, and leave human beings unable to define a higher purpose for their worldly existence. Therefore, structural evil is a manifestation of one of the greatest afflictions of human life, one that can deprive human existence of meaning both from within and from without and take away hope, which is the most important component for the continuation of life. The way to confront this threat is to recognize human responsibility within our own lifeworld: we ourselves are responsible for questioning the philosophy and purpose of life, and we must define transcendent values for our lives and significant functions for ourselves through which to construct meaning in life. In short, our recognition of human responsibility and our individual and collective efforts have the capacity to destroy, or at least reduce, the effects of structural evil. Therefore, expecting a supernatural agent to deliver us from this deplorable condition is not particularly effective. Rather, attention to individual and social responsibility, together with hope for a brighter future, constitutes an effective and productive factor in understanding the philosophy of life and giving meaning to it.
Keywords: Structural Evil, Meaning of Life, Structural Injustice, Transcendent Values, God, Purpose of Life.
Perceptual Genealogy of Vitality: A Dialectic of Memory Systems and Existential Constriction in the Light of Phenomenology and Computational Neuroscience
Alireza Farnam
Professor of Psychiatry Department, Tabriz University of Medical Sciences; Kharazmi Research Center, University of Tabriz, Tabriz, Iran
Abstract
The concept of "Vitality" has traditionally been formulated in philosophical discourse not merely as a transient affective state or a mood disorder reducible to neurochemistry, but as the measure of “Dasein’s” openness to the world and the intensity of the subject’s engagement with their own existential possibilities. This study adopts an interdisciplinary approach, bridging embodied phenomenology, experimental epistemology, and computational neuroscience, to advance a novel thesis: the biological-existential quality of psychic life is directly contingent upon the structural dominance of one of the three memory systems (episodic, semantic, or procedural) over the dynamics of consciousness. Within this framework, it is demonstrated that the greater the influence of episodic memory and autonoetic consciousness on mental architecture, the more the lived experience is characterized by vitality, contextual richness, and openness to the surprise of the event. Conversely, the erosion of the episodic domain and the total hegemony of semantic memory—through categorical abstraction and cognitive over-generalization—leads to semantic petrification; furthermore, the dominance of procedural memory reduces the subject to an executive organism, bound by behavioral automation. By re-reading this phenomenon through the lens of "Predictive Processing" theory, this paper argues that authentic vitality is equivalent to the nervous system's resilience in the face of "prediction error" and the hippocampus's capacity for "pattern separation." In contrast, mechanistic rigidity arises from the excessive precision of prior beliefs (hyper-precise priors) and the phenomenological exclusion of novelty from the subject's “Lebenswelt* (lifeworld).
Keywords: Vitality, Episodic Memory, Semantic Memory, Procedural Memory, Autonoetic Consciousness, Predictive Processing, Phenomenology, Existential Constriction.
Ontological Epigenesis: On the Transcendental Dimension of Human Life
A Reflection on Applying Existential Phenomenology to Theories of Psychological Development
Alireza Farnam
Professor of Psychiatry Department, Tabriz University of Medical Sciences; Kharazmi Research Center, University of Tabriz, Tabriz, Iran
Abstract
The reduction of the rich, multi-layered concept of "human life" to mere physiological mechanisms and neurobiological determinism, while successful in explaining organic functions, suffers from extreme reductionism when confronted with the dimensions of "meaning" and "lived experience." Adopting an interdisciplinary approach bridging existential phenomenology (with emphasis on Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty) and developmental psychology, this paper proposes the concept of "Ontological Epigenesis" as an alternative paradigm for understanding human "becoming." In this framework, human life is not a rigid entity or a mechanical output, but a "dialectical project" that emerges from material and temperamental substrates and ascends to a transcendental level through a graded structure of four fundamental stages: ۱) the transition from instinct to symbolic and cultural formations via "sublimation" (Freud); ۲) the shift from sensorimotor adaptation to "openness to possibility" (Piaget); ۳) the transcendence of the isolated ego toward "historical care" and existential integrity (Erikson); and ۴) the ascent from the somatic infrastructure of temperament to intuitive "self-transcendence" and unity with Being (Cloninger. The paper argues that human life is a continuous self-transcending project and redefines psychopathology not merely as a "neurochemical failure," but as an "arrest in the epigenetic dynamics of existence." This conceptual framework paves the way for understanding the human being as an architect open to the infinite horizon of meaning, transcending the boundaries of reductionism.
Keywords: Human Life, Transcendental Dimension, Existential Epigenesis, Phenomenology, Care (Sorge), Self-Transcendence, C. R. Cloninger. Sent from
The Phenomenology of Life’s Self-Revelation
Neda Mohejel
Assistant Professor, Department of Educational Sciences, Farhangian University, East Azerbaijan Province
Abstract
This article seeks to demonstrate that, in Michel Henry’s phenomenology, particularly in his book Material Phenomenology, life possesses a pre-reflective and self-revelatory dimension that cannot be adequately explained through Husserlian phenomenology, which is based on the appearance of an object to a subject. The central question in Michel Henry’s phenomenology is whether the appearance of things in the world and the intentional relation of the subject’s consciousness to an object can constitute the primary and most fundamental form of appearing, or whether, prior to every external manifestation, there exists a kind of internal and pre-intentional appearing. By distinguishing between the manifestation of the world and the self-revelation of life, Henry argues that life does not reveal itself through the observation of an external object, but rather through the immediate and internal experience of itself. For example, does pain stand before me like a tree? The answer is no. Pain reveals itself in the very experience of feeling it. I do not need to observe pain from the outside in order to feel it. Consequently, life experiences itself directly and inwardly. From this perspective, experiences such as pain, pleasure, suffering, joy, and the capacity to act are present fully within lived experience prior to becoming objects of the reflective and intentional consciousness of the subject. Henry calls this mode of appearing “immanence” and “auto-affection” or “self-revelation of life,” and makes it the foundation of his material phenomenology. Accordingly, affectivity and lived experience are not secondary elements of consciousness; rather, they are regarded as conditions of possibility for any relation to the world and its objects. This is also a point emphasized by Merleau-Ponty in Phenomenology of Perception. This perspective further leads to a redefinition of the concept of the body and of the relationship with the Other. For Henry, the body is not merely a physical object. I do not experience my body simply as an external thing. For example, when I move my hand, I do not first need to construct a mental image of my hand and then decide to move it. I directly experience the capacity to act. Here Henry approaches the concept of the lived body: a body that, prior to being an observable physical entity, experiences ability, suffering, pleasure, pressure, and movement from within. Before the body is an object in the world, it is a lived and affective body.
The relationship with the Other, likewise, is grounded in a shared participation in life and affective experience. Thus, by shifting the focus of phenomenology from “consciousness observing the world” to “life revealing itself,” Henry offers a distinctive interpretation of human experience in which life and affectivity are more fundamental than intentionality and external manifestation.
Keywords: Life; Self-Revelation; Lived Experience; Material Phenomenology; Body; Henry
An Inquiry into the Paradoxes of the Purposelessness of the Universe and Life
Hossein Kalbasi Ashtari
Professor of Philosophy, Allameh Tabataba'i University.
Abstract
The philosophical critique of the view denying teleology (purposiveness) in creation is primarily directed at the materialist and mechanistic worldview that reduces existence to a chain of blind, random, efficient causes. We pursue this critique across four levels: epistemological, ontological, causal, and axiological:
۱. The Epistemological Paradox: The most fundamental philosophical critique regarding the denial of purpose traces back to an epistemological principle. If the human mind and perception arise solely from random genetic mutations and chemical interactions aimed at survival, then attaining "truth" is not only impossible but merely represents "adaptation" to the environment. If our tools of cognition (perceptual faculties) serve no purpose other than biological survival, then the very claim that "there is no purpose in the universe" is itself an evolutionary construct for adaptation, rather than a true proposition about reality. Thus, this approach falls into a fundamental paradox: to prove the purposelessness and lack of teleology in the universe, it employs a tool whose own validity—if it is ultimately hollow and meaningless—would also be nullified.
۲. Confusing Levels of Causality (Efficient Cause vs. Final Cause): Certain trends in modern philosophy, relying on classical physics, have excluded the final cause (purpose) from the realm of scientific explanation, limiting themselves instead to the mechanical efficient cause (the "how" of an occurrence). However, a philosophical assessment of this view reveals that "how" things happen never replaces the "ultimate why." While the movement of a billiard ball can be explained by physical momentum, the geometric order of the table and the laws governing collisions themselves require a teleological explanation. In Aristotelian terms, the final cause does not conflict with the efficient cause but complements it; omitting the former renders the explanation incomplete, as the order inherent in the laws manifests a sense of directionality and an "orientation toward action."
۳. The Principle of Causality and the Problem of Accidental Order: According to the philosophical principle of "existential contingency" (*imkān-e faqrī*), a contingent being possesses—in its own essence—no inherent priority for existence over non-existence, nor any preference for one form of order over another. Absent a final cause (purpose), the emergence of the actual universe—with its precise mathematical discipline—would be tantamount to an impossibility (an infinitely improbable event). Denying purpose in an attempt to avoid teleology leads one to take refuge in "pure chance"; yet philosophically, chance—being a mere negation of cause—cannot account for the existence of order, as there is no inherent tendency for regularity to arise from chaos (entropy). The universe possesses an "intrinsic purpose" regarding its own order and persistence, driving it toward stability and continuity.
۴. Inconsistency in the Realm of Value and Meaning: Those who deny purpose often justify their stance by appealing to ideals such as "scientific evidence" and "freedom from presuppositions." Yet, in a worldview entirely devoid of purpose, the virtue of honesty and the vice of falsehood lack objective value, appearing instead as merely psychologically conditioned behaviors. The fundamental critique here is that, in order to critique *telos* (purpose/end), they employ concepts such as "truth" or "objectivity"—concepts that themselves hold no place within a nihilistic paradigm. In Husserlian terms, this represents the "crisis of European sciences," wherein the institution of rationality loses its meaning by being reduced to mere quantity.
۵. Inability to explain purposiveness within the evolutionary process itself (teleonomy): Even if we reject metaphysical *telos*, evolutionary biology is inevitably compelled to utilize concepts like "function" and "intrinsic purpose" (teleonomy). The heart evolved to pump blood, and the eye to facilitate vision. Denying any form of purpose renders these functions—which arise from natural selection—illusory; yet, in practice, biology can never achieve a coherent explanation without presupposing a "relative directedness" within biological structures.
Ultimately, the philosophical denial of purposiveness suffers from contradictions in epistemological foundations, fallacies regarding causal explanation, and incoherence within value systems."Telos" is not an external add-on but an intrinsic, objective reality of the ontological order; any coherent explanation of the universe's order inevitably presupposes it at some level (even if merely as a functional premise). A purposeless universe and existence constitute an incomplete explanation lacking sufficient rationality—a view shared by both Sadrian philosophy (which regards existence as graded and possessing an intrinsic purpose) and later analytic philosophy (which emphasizes the necessity of a "sufficient reason").
Keywords: Nihilism, entropy, mechanical causality, teleology, gradation of being.
Evaluating Persian Responses to Metz's Critique of Supernaturalist Meaning
Seyedeh Leila Mosavi,
Postdoctoral Student at the University of Pretoria.
Abstract
Debates concerning the meaning of life in contemporary philosophy, particularly in the works of Thaddeus Metz, have generated significant responses among Persian-speaking philosophers. A major part of these studies addresses Metz’s critiques of supernaturalist theories, especially God-centered and soul-centered accounts of meaning in life. This article critically examines these responses by reconstructing their main arguments and analyzing their philosophical and theological foundations. Most Persian critics, often influenced by Islamic philosophy, defend the possibility and desirability of a meaningful life within a supernaturalist framework and reject Metz’s objections to concepts such as divine purpose, the soul, and the afterlife. Using an analytical-critical method, the study explores the confrontation between Metz’s advocacy of naturalism and Persian supernaturalist responses to him. This article offers the first systematic reconstruction and critical analysis of Persian philosophical responses to Metz’s critiques of supernaturalism, and findings suggest that, although some Persian critiques successfully challenge certain presuppositions in Metz’s account, many fail to represent his arguments accurately or to provide a coherent alternative theory of meaning in life. The study further seeks to clarify how future dialogue between Islamic philosophy and contemporary analytic philosophy can proceed more fruitfully.
Keywords: Meaning in Life, Theism, Soul, Naturalism, Thaddeus Metz, Islamic Philosophy
Return to the Lifeworld (Lebenswelt): A Critique of Epistemological Abstractionism in Philosophy and Human Sciences
Fatemeh Ahmadi
Associate Professor, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Lorestan University, Khorramabad, Iran
Abstract
This article argues that a central source of the contemporary crisis of meaning in philosophy and the human sciences is epistemological abstractionism: the tendency to privilege formal models, objectifying concepts, and method-driven explanations at the expense of the pre-theoretical field of lived experience. Drawing on Husserl’s late phenomenology and his diagnosis of the Crisis of the European sciences, the study reconstructs the concept of the lifeworld (Lebenswelt) as the pregiven horizon within which all cognition, scientific idealization, and socio-historical sense-making first become possible. Methodologically, the paper combines (۱) a conceptual analysis of abstraction and idealization in modern epistemology, (۲) a phenomenological clarification of lifeworld structures through epoché and reflective description, and (۳) a critical assessment of objectivist tendencies in selected approaches within the human sciences. The argument proceeds in three steps: it traces how mathematisation and objectification detach scientific reason from its experiential ground; it shows that the human sciences inherit this detachment by treating meaning, agency, and normativity as derivative or reducible; and it proposes a lifeworld-oriented re-grounding of inquiry that preserves scientific rigor while restoring the primacy of meaning-constitution. The article concludes that returning to the lifeworld is not an anti-scientific gesture but a methodological correction: it re-situates abstraction within its originating context and enables the human sciences to address subjectivity, intersubjectivity, and historical life as irreducible sources of intelligibility.
Keywords: Lifeworld (Lebenswelt); Phenomenology; Husserl; Abstraction; Objectivism; Human Sciences; Meaning.
A Critical Reading of the Meaning of Life in the Artificial Intelligence Lifeworld
Against the Backdrop of the Intellectual Foundations of Allameh Tabataba'i and Sartre
Saeed Niazi
(Corresponding Author; PhD in Theology, University of Tabriz)
Ghorbanali Karimzadeh
(Full Professor, Department of Philosophy and Islamic Theology, University of Tabriz)
Abbas Abbaszadeh
(Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy and Islamic Theology, University of Tabriz)
Abstract
The rapid expansion of artificial intelligence and the transition from mere tool-use to the formation of an "algorithmic lifeworld" will gradually confront the realms of human existence, volitional agency, and the structure of the "meaning of life" with a fundamental challenge and a crisis of reification. In this computational order, the human subject risks being reduced to statistical data, deprived of the possibility of authentic choice, and subjugated to endless cycles of sensory gratification and instinctual desires. Employing a descriptive-analytical method and a comparative-philosophical approach, this study critically examines the implications of this lifeworld for the meaning of life from the perspectives of Jean-Paul Sartre’s atheistic existentialism and Seyyed Mohammad Hossein Tabataba'i’s Transcendent Theosophy (“Hikmat-e Muta'aliyah”). The findings indicate that, while both philosophers align in their critical assessment of the potential risks of human dehumanization within intelligent systems, their respective accounts of the true nature of the "meaning of life" rest upon two entirely distinct foundations. From Sartre’s perspective, the world-in-itself lacks inherent teleology, an “a priori” essence, or objective meaning; furthermore, given the "primacy of existence over essence," the human being is condemned to freedom and cast into the abyss of anguish. Consequently, within Sartrean existentialism, the meaning of life is defined as something "invented" and "subjective," contingent upon the individual's courageous action and choice within a void. In this light, the lifeworld of artificial intelligence poses the greatest threat to the meaning of life; for through the deception of "algorithmic bad faith," it enables humans to delegate their will to the machine—thereby escaping the crushing anxiety of responsibility—and to freeze their identity into a rigid object, resulting in nothing but a descent into inauthentic existence and the proliferation of meaninglessness. In contrast, Allameh Tabataba'i does not view the meaning of life as a mere "construct" or the product of individual conventions; rather, he defines it as an "objective" and "ontological" reality rooted in the essential nature of the human being. Within Allameh’s Sadrian philosophy, the human possesses an "immaterial soul-substance" and the constant nature of the "divine “fitra”" (innate disposition), while their very existence is one of "sheer relational dependence" (“ayn al-rabt”) and absolute poverty vis-à-vis the Necessary Being; thus, the meaning of life is determined through a connection to the Sacred Origin, the teleology of creation, and the soul’s perfection-seeking journey along the "arc of ascent" via knowledge and righteous action. By formulating the theory of "constructs" (“i‘tibāriyyāt”), Allameh demonstrates that a crisis of meaning arises when humans mistake these instrumental constructs for ontological truths, become ensnared by the veil of material multiplicity, and fall into heedlessness regarding the Source of existence. In a comparative and critical assessment, while Sartre—relying on free will—advocates for rebellion against computational determinism, his denial of innate human nature (“fiṭrah”) and failure to posit an objective “telos” cause him to slide into nihilism in the face of the ever-expanding dominance of artificial intelligence; for if meaning is merely subjective, the algorithmic engineering of preferences can fabricate even the perception of freedom. Conversely, by establishing the soul’s connection to Absolute Perfection, Allameh’s philosophical framework offers a robust teleology that empowers humans to remain immune to algorithmic reification. Liberation from the captivity of intelligent systems and the recovery of life’s authentic meaning are achieved not by validating an atomized individualism, but rather through the sovereignty of reason over tools, the reclassification of artificial intelligence as a mere instrumental construct, the revitalization of innate human inclinations, and a return to the transcendent and sacred horizon of existence.
Keywords: Meaning of life, AI lifeworld, Allameh Tabataba'i, Jean-Paul Sartre, constructs (“i‘tibāriyyāt”), existentialism.
Love-Based Interaction in Relations Between Individuals and Nations
Mansour Imanpour
Professor of Philosophy and Islamic Theology, Shahid Madani University of Azerbaijan
Abstract
Humans are social beings by nature or necessity, and this social living has manifested itself in forms and structures such as family, village, city, and society, and at a higher level in the global community. The basis of this collective and global living is different according to the identity of individuals and nations, and this difference in basis has led to different and sometimes destructive effects. Some define relations between individuals and nations based on obtaining material and economic benefits, while others based on racial or linguistic motivation, ideology, or religion, and implement these principles and positions with the means of power. As a result of these principles and motivations, all kinds of wars and bloodshed have occurred throughout history, presenting a terrible picture of human personality and behavior in the mirror of history. In addition to this basis of interaction and diplomacy such as scientific, cultural, and political diplomacy, we can talk about another basis and diplomacy that is rooted in our mysticism, literature, philosophy, and ethics, and that is the same basis and diplomacy based on love and affection. On this basis, from the perspective of transcendent morality and divine mysticism, all humans have the right to life just like ourselves, and our moral duty on a transcendent level is to love and cherish them. According to this view, we deal with humans and nations not as means of gaining benefits, but as goals and objects of love, and we interact based on universal morality and the golden rules of morality. On a higher level, in addition to considering granting them their rights as our moral duty, we do them a favor and love them as our own children. This view and basis of interaction can also be presented from the perspective of a religious reading, and that is the same mystical view of objects, phenomena, and humans. Based on this approach, all creatures are manifestations of God and are worthy of love. This article seeks to substantiate and justify this approach by citing ethical, mystical, literary and religious texts with a descriptive-analytical method and present it to those who are reflective and moral.
Keywords: Love, Relations between Nations, Interaction, Diplomacy, Global Ethics
Hermeneutic Tradition, Humanities, and Philosophies of Life (An Analysis of Dilthey's Legacy)
Malek Shojaei Jeshouqani
Professor of Philosophy, Institute of Humanities and Cultural Studies
Abstract:
Wilhelm Dilthey (۱۸۳۳-۱۹۱۱), a ۱۹th-century German philosopher, is considered, along with Schleiermacher and Gadamer, as one of the pioneers of the serious project of the hermeneutic tradition in the discourse of continental philosophy. Dilthey understands the interpretation of life in philosophies of life as "as lived by human beings" and consequently considers the humanities to be the conceptualization of the lived experience of a people and culture, and with the help of his methodological hermeneutics, he establishes a close link between lived experiences and the humanities in the European tradition. The innovation of Dilthey's hermeneutic theory is the linking of the hermeneutic tradition with the central issues of "philosophy of life"; A controversial concept that has two distinct semantic applications: the first refers to a philosophy with a practical orientation and focused on the style and meaning of life that rejects the value of mere speculation, and the second implies the primacy, irreducibility, and irrationality of life and the subordination of reason to the will, which includes thinkers such as Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. Dilthey adopts a distinct position by accepting the first meaning and rejecting the second; however, the confusion and neglect of interpreters of this conceptual distinction has caused thinkers such as Rickert and Lukács, ignoring the theoretical boundaries of Dilthey's vitalism, to consider him a member of the intellectual family of voluntarist movements and classify him among the pioneers or expanders of the anti-rationalist tradition. This article shows that the label of anti-rationalism applied to Dilthey's approach is the result of a failure to distinguish between these two semantic horizons of the philosophy of life.
Keywords: Wilhelm Dilthey, philosophy of life, hermeneutics, anti-rationalism, Heinrich Rickert, Georg Lukács.
The Wisdom of Life and the Public Sphere in Suhrawardi’s Political Philosophy
Tayyebeh Mohammadi-Kia
Faculty Member, Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies (IHCS), Tehran, Iran.
Abstract
Shahab al-Din Yahya Suhrawardi (۵۴۹–۵۸۷ AH), the founder of the Philosophy of Illumination (“Ishraq”), presents a vision of politics—alongside his ontological and epistemological systems—that is rooted in a synthesis of ancient Persian “Khosravani” wisdom, Platonic-Neoplatonic philosophy, and Islamic thought. Suhrawardi conceptualizes politics in close connection with light, inner illumination, and existential hierarchies. The Master of Illumination (“Shaykh al-Ishraq”) seeks to bridge the gap between personal existence and public life by radiating the light of being. He initiates this endeavor through a personal spiritual journey focused on the marvels of the "Spring of Life" and culminates in a political philosophy grounded in light and “Farrah” (divine glory/charisma). In his treatise “The Red Intellect” (“‘Aql-e Sorkh”), speaking through the figure of the "Red Elder," the Master enumerates seven marvels, designating the Spring of Life as the seventh and final one. These seven marvels are: Mount Qaf, the Night-Illuminating Gem, the Tuba Tree, the Twelve Workshops, David’s Armor, the Blade of Belarak, and, finally, the Spring. This sequence is not arbitrary: Qaf represents the homeland; the Gem, the Tuba Tree, and the Workshops symbolize the cosmic order; the Armor represents the body; and the Blade signifies death. The Spring serves as a response to both the armor and the blade: it is the water that softens the armor, making the blade’s strike easier, while bathing in it grants immunity from death and bestows eternal life. In this treatise, eternal life is not a remedy that eliminates death; rather, it is a light that attenuates the body's hold on the soul. The Fountain of Life is the very point where existence transcends mere physical survival to attain the "Water of Life" (“ma’ al-hayat”); when this is realized within the theosophical sage (“hakim-e muta’allih”), it manifests as the capacity for “Kiyan-Khwarrah” (Royal Glory) and luminous leadership of the age. From this perspective, the seventh wonder represents the culmination of all other marvels: without the Fountain, Mount Qaf becomes a forgotten homeland, armor turns into a prison, and the sword signifies nothing but annihilation; yet with the Fountain, they all transform into paths of true life. In Suhrawardi’s system, the cosmos is a hierarchy of Dominating and Governing Lights. Human political life is viewed as a microcosm of this luminous cosmic order. Thus, the public sphere is not merely an arena for the interplay of interests, but a realm where the hierarchies of being and knowledge manifest. One who has attained perfection through Illumination (“Ishraq”) is the most worthy to lead society, for he possesses both rational demonstration and spiritual unveiling. In Suhrawardi’s luminous framework, ontological ranks are determined by the intensity or dimness of light; by the same token, social ranks should reflect individuals' capacity to receive and radiate the light of knowledge. In his political thought, Suhrawardi consciously draws upon ancient Iranian concepts—such as “Farrah-ye Izadi” (Divine Glory or “Khwarrah”)—to address the political legitimacy of the philosopher-king. In his philosophy, “Farrah” is a divine light bestowed upon the worthy, designating them for rulership. This reinterpretation seeks to bridge the pre-Islamic Iranian wisdom tradition with the framework of Peripatetic-Illuminationist philosophy, while simultaneously serving as a means to ground political power in epistemological—rather than merely hereditary—legitimacy. The point is that, although the "Spring" appears to be a matter of individual spiritual journeying, Suhrawardi’s system of thought reveals a remarkable connection between the personal realm and the public sphere; Kay Khosrow embodies this link. Under Kay Khosrow’s rule, the "Water of Life" is transmuted, within the body politic, into “Kiyan-Khwarrah” (Royal Glory). Kay Khosrow plays a pivotal role in Suhrawardi’s philosophy—a role best understood through the relationship between light and life. The “Isfahbad” Light (the commanding light of the soul) resides in every human being; “Kiyan-Khwarrah” is that very light when it settles as “Sakina” (divine tranquility) within a purified soul, extending thence to the body and, subsequently, to society. Thus, Kay Khosrow serves as the connecting link between the light of personal existence and that of public life. He represents the ideal of the divinely realized ruler: his soul has ascended, his body has acquired majestic awe, his words are heard in the realm of the Unseen, and his era is one of luminous time. He also represents Illuminationist philosophy’s response to two deficiencies: against the king devoid of wisdom, he demonstrates that a crown lacking the sanctification of the "Light of Lights" fails to confer “Kiyan-Khwarrah”; against the sage lacking a crown, he shows that divine realization (“ta’alluh”) can manifest as overt leadership rather than remaining merely a hidden spiritual pole. Consequently, public life attains fulfillment only when the Kay Khosrow model remains a possibility—a form of governance that yields justice, triumph, and security for the people.
Keywords: Spring of Life, Suhrawardi, Light, Kay Khosrow, Kiyan-Khwarrah.
The Iranian System of “Fiqh” (Jurisprudence) and Its Relation to the Philosophy of Life
Abdolmajid Moballeghi
Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies (IHCS)
The issue of the philosophy of life can be approached by asking how any given system of consciousness articulates the relationship between a general principle and an objective situation within the realm of life. In this regard, the differences among certain dominant forms within the Greek, Indian, and Iranian traditions can be traced through the epistemological logic of their respective approaches to this matter. In the Greek tradition, the issue primarily takes philosophical form within the horizon of seeking unity, oneness, and an all-encompassing principle; here, “Logos” enables the understanding of multiplicity in light of a universal order and a unifying principle. In the Indian tradition, a different epistemological capacity comes to the fore—one that emerges amidst a multiplicity of rituals, practices, lived situations, and diverse forms of religiosity, all in close connection with the world as experienced. In the Iranian formulation, the epistemological issue is highlighted by the quality of the relationship established between these two realms: unity manifests within multiplicity, while multiplicity becomes intelligible and organized in relation to unity.
A crucial point must be addressed in this exposition: within the Iranian system of consciousness, this epistemological capacity has found its historical expression most notably in “Fiqh” (Islamic jurisprudence). Here, “Fiqh” is not merely a normative discipline or a collection of rulings; rather, it represents an epistemological potential capable of mediating between the Transcendent and the lived world. On one hand, “Fiqh” connects to the celestial realm and the obligatory nature of existence; on the other, it finds its subject matter in the details of life, human relations, shifting situations, and diverse modes of living. Thus, “Fiqh” can be understood as a form of knowledge and practice that establishes the relationship between principle and situation, ruling and reality, and the Transcendent and the immanent within the sphere of life. It is important to note that jurisprudence in Iran—in this fundamental sense—is not limited or confined to Shi'a jurisprudence; rather, this perspective necessitates the concept of a "system of Iranian jurisprudences." Indeed, Zoroastrian, Sunni, and Shi'a jurisprudences—despite profound differences in their foundations, methodologies, and epistemological institutions—represent three distinct historical manifestations of a capacity that can be studied within the context of Iranian civilization to discern the various levels of the Iranian approach to the philosophy of life. Naturally, it would be a mistake to assume that this continuity implies an identity of jurisprudential content or the simple extension of a single, uniform tradition. What matters here is the enduring possibility of structuring life through a form of knowledge that establishes a relationship between the transcendent horizon of obligation and the pluralistic reality of human existence. Consequently, the historical evolution of these jurisprudential traditions is inextricably linked to the evolution of lifestyles, transformations in social relations, and changes in the ways humans engage with the world.
With this in mind, one can more precisely articulate the position of jurisprudence regarding the Iranian way of life and the Iranian tradition: jurisprudence serves as a bridge between earth and heaven—a bridge facilitating epistemological and practical traffic between these two realms. Within jurisprudence, the transcendent enters the lived world in the form of rulings, obligations, and criteria, while the pluralistic world of life—through its concrete issues and situations—is brought within the ambit of this normative horizon. What occurs in jurisprudence is not merely the transmission of a rule from a higher to a lower realm; rather, it is the establishment of an ongoing relationship between principle and situation. In this process, a pluralistic life can find order within a unifying horizon, while the unifying principle itself gains the capacity for historical realization through its engagement with a multiplicity of situations.
On this basis, the philosophy of life within the Iranian framework can be characterized as a philosophy grounded in "mediation" (acting as an intermediary). Life within this horizon derives its meaning from the quality of the relationship established between the diverse realms of existence and human experience. Iranian historical jurisprudence—serving as the mode of emergence and the vehicle for realizing this potential—provides a mechanism for regulating this relationship in the realm of practice. The outcome of this epistemological logic is a form of dynamic equilibrium wherein stability and change, the individual and the collective, meaning and matter, and ideals and reality become intelligible in relation to one another. Indeed, "equilibrium" here is not a static point or a final state; rather, it is a quality of relationality that must be continuously reproduced within the fabric of life. In this light, the philosophy of Iranian life embodies a possibility centered on the fundamental question of how to exist amidst unity and multiplicity, and how to transform this relationship into a practical mode of living through the diverse forms of jurisprudence found in the history of this land.
Dialogue as a Solution to Life's Problems: The Socratic Method as an Example
Hawkar Hamad Khdir
Lecturer at university of Raparin-Iraq
Abstract
Throughout different stages of life, human beings face problems and challenges; however, as a dialectical process, these problems are an essential and part of life. Therefore, they have continuously pursued to overcome and resolve these issues through different methods and tools. An assessment of the history of philosophy reveals that philosophers have tried to present their perspectives on life's problems using various approaches. Socrates dialectically embodied this approach by resorting to dialogue and definition, demonstrating that certain life problems arise from misunderstandings. Therefore, through his method he strived to offer appropriate solutions. Dialogue is considered as humanity's most powerful tool to understand themselves and their surroundings as a significant portion of life's problems are due to ambiguity, miscommunication, and flawed thinking. The primary objective of dialogue is to reduce conflicts, achieve mutual understanding, and bridge differences regarding issues.
The Socratic method is built upon constant questioning and analyzing problems. Rather than providing pre-packaged answers, it encourages individuals to re-examine their views and identify their weaknesses through persistent inquiry, ultimately guiding them to discover the source of truth and appropriate solutions on their own. Within dialogue, opportunities for expressing diverse viewpoints, encouraging free thought, fostering the will to make decisions, and promoting peaceful coexistence expand. Furthermore, human relationships are reconstructed on the foundation of mutual understanding, the common good, and empathy. In the modern era, philosophy fulfills this role through philosophical counseling and philosophical therapy, utilizing various techniques, approaches, and methods within the advisory and therapeutic process.
Keywords: Philosophical Therapy, Dialogue, Socrates, Life, Problems.
Life as an Event in Relation to Becoming and Time: A Reading through the Philosophy of Henri Bergson
Mahmoud Soufiani
Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Tabriz
Abstract
Given that life is neither a completed nor a determinate phenomenon, it can be understood, in relation to the whole of being and existence, as an event or a fact. Since being and non-being, or absence, are intertwined, and human life acquires meaning within this contradictory and difficult interrelation, life can be regarded as a profoundly weighty and unique event. In any account of the meaninglessness and futility of life, life must be approached philosophically through an analysis of such an event. In other words, the event of life refers to itself, and living is itself a contradictory and difficult condition. This event is constantly in a process of becoming and transformation and, in this respect, is closely related to the profound concepts of time and movement. When we speak of the profound concept of time and movement, our attention is directed primarily toward Bergson’s philosophy, according to which the world is fundamentally characterized by movement; that is, the world is movement in itself rather than an object that happens to move. From this perspective, such a world, and consequently human life, cannot be reduced to objectivity, nor can it be confined to human subjectivity alone.
Bergson’s famous thesis that there is only movement and no independently existing moving object confronts us with a strange and difficult-to-understand condition, and it is precisely this strangeness that gives human life its unique meaning. Human beings are situated within this condition and, in some way, represent it. The relationship between the concepts of time and movement must be understood in light of this fundamental relation. In contrast to Leibniz’s view that monads are “windowless,” Bergson maintains that the moments of time interpenetrate one another. Accordingly, time is not merely quantitative and measurable time, conceived as the counting of an object’s movement through space. Representing such a condition through ordinary logical and mathematical language is impossible; hence, imagination and fantasy acquire particular significance. Their effects can be observed in artistic creation, or poiesis, and more specifically in creative poetry. It is through imagination and fantasy that the interweaving of past, present, and future can be apprehended, allowing one, in a sense, to dwell within it—a dwelling that is fundamentally a form of homelessness. Human life is precisely this fundamental existential homelessness and its discovery, which becomes manifest for the individual in action or praxis.
Keywords: Life; Becoming; Time; Event; Interrelatedness; Movement; Imagination; Fantasy; Poiesis; Action.
"Attentive Love": The Connecting Link Between Life and Upbringing in Sara Ruddick’s Thought
Neda Mohajel
Assistant Professor, Department of Educational Sciences, Farhangian University, East Azerbaijan Province
Abstract
This article aims to demonstrate that Sara Ruddick, a contemporary feminist philosopher, does not view upbringing merely as a set of methods for transmitting knowledge or shaping a child's behavior; rather, she regards it as a form of ethical and philosophical action rooted in the fundamental reality of human vulnerability and interdependence. In Ruddick’s educational and philosophical thought, caring for a child serves as the intersection of life, ethics, and upbringing; because the child is a dependent being at the start of life, the tasks of preservation, growth, and preparation for entry into the social world place a moral responsibility upon the caregiver. From this perspective, ideal upbringing is realized not through controlling the child, but by creating conditions that—while ensuring safety and support—facilitate the child's gradual growth and independence. Central to this discussion is the concept of "attentive love," which can be seen as the connecting link between the philosophy of life and upbringing in Ruddick’s thought. In this framework, "love" aligns with the realm of life, while "attentive" aligns with the realm of upbringing, together imbuing love within life and education with new meaning. Ruddick maintains that this concept signifies more than just a feeling of affection toward the child; it represents a conscious, responsible relationship grounded in careful attention to the actual child. Parents or educators must understand the child not through the lens of an idealized image or societal and personal expectations, but rather in light of the child's specific needs, abilities, limitations, and unique characteristics. Such love requires the parent to strike a balance between care and freedom, support and independence, and the transmission of social values alongside the preservation of the possibility to critique them. Within this framework, the three primary goals of the educational act are preserving life, fostering growth, and preparing the child for participation in social life. Conscious love plays a fundamental role at all three levels: initially as care and responsibility; subsequently by creating the conditions for growth and autonomy; and finally, by accompanying the child as they enter the social world consciously and responsibly. Thus, in Ruddick’s thought, autonomy does not signify the negation of dependency but rather the outcome of a healthy, caring relationship. Moreover, by emphasizing care, attentiveness, responsibility, respect for autonomy, and the avoidance of domination, this perspective facilitates a connection between education and peace. Ultimately, Ruddick’s thought demonstrates that education is not merely a process of shaping the child; it is a reciprocal process that invites parents and educators alike to reflect upon life, responsibility, freedom, power, vulnerability, and the relationship with the "other." From this vantage point, conscious love can serve as a foundation for understanding education as a human, ethical, and peace-oriented act.
Keywords: Sara Ruddick, philosophy of education, conscious love, maternal thinking, care, vulnerability, autonomy, moral education.
The Lifeworld Under Algorithmic Siege: The Crisis of Political Intersubjectivity in the Age of Artificial Intelligence
Reza Gholami
Assist. Prof., Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies, and Head of the Iranian Wisdom House, Vienna, Austria
Abstract
In the near future, human individual and collective life will become increasingly intertwined with artificial intelligence systems. In this context, philosophical reflection has a vital role to play in shielding human beings from the harms associated with false consciousness, superficial thinking, and technological reductionism. The emergence of generative and recommendation systems based on artificial intelligence has created new forms of human–machine interaction in the public sphere, whose implications for political philosophy have not yet been sufficiently examined. Drawing on the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, particularly the concepts of the “lifeworld” (Lebenswelt) and “intersubjectivity,” this article seeks to provide an analytical framework for addressing the following question: Can political dialogue mediated by artificial intelligence preserve the possibility of mutual understanding and genuine democratic participation? Drawing on Husserl’s analysis of the concept of “pairing” (Paarung) in the Cartesian Meditations—which understands knowledge of the Other as grounded in embodied and lived presence—the article argues that certain uses of artificial intelligence in the public sphere, including the automated production of political content and the algorithmic personalization of information, can alter the intersubjective structure of political dialogue without users being aware of it, thereby creating the conditions for a form of collective false consciousness. At the same time, this study avoids any general opposition to technology or scientific rationality. It emphasizes that Husserl’s critique of the “crisis of the European sciences” was directed at the exclusive dominance of an instrumental perspective, rather than at the value of science and technology themselves. Accordingly, artificial intelligence is presented not as an inherent threat, but as a test that calls for conscious rethinking of technological design and governance. The methodology of this study is analytical and interpretive, based on a careful rereading of Husserl’s key texts alongside contemporary literature in the philosophy of technology and political philosophy. The initial findings of the study suggest that a phenomenological reconsideration of intersubjectivity can provide new normative criteria for the responsible assessment of the role of artificial intelligence in democratic institutions, without requiring a retreat from modernity or from its scientific and technological achievements.
Keywords: Phenomenology, Lifeworld, Intersubjectivity, Artificial Intelligence, Political Philosophy, Husserl
The Rhythm of Life, the Rhythm of Music
Majid Akhshabi
Assistant Professor, Payame Noor University, Tehran
Abstract
Music unfolds in time—yet not merely in quantitative, metronomic time. The listener does not experience a musical work as a collection of discrete events; rather, they perceive and feel sounds within a continuous, dynamic, evolving, and directional flow. In this light, the element of rhythm cannot be reduced to a simple arrangement of beats and durations. This article views rhythm not as a metric or quantitative pattern, but as an existential structure that—through the lived body, melody, and time—shapes the "directionality of life." It is grounded in the central idea that the rhythm of music and the rhythm of life intertwine within a shared phenomenological field: pulse, breathing, steps, and daily habits merge with the durations, repetitions (both similar and varied), cycles, and rhythmic nodes of music to create an experience of qualitative time. The study’s theoretical framework synthesizes Husserl’s phenomenology of time (the tripartite structure of retention, primal impression, and protention), Bergson’s philosophy of duration, and Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the lived body. It aims to demonstrate that rhythmic perception—prior to any metric organization—generates an intuitive, embodied flow of meaning. Extending this perspective, the article draws upon the "Orpheus hypothesis" and the concept of the "Orphic body"—a body that does not anticipate time but resonates within it, constructing the rhythmic structure of experience through coupling with the temporal attractions of the environment. Consequently, rhythm is redefined as the foundation of the intertwining of the body, melody, and existential directedness. This redefinition not only deepens the understanding of musical experience but also opens up a horizon for a "philosophy of life": a rhythmic life understood as the capacity to live within continuous duration, to endure rupture and suspension, and to reconfigure oneself in relation to the shifting rhythms of the body, music, and the world.
Keywords: Rhythm; lived time; phenomenology of music; lived body; duration; metric modulation; existential directedness; philosophy of life.
The Price of Forgetting: Memory, Identity, and Ethical Life in Lois Lowry’s The Giver
Dr. Hoda Niknezhadferdos
Faculty Member at Marmara University, Department of English Language Teaching, Istanbul, Turkiye
hoda.niknezhadferdos@marmara.edu.tr
Abstract
This article examines the interplay among memory, forgetting, and the formation of identity in Lois Lowry’s The Giver through Paul Ricoeur’s philosophical account of memory, narrative identity, and selfhood. Focusing on the novel’s representation of a society that deliberately suppresses collective memory, the study explores how the regulation of remembrance and forgetting shapes individuals’ understanding of themselves, their relationships with others, and their capacity for ethical responsibility. Drawing on Ricoeur’s distinction between remembering and forgetting and his conception of identity as narratively constituted, the article argues that the removal of memory does not merely deprive individuals of knowledge of the past but also disrupts the narrative processes through which personal and collective identities are formed. Jonas’s gradual recovery of memories consequently becomes a process of self-discovery and ethical awakening, enabling him to recognize experiences and responsibilities that the community has systematically excluded from its social order. The analysis further demonstrates that memory functions not simply as a repository of the past but as a constitutive dimension of selfhood and ethical life. By bringing Ricoeur’s phenomenological-hermeneutic framework into dialogue with Lowry’s dystopian narrative, the study highlights the ethical implications of institutionalized forgetting and demonstrates how the preservation and transmission of memory remain essential to the formation of a responsible self.
Keywords: Memory/Forgetting → Narrative Identity → Selfhood → Ethical Life.
From the Higher Life to Ordinary Life: The Transformation of the Meaning of the Moral Good and the Emergence of Modern Secularism
Rasoul Rasoulipour
Faculty Member, Kharazmi University
Abstract
This article examines the historical and philosophical transformation of the meaning of the “moral good” from the model of the “higher life” to that of “ordinary life,” and explores the relationship between this transformation and the emergence of modern secularism. The central question of the study is how, in the process of the transformation of Western ethics, activities and domains such as work, marriage, family, production, livelihood, well-being, and everyday relationships—which in significant parts of the classical tradition had largely occupied a lower position than the highest forms of human life—gradually came to be regarded as primary arenas for the realization of human good, meaning, and flourishing. Drawing on the distinction between the “higher life” and “ordinary life,” and particularly on Charles Taylor’s analysis of the “affirmation of ordinary life” in A Secular Age, the article argues that this transformation did not initially arise in opposition to religion. Rather, it developed to a considerable extent within the religious transformations of the West, especially Protestantism and Puritanism. The Protestant doctrine of calling, the valorization of work and worldly responsibilities, the rejection of the moral and spiritual privilege traditionally accorded to monastic life, and the Puritan emphasis on self-discipline, regular labor, family, self-restraint, and the moral ordering of everyday life all played significant roles in shifting the meaning of the moral life from exceptional and ascetic models toward ordinary life. In this process, worldly life came to be understood not merely as an arena for satisfying material needs, but as a sphere in which moral and religious responsibility could be fulfilled.The article then demonstrates that this religious affirmation of ordinary life generated consequences that extended beyond its original intentions. Once work, family, well-being, the preservation of life, the reduction of suffering, and social relations had become established as genuine human goods, these goods gradually acquired the possibility of becoming independent of their original theological framework and of being redefined within an immanent horizon. From this perspective, modern secularism cannot be understood merely as the result of the decline of faith or the rejection of religion. Rather, part of the conditions for its emergence should be sought in the internal transformation of the concept of the moral good and in the shift of the center of gravity of the good life from the higher life to ordinary life. Accordingly, the article argues that Protestantism and Puritanism, although deeply religious movements in themselves, contributed through their moral valuation of everyday life, work, and family to the formation of an ethical horizon that could later persist independently of its theological foundations. The relationship between religion and secularism in this process, therefore, is not merely oppositional; it is, to some extent, genealogical and paradoxical. Some of the values that were later articulated in the form of secular ethics initially acquired their meaning within a religious horizon, particularly in the context of the Protestant Reformation.
Keywords: higher life, ordinary life, moral good, virtue ethics, work ethic, Protestantism, Puritanism, modern secularism
Free Play and the Passion of Existence: Kant's Aesthetics as a Prelude to the Philosophy of Life
Author: Mohsen Bagherzadeh Meshkibaf,
Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Kurdistan, Sanandaj
mohsen.bagherzade.meshkibaf@gmail.com
Abstract
The issue of life and the concrete quality of lived experience, although at first glance placed on the periphery of Immanuel Kant's critical system and his transcendental project, finds an organic and profound link with the philosophy of life through a fundamental rereading of the concept of the "free play" of the cognitive faculties in the Critique of the Power of Judgment. This essay seeks to answer the fundamental question of how the free play of imagination and understanding, transcending a formal and neutral mechanism in aesthetic judgment, serves as the pulsating core of the feeling of life and the pinnacle of the flourishing of human subjectivity. Moving beyond formalist and epistemological reductionisms in the traditional reading of Kant, this article argues that aesthetic pleasure is the reflection of the self-dynamism and living equilibrium of the mental faculties—a state in which rationality and imagination, in the absence of a specific conceptual purpose, vote in favor of enhancing the individual's ontological capabilities and vital energy. In this perspective, free play is not an abstract flight from reality, but rather a liberation from the hegemony of instrumental purposiveness and an entry into the authentic realm of "self-creation"; a place where life ascends from the mere level of self-preservation to the rank of meaning, passion, and creative vitality. Thus, Kantian aesthetics is not the endpoint of a dry formalism, but a transcendental prelude to the philosophy of life, in which the harmony of the cognitive faculties is regarded as an allegory of the gushing dynamism of existence and the becoming of human life when confronting nature and the work of art.
Keywords: Immanuel Kant, Free Play, Feeling of Life, Philosophy of Life, Critique of the Power of Judgment, Purposiveness Without Purpose, Subjective Dynamism.
Intelligible Life Theory: a Paradigm Shift in Islamic Ontology or an Innovation in Hekmatic Philosophy of Life?
Beytollah Naderlou
Assistant Professor of Philosophy
Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Human and Social Sciences, University of Kurdistan, Sanandaj, Iran
b.naderlou_philosophy@yahoo.com
Abstract:
Allama Muhammad Taqi Jafari is generally seen as an idiosyncratic figure in the history of contemporary Islamic philosophy by the traditional philosophical thinkers. This intellectual idiosyncrasy has its origin to the most part in the pioneering and creative debates found in Jafari’s works that cannot be included in the mainstream trends representing Islamic philosophy as a whole. Hekmatic philosophy is ontologically-grounded in its essence and other branches of philosophical sciences in Islamic world are oriented through this ontological vision. Philosophy, thus conceived, is contingent upon ontology per se and accordingly brilliant minds devote themselves to the exposition and development of such ideas. Needless to say, philosophical career in this context is secured only if you follow the guidelines set by the giants and champions of the ontological tradition. Instead of keeping with the mainstream, however, Allama Jafari embarked upon an alternative path. He devoted his works to new readings of the fundamental Hekmatic notions in different directions. Jafari’s Intelligible Life (۲۰۱۱) represents the heart of this innovative philosophical project. This work presents a comprehensive debate on metaphysics of life. The current essay seeks to address two key questions as regards Jafarian philosophy of life: ۱- Can Jafari’s theory of intelligible life be relocated within the perennial parameters of Islamic philosophy? ۲- Are vitaeological reflections of Jafari representing a paradigm shift or a new opening of the potentiality latent in Islamic ontology?
Key Words: Allama Jafari, Intelligible Life, Metalife, Philosophy of Life, Hekmatic Philosophy, Ontology.
Capacities of Islamic Philosophy (Transcendent Wisdom) in Resolving the Crises of the Meaning of Life in the Contemporary Era
Ghorbanali Karimzadeh Qaramaleki
Full Professor, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, University of Tabriz, Tabriz, Iran
One of the fundamental issues of contemporary humans is the issue of the meaning of life; an issue that despite significant advancements in scientific and technological fields, has increasingly become a focus of philosophical investigations. The experience of feeling emptiness, directionlessness, and disconnection from ultimate horizons of meaning is regarded in many contemporary analyses as a sign of the crisis of the meaning of life. Viktor Frankl calls this situation the “existential vacuum” and considers it the result of modern humans' neglect of the spiritual dimension of their existence; a condition that leads to anxiety, aimlessness, and existential dissatisfaction. From a philosophical perspective, some contemporary thinkers have sought the roots of this crisis in the fundamental developments of modernity. Charles Taylor, through a historical analysis of the process of secularization, shows how in the modern world, the sacred horizons of meaning have gradually weakened and the human being, as a self-founded agent, has been regarded as the ultimate reference for valuation. In such a context, twentieth-century existentialist philosophers, including Sartre and Camus, have attempted to present a worldly reading of the meaning of life by emphasizing human freedom, choice, and consciousness; however, these approaches have often faced the issue of lacking a fixed metaphysical basis for meaning. In contrast to these approaches, the tradition of Islamic philosophy, especially the Transcendent Wisdom of Mulla Sadra, provides distinct capacities for explaining the meaning of life within an ontological and divine horizon. In Mulla Sadra's thought, existence has graded levels and an intensifying journey, and the human being, as a creature possessing substantial motion, is on a path toward existential perfection and proximity to the origin of being. In this framework, the meaning of life is not a merely subjective or conventional matter, but a truth rooted in the objective structure of existence and the purposiveness of human being.The main problem of this research is how one can, by relying on the ontological and anthropological foundations of Transcendent Wisdom, provide a philosophical explanation of the meaning of life that has the power to respond to the crisis of meaning for contemporary humans. The research findings show that in Transcendent Wisdom, the meaning of life cannot be sought merely in pleasure, benefit, worldly success, or conventional goals; rather, the meaning of life has a fundamental link with the truth of human existence and their path of perfection. Based on principles such as the originality of existence, the gradation of existence, and substantial motion, the human is a dynamic and perfectible being whose life finds meaning in the path of existential transformation and perfection. In this framework, human knowledge regarding the origin and end of existence, attention to the truth of the soul, free will and volition, directing life based on true perfection, and moving in the path of divine proximity are considered the essential elements for resolving the crisis of meaning. Therefore, Transcendent Wisdom, by presenting a purposeful image of existence and the human being, enables the reconstruction of the meaning of life based on the truth of existence and human perfection, and can offer a philosophical framework for confronting the crisis of the meaning of life in the contemporary era.
Death and the Meaning of Life in the Thought of Morteza Motahari
Abdollah Salavati
Professor of Philosophy and Theology, Shahid Rajaee Teacher Training University
Ali Heidari Faraj
PhD Student in Philosophy and Islamic Theology, Shahid Rajaee Teacher Training University
Abstract:
The problem of death is one of the fundamental issues in the philosophy of life, since awareness of the end of life raises questions about the purpose, value, and meaning of human life. In the thought of Morteza Motahari, death cannot be analyzed merely as the biological end or loss of life; rather, it can be understood in relation to concepts such as perfection, motion, the soul, and the afterlife. The main question of this study is what meaning death acquires within Motahari’s anthropology and worldview, and how this meaning is related to the understanding of human life. Using an analytical-descriptive method and drawing on Motahari’s philosophical and theological works, the study first examines the distinction between death as the end of bodily life and death within a philosophical-religious framework. It then shows that, within the framework of motion and perfection, human life is not merely a biological and static process but is understood within a teleological horizon, and death is also part of this horizon. The study further examines the place of the afterlife and its relation to human perfection in order to clarify how Motahari’s interpretation of death extends the meaning of life beyond the limits of earthly existence. On the basis of this analysis, death in Motahari’s thought is not merely the negation and end of life; rather, within a broader framework, it is regarded as the end of one stage of the human mode of existence and the beginning of entry into another level. Nevertheless, a distinction must be made between an ontological and eschatological explanation of death, on the one hand, and the individual human experience of loss, fear, and rupture arising from death, on the other. Accordingly, this study seeks to show that Motahari’s account of death, in addition to addressing its nature and place, has significant potential for reconsidering the problem of the meaning of life, although the relationship between this account and the lived experience of human beings still requires separate examination. Thus, the question of death moves from a question concerning the mere continuation of biological existence toward a question concerning the ultimate and meaningful horizon of human life.
Keywords:
Death; Meaning of Life; Human Perfection; Morteza Motahari
The Possibility of Meaningfulness in Animal Life from a Sadrian Perspective: With an Emphasis on Embodied Cognition and Animal Agency
Mehdi Monazzah
Assistant Professor, Faculty of Theology, University of Tabriz
Abstract
The meaningfulness of life is an important issue in the philosophy of life and, in a significant part of contemporary philosophical literature, has predominantly been associated with such capacities as consciousness, rationality, self-consciousness, and the ability to reflect upon the value and purpose of life. This approach raises the question of whether the capacity for conceptual reflection on the meaning of life is a necessary condition for meaningfulness, and whether the absence of such a capacity excludes animal life from the domain of meaningfulness. The central question of the present study is whether, within the framework of Mulla Sadra’s Transcendent Philosophy (al-Hikmah al-Mutaʿaliyah), it is possible to account for the possibility of a form of meaningfulness proportionate to the ontological rank and mode of life of animals, without imposing an anthropocentric model of meaningfulness, and what role embodied and embedded cognition and animal agency play in such an account. The study employs a descriptive-analytical method and a comparative-critical approach. It first examines the relation between meaningfulness, consciousness, rationality, and the capacity for conceptual reflection. It then analyzes the ontological status of animal life on the basis of Mulla Sadra’s accounts of the gradations of being, life, the animal soul, sensory and imaginal perception, voluntary motion, the relation between soul and body, and teleology and perfection. Subsequently, embodied and embedded cognition is examined as a contemporary framework for understanding the dynamic relation between the animal, its body, and its environment, while animal agency is considered as an intermediary link between perception, action, and directedness. The argument proceeds on the basis that the inability to engage in conceptual reflection on the meaning of life does not necessarily entail the absence of any form of meaningfulness; at the same time, mere biological directedness or behavioral goal-directedness is not sufficient, in itself, to ascribe meaningfulness. The main finding of the study is that, on the basis of a Sadrian reconstruction, a theoretical connection can be established among life, perception, agency, directedness, and perfection, each proportionate to the relevant ontological rank, thereby explaining the possibility of meaningfulness in accordance with the ontological rank and mode of life of animals. Accordingly, the meaningfulness of animal life is neither identical with the meaning of human life nor reducible to biological function or natural goal-directedness; rather, its possibility can be explained in terms of the animal’s mode of being, perception, and agency. This conclusion, while extending the scope of questions in the philosophy of life to nonhuman life, provides a basis for a non-reductive dialogue between Transcendent Philosophy and contemporary discussions of embodied cognition, animal cognition, and animal agency.
Keywords: meaningfulness of life; philosophy of life; Transcendent Philosophy; animal life; embodied cognition; embedded cognition; animal agency.
A Feasibility Study of the Reconstruction of “Philosophy of Life” in the Islamic Philosophical Tradition
Mohammad Mahdavi
Associate Professor, Department of Islamic Studies, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Sciences, University of Tabriz
Abstract
The present study, by framing the relationship between “philosophy of life” and the Islamic philosophical tradition, examines the possibility or impossibility of using this concept within the framework of Islamic thought. Its main question is: what status does the concept of “philosophy of life” in its modern sense have in the Islamic philosophical tradition, and how can it be systematically reconstructed? The theoretical focus of the article is an examination of the definitions and history of the concept of “philosophy of life” and its relation to the fundamental questions of life, the soul, meaning, happiness, and motion in Islamic thought. The hypothesis of the study is that although the Islamic tradition lacks an independent discipline or title of “philosophy of life” in its contemporary form, it nonetheless has considerable capacities, in terms of content and concepts, for dialogue with this field. This study adopts an analytical-comparative approach at two levels, conceptual and historical: first, it analyzes the definitions and conceptual developments of “philosophy of life” and explains its relation to the question of the “meaning of life”; second, it searches for its functional equivalents in Islamic texts. In this regard, citing primary texts and the works of commentators, it examines the views of Ibn Sina, Suhrawardi, Mulla Sadra, and Iqbal Lahori. The findings show that in Ibn Sina, the connection between the soul, life, and happiness; in Suhrawardi, light, presence, and spiritual life; in Mulla Sadra, substantial motion, gradation of existence, and bodily-spiritual resurrection; and in Iqbal, selfhood, love, action, and reconstruction of religion can be reread as elements of an Islamic philosophy of life. However, such a rereading is not possible without distinguishing between “philosophy of life” as second-order knowledge and “meaning of life” as an existential question, and also without attending to the historical and theological contexts of the Islamic tradition. The conclusion is that “philosophy of life” in its modern and systematic sense does not exist in the Islamic tradition; however, the possibility of its systematic and comparative reconstruction exists on the basis of concepts such as life, the soul, meaning, happiness, and motion. Such a reconstruction neither claims complete conformity with the tradition nor denies paradigmatic differences; rather, it proposes a kind of critical hermeneutics and intercultural dialogue.
Keywords: philosophy of life, Islamic philosophy, meaning of life, happiness, substantial motion, conceptual reconstruction.
When the World Is No Longer Livable
Psychosis, the Disintegration of the Lifeworld, and the Possibility of Reconstructing Meaning
Dr. Abbas Bakhshipour
University of Tabriz – Department of Psychology
۱۴۰۵
Abstract
Psychosis is typically described within a diagnostic framework on the basis of symptoms such as delusions, hallucinations, disorganized thinking, and negative symptoms. Although this level of description is essential for diagnosis and treatment, it does not necessarily reveal how a person experiencing psychosis experiences the world, the self, and others. By shifting the focus from the content of symptoms to the structure of experience, the phenomenological approach suggests that, across the psychosis spectrum, fundamental alterations may occur in selfhood, the taken-for-grantedness of the world, the sense of familiarity with the environment, relations with others, and the temporal continuity of experience. Blankenburg’s concept of the “loss of natural self-evidence” and the theory of fundamental self-disorder within the tradition of Sass and Parnas constitute two complementary formulations for understanding these transformations. Empirical evidence and systematic reviews indicate that disturbances of self-experience are disproportionately represented in the schizophrenia spectrum, may also be observed in some individuals at clinical high risk for psychosis, and are associated with certain clinical dimensions and aspects of social functioning. From this perspective, psychosis may be studied not merely as a constellation of false beliefs and anomalous perceptions, but as a transformation in the way of “being-in-the-world.” From the same standpoint, recovery does not necessarily mean merely a reduction in symptoms; rather, it may involve rebuilding connections with the self, others, time, the environment, and meaningful life goals. Nevertheless, the concept of the lifeworld should not be reduced to a single causal factor or transformed into an essential definition of psychosis. With this caution in mind, the present article proposes an integrative model in which psychosis is understood as a relative disruption in the organization of experience and world-relatedness. Within such a framework, psychotherapy, alongside biological treatment and social interventions, may contribute to the gradual reconstruction of a shared and livable world.
Keywords: psychosis, schizophrenia, lifeworld, phenomenology, self-disorder, natural self-evidence, meaning, recovery, psychotherapy.
Life as a Portfolio? A Philosophical Critique of the Financialization of Everyday Life from the Perspective of Human Flourishing
Seyed Mohammad Abbasnia
Assistant Professor of Financial Management and Faculty Member, Payame Noor University, Tehran, Iran
Sm.abbasnia@pnu.ac.ir
Abstract
Financialization in contemporary societies is no longer confined to the expansion of financial markets, institutions, and instruments. It increasingly penetrates everyday life and shapes how individuals understand themselves, their futures, and their choices. Decisions concerning education, housing, health, retirement, debt, savings, and future security are progressively framed in terms of return, risk, time value, and resource optimization. Under such conditions, individuals become not merely holders of assets but, in a deeper sense, managers of their own life portfolios. This article asks how the expansion of financial rationality relates to the idea of the good life and at what point finance ceases to function as a means of supporting life and becomes a logic for organizing and evaluating life itself.
The study employs conceptual-critical analysis and normative reconstruction. First, the financialization of everyday life is conceptualized not simply as the growing use of financial services, but as the extension of the logic of return calculation, risk management, and optimization into existential and life-related decisions. Second, drawing primarily on the Aristotelian conception of eudaimonia and using the capability approach as its contemporary normative extension, the article examines the relationship between wealth, financial security, freedom of choice, and a life worth living.
The central argument is that the philosophical problem of financialization does not arise from the presence of finance in human life, but from a reversal in the relationship between means and ends. Finance serves human flourishing insofar as it provides the material conditions and capabilities required for pursuing a valuable life. However, when return, risk, and wealth accumulation become criteria by which a successful life is defined, life itself risks being reduced from the end of economic activity to an object of financial management, measurement, and optimization. The article therefore distinguishes between a life supported by finance and a life organized according to financial logic and proposes this distinction as a normative framework for reconsidering the ends of finance. It concludes that financial systems should be evaluated not only by efficiency, return, and stability, but also by their contribution to human capabilities, autonomy, and the possibility of living a life one has reason to value.
Keywords: Philosophy of Life; Financialization of Everyday Life; Human Flourishing; Financial Rationality; Capability Approach
The Presence of Absence: Mourning, the Reconfiguration of Meaning, and the Possibility of Living in the Dialogue between Gadamer and Derrida
Neda Rahbar
PhD in Philosophy. Visiting Professor of Philosophy at university of Mazandaran . Iran
Abstract
This article examines two fundamental questions concerning the problem of mourning within a shared philosophical discourse between Jacques Derrida and Hans-Georg Gadamer. The first question concerns how, within Derrida’s poststructuralist perspective, the mourning of the Other—as absence—can, contrary to conventional conceptions of absence as the negation of presence, become itself a condition of possibility for presence. From this perspective, the absence of the Other is not merely a remembrance of what has been lost; rather, it constitutes, within the structure of language, the possibility of the Other’s presence from within absence itself. The second question, extending this Derridean reading, concerns how philosophical hermeneutics, in confronting the binary of presence and absence, makes possible a movement beyond such oppositional structures through the production of new configurations of meaning. Employing an analytical method rather than a comparative approach, this study brings poststructuralism and philosophical hermeneutics into dialogue and argues that, by moving beyond the binary opposition between presence and absence, both traditions situate mourning not as the opposite of presence but as a condition of its possibility within the sphere of lived existence. In other words, Derrida brings to light the structure of mourning and the constitution of the absent-present, while the Gadamerian dialogue between presence and absence invites an acceptance of living with the pain of the Other’s absent mode of presence and with the proliferation of new meanings emerging from it. The findings demonstrate that mourning, understood as a hermeneutic event, can constitute a precondition for the re-emergence of presence and a return to life. Derrida’s invitation to move beyond the aforementioned binaries is, in this sense, an invitation to rethink meaning and the possibilities concealed within it, thereby giving rise to a renewed conception of mourning. Mourning, beyond being an experience of the loss of the Other, becomes a possibility for articulating presence and a precondition for its emergence. Philosophical hermeneutics, in turn, conceives mourning as a hermeneutic event that traverses the binary boundaries of language and reconfigures the relationship between presence and absence within a philosophical-hermeneutic entanglement, thereby offering a renewed mode of living in the movement between death and life. Accordingly, within this shared discourse, Derrida and Gadamer understand mourning as a potential site for the production of new forms of meaning, language, world, and lived possibilities.
Keywords: Mourning; Derrida; Gadamer; Hermeneutic Event; Presence; Absence
Love as a Form of Life: The Reconfiguration of Self, Time, and World in the Experience of Loving
Ali Almasi Zand
PhD Graduate in Philosophy of Religion,Allameh Tabataba'i University
Abstract:
Love has been conceptualized in many philosophical and psychological approaches as an emotion, desire, virtue, commitment, or a relation between two individuals. Such accounts, however, often leave insufficiently examined the more fundamental question of how the experience of love transforms the overall structure of human living. The central question of this study is whether love can be understood not merely as an event occurring within life, but as a “form of life,” that is, as a mode of being in which one’s relation to the self, the other, time, and the world is fundamentally reconfigured. Drawing on conceptual analysis and phenomenological description, and employing theoretical resources from Max Scheler’s phenomenology of value, Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s account of the lived world and embodiment, and Paul Ricoeur’s analysis of narrative identity and selfhood, this study examines the structure of the experience of loving on four interrelated levels. First, at the level of selfhood, love shifts self-understanding from a purely self-contained model toward a relational conception of identity, without necessarily dissolving individuality into the other. Second, at the level of temporality, the experience of love reshapes the structure of past, present, and future: the past is reinterpreted in light of the relationship, the present acquires a distinctive quality through the presence of the other, and the future opens up in the form of shared possibilities, promises, and projects. Third, at the level of world hood, the other does not merely appear as an object of desire within an already constituted world; rather, the other’s presence reconfigures the field of meaning itself, placing ordinary objects, places, and events within a new network of significance. Fourth, at the level of intersubjectivity, love entails the emergence of a shared world in which intimacy remains compatible with the irreducible otherness of the beloved. The article argues that love becomes a form of life when it exceeds the level of feeling or attachment and transforms the horizon within which the self, the other, and the world appear. On this basis, the study distinguishes authentic love from unhealthy forms such as possession, dependency, and fusion, and concludes that loving life can be understood as a relational mode of existence in which self-realization becomes possible neither through absolute independence nor through the erasure of individual boundaries, but through a responsible openness to the other.
Keywords: Love, Form of Life, Phenomenology, Selfhood, Temporality, World hood, Intersubjectivity.
A Philosophical Reflection on the Place of the Concept of Play in Life: A Phenomenological and Hermeneutic Approach
Esmaeil Panahi
Researcher at the Institute for Cultural, Artistic, and Communication Research
Abstract
In common understanding, play is situated on the margins of serious life, in opposition to work, duty, and responsibility. However, its structural presence in education, art, culture, sports, the economy, politics, and social relations challenges this dichotomy with a philosophical question: if play is not merely a pastime or a temporary escape from reality, what structure transforms it into a fundamental form of human experience and cultural life? This article is grounded in the idea that play is not simply an activity performed by humans, but a mode of being and relating to the world, the Other, and future possibilities—a mode in which freedom and rules, reality and possibility, individuality and collective participation, and seriousness and leisure enter into a relationship that is seemingly incongruous yet generative. Adopting a phenomenological and hermeneutic approach, the article analyzes the structure of the experience of play and its role in the formation of meaning. In play, the human being is not merely an agent in command of their own actions; rather, they become engaged in a network of rules, situations, relationships, and emerging possibilities, and are themselves shaped during the course of the game. By understanding play as an event that draws the player into its own arena, Gadamer elevates this characteristic to a hermeneutic level, such that meaning is not merely the product of the subject's intention, but the outcome of participation in the event of play itself. Accordingly, the logic of play can be observed in education—as a realm for learning and character formation; in art and culture—as a sphere of creation, interpretation, and shared experience; and in economics and politics—manifesting as competition, rule-following, role-playing, negotiation, strategy, and the creation of possibilities. However, play possesses a dual nature: it can foster learning, creativity, understanding, participation, and openness to the world, or—when severed from truth, responsibility, and the human telos—degenerate into futility, frivolous diversion, and heedlessness. Drawing upon the Quranic distinction between *la‘b* (play) and *lahw* (frivolous diversion), this article asks how the boundary is drawn between play as a source of meaning and play as a breeding ground for heedlessness. Answering this question elucidates the role and significance of play within the context of human experience and cultural formation.
Keywords: Play, life, phenomenology, hermeneutics, meaning.
Philosophy as an “Art of Living”: The Relation of Philosophical Life to “Self-Transformation” and the “Problematics of Thought” in Michel Foucault’s Thought
Amirreza Shatizade Malekshahi
PhD in Contemporary Philosophy, University of Tabriz
Extended Abstract
Foucault understands philosophy as the critical work of thought upon itself. He maintains that, rather than legitimizing what we already know, philosophy is an attempt to determine how and to what extent it is possible to think differently. From this perspective, philosophy is not primarily a system of propositions and abstract concepts; it is a “way of living” and a concrete practice that sheds light on the entirety of an individual’s life. In a certain sense, Foucault seeks to restore philosophy to what it once was: a continuous exercise and practice directed toward “change”—the transformation of things and of the self, a capacity embodied in Foucault’s conceptual machinery and toolbox. This change is achieved by creating possibilities and opening spaces of freedom through the problematization of the present, that is, of actuality. Ultimately, its raw material is found in the context of everyday life, and its aim is nothing other than the transformation of lived experience.
From Foucault’s perspective, philosophy is not merely a matter of changing frameworks of thought and systems of value. It is an effort to think differently and to transform one’s relation to oneself—in other words, to transform the form of subjectivity. More importantly, philosophy is a mode of reflecting on and thinking about our relation to truth, as well as a way of putting ourselves into question. These dimensions may be understood as a mode of existence and as the “life of philosophy.” Accordingly, the “life of philosophy” is nothing other than the transformation of philosophy into an “art of life,” or, more precisely, an “art of living”: an art in which life itself becomes the locus for the testing of truth. The question, then, is this: When the way of life associated with philosophy is described in these terms, how does philosophical work transform the “self” in relation to one’s “own life,” and how does it turn our everyday existence and manner of living into a field of fundamental transformation?
Michel Foucault also regards his thought as a toolbox that makes possible the “transformation of things” and, indeed, the “transformation of individuals.” He maintains that he writes not for “readers” but for “users”—users who wish to employ these tools in the workshop of their own concrete lives and reconstruct their mode of being in the world. Foucault himself is the first active user of his own “toolboxes.” He explicitly identifies the transformation of the “self” as his concern. This is why he maintains that he writes in order to become other than what he is, since one attempts, through philosophical work, to modify one’s mode of existence.
This modification of one’s mode of existence is, in fact, the ongoing exercise of living: a way of living that continually seeks liberation from imposed forms of subjectivity. Foucault understands this transformation of the self as a form of aesthetic experience of oneself. Intellectual work, for him, is thus a form of aesthetic activity connected with the transformation of the self and aimed at preventing the formation of a rigid identity and the reification of the self. At this point, Foucault revives the aesthetic ideal of existence: turning life into a “work of art” so that actions, relationships, and lived moments may acquire a singular and self-created style rather than conforming to disciplinary norms.
Foucault even introduces the concept of the “author-function” in order to move beyond the authorial identity of a writer associated with a book bearing a determinate identity and thereby displace the “author’s name.” Through this move, he seeks to redefine and foreground the act of authorship while effacing the author’s identity, thereby showing that what possesses authenticity is the fluid movement of life and thought, rather than a static name attached to a subject. Once one effaces one’s identity in this way and, by means of one’s conceptual toolbox, aims first at transforming things and then at transforming the “self,” the position of the intellectual also acquires a different significance.
This means that the role of the intellectual is likewise bound up with “change”: “changing something in people” and opening a new possibility within their way of living. The intellectual’s task is to unsettle habits and established modes of acting and thinking, to dismantle accepted familiarities, to reassess rules and institutions, and, on the basis of this renewed problematization, to carry out the distinctive vocation of intellectual work. In this way, the intellectual challenges dominant and restrictive forms of life. It is at this point that Foucault’s emphasis on the importance of theory as a practice becomes apparent.
Foucault goes beyond the question of intellectual work and reconsiders thought in its general sense. Thought is what enables an individual to withdraw from one mode of action or reaction, present that mode to oneself as an object of thought, and call its meaning, conditions, and aims into question. This critical withdrawal makes it possible to reconsider lived experience, so that human beings are no longer enslaved to the unexamined habits of everyday life.
Thought is freedom—freedom in relation to what an individual does. It is a movement through which the individual separates themselves from what they are doing, establishes it as an object, and thinks of it as a problem. It is at this point that the meaning of problematization becomes clear. Problematization is the distinctive task of thought: transforming obstacles and difficulties into questions that can be answered and, in this way, opening the conditions of possibility for finding new solutions.
Thus, the whole of life becomes a domain of problematization: a field in which every behavior, every desire, and every practice of living becomes an object of critical reflection. For Foucault, the task of philosophical and historical reflection consists in stepping back into the field of thought, provided that problematization is understood not as the ordering and organization of representations, but clearly as the specific work of thought.
It is here that the role of the philosopher as a “diagnostician of the present” becomes prominent. The aim of this diagnosis is to understand the forms that shape and constrain our contemporary lives. For Foucault, this task is inseparable from an “ontology of the present” and from the claim that “the problem of the present time and the problem of who we are at this particular moment” constitute the most decisive problem of philosophy in our era.
Accordingly, actuality becomes the domain of philosophy, while the “critical analysis of the world in which we live” becomes philosophy’s task. Yet because it is this very contemporary world that has shaped our identity and our mode of being, criticism of the surrounding world inevitably leads to criticism of ourselves. This is why the French philosopher emphasizes that the primary aim is not to discover what we are, but to refuse what we are; philosophy is one of the principal means of doing so. Such refusal entails inventing new modes of being and creating other forms of life.
Foucault understands philosophy as the critical work of thought upon itself: an attempt to determine how and to what extent it is possible to think differently. The ultimate aim of this effort is to make possible the following radical question: How can one live differently?
Keywords: philosophy; art of living; problematization; life as a work of art; self; Michel Foucault
From Psychological Well-Being to the Philosophy of Life: A Network Reconstruction of Ḩayāt Ṭayyibah in the Qur’anic Horizon
Zohreh Ghaderi
Researcher in Philosophy and Religious Studies, Institute for Humanities and Social Studies (IHSS)
Zo.ghaderi@gmail.com
Abstract:
Contemporary research on well-being, particularly within positive psychology, has identified and operationalized diverse dimensions of the desirable human condition, from happiness and life satisfaction to meaning, autonomy, and personal growth. The philosophical question of what makes a life good, however, cannot simply be answered by measuring a set of psychological states or indicators. This study asks whether “well-being,” understood as a cluster of desirable states, can be distinguished from the “goodness of life,” understood as the quality of a lived whole, and whether a coherent structure of the good life can be reconstructed on this basis.
Drawing on “network reconstruction” and a structural reading, the paper examines a set of central Qur’anic concepts — including faith (īmān), righteous action, ḥayāt ṭayyibah, self-purification (tazkiyah), patience (ṣabr), trial (ibtilāʾ), responsibility, and mutual exhortation (tawāṣī) — in relation to one another. The central argument is that these concepts cannot be treated as an aggregate of independent virtues or components; rather, in structural relation to one another, they form a pattern of living in which purpose, direction, value, and relationality are bound together. On this basis, ḥayāt ṭayyibah is reconstructed not as the Qur’anic equivalent of psychological well-being, but as a condensed expression of a way of living that is oriented through relation to the transcendent, actualized through inner transformation and individual agency, extended into responsibility and action through relations with others and the world, and consolidated through patience and trial in the face of suffering and limitation.
The paper’s central finding is that this conceptual network yields a “relational–teleological” model of the good life. This model shows that a good life cannot be explained merely by the aggregation of positive states or well-being indicators; the quality of life also depends on the relational structure and overall orientation of living. From this perspective, the Qur’anic reconstruction can contribute, as an independent religious-philosophical formulation, to contemporary debates on the good life, meaning, agency, and the human relation to suffering — without treating Qur’anic concepts as equivalent to contemporary theories of well-being.
Keywords: philosophy of life; the good life; ḥayāt ṭayyibah; psychological well-being; network reconstruction; structure of living; relational–teleological model.
“The de-worlding of the human being in the age of Artificial Intelligence, in light of the philosophical concept of Dasein.”
Raham Sharaf
Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Zanjan
raham_sharaf@znu.ac.ir
Abstract
Without a doubt, one of the most significant (if not the most significant) achievements of modernity and technology in the present era is Artificial Intelligence. It can be asserted unequivocally that AI has permeated all spheres of human existence and, in many instances, has constricted them. Consequently, the debate regarding the positive and negative implications of this modern achievement has remained fervent, garnering attention from psychological, sociological, ethical, and philosophical perspectives. One of the critical challenges of AI, which warrants philosophical scrutiny, is the relationship between humanity and the world following the emergence of this technology. It could be argued that a thorough investigation of this challenge would provide a robust foundation for discussing the constraints of AI in other domains.
From the author’s perspective, the most significant negative philosophical consequence of AI in the contemporary era is the issue of “human de-worlding” (unworlding). This research endeavors to examine this issue through the lens of the concept of Dasein, as formulated by the great German philosopher Martin Heidegger. For Heidegger, Dasein represents the specific mode of human being that distinguishes humans from all other entities. Indeed, when Heidegger seeks to scrutinize the question of the essence of Being, he invokes the concept of Dasein, or the unique mode of human existence. Based on this concept, the human being is “Being-in-the-world,” possessing an inherent connection and belonging to existence. In truth, the human is the sole entity upon whom Being is disclosed, granting them the capacity to choose their mode of being. However, in the age of Artificial Intelligence, we face the challenge that AI has restricted human choices across various domains and, in some cases, has even supplanted them. This phenomenon is manifest not only in the empirical sciences but also in the humanities and even the arts. Accordingly, it appears that the openness of Being to the human being has encountered a fundamental challenge, and contemporary humanity has become, to a large extent, “de-worlded.”
Keywords: Artificial Intelligence, Dasein, Being-in-the-world, Heidegger, Truth.
Life as a Plastic Narrative: Rethinking Meaning in Life in Light of an Open Future
Mohammad Ali Tavana
Associate Professor, Department of Political Science (Political Thought), Faculty of Law and Political Science, Shiraz University, Shiraz,
Seyed Yazdan Hashemi Asl
Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science (Political Thought), Faculty of Law and Political Science, Shiraz University, Shiraz, Iran
Abstract
This article asks how meaning in life can remain intelligible without a final telos that fixes its value in advance. It develops the concept of a “plastic narrative” to connect temporal narrative configuration with plasticity, embodiment, and the possibility of revising the forms through which we understand a life. Through conceptual analysis and critical reconstruction, it brings Paul Ricoeur’s account of emplotment and narrative identity into dialogue with Antti Kauppinen’s analysis of meaningfulness and time and Catherine Malabou’s account of plasticity, while critically engaging anti-narrativist objections and contemporary theories of life’s meaning. Bodily limits, rupture, and data-driven prediction serve as conceptual tests; the article makes no empirical claims about technologies. Narrative can provisionally cohere events without closing a life into a final plot. Plasticity names linked capacities to receive forms, participate in giving them, and undergo transformations that may unsettle them. These capacities are situated and are not inherently emancipatory. The absence of a predetermined end need not mean meaninglessness. Meaning is a revisable relation among past, present, and possible futures. A defensible criterion is the preservation of responsible reconfiguration, answerable to embodied reality, other people, and the consequences of action.
Keywords: Embodiment, Future, Life, Meaning in Life, Narrative, Plasticity
Life as Narrative: Time, Answerability, and the Unfinalizable Self
Narrative Identity, Antenarrative, and the Meaning of a Human Life in the Philosophy of Life
Farzaneh Fatemi
PhD Candidate, Department of Management, College of Economics and Management. University of Tabriz, Tabriz, Iran. Email: f.fatemi@Tabriz.ac.ir
David M. Boje
Emeritus Professor of Management, Department of Management, College of Business. New Mexico State University, Las Cruces, NM ۸۸۰۰۳, USA. Visiting Professor, Fisk University, Nashville, TN. davidboje@pm.me
Abstract
This paper defends a philosophically precise version of the thesis that human life is constituted, understood, and made meaningful in a narrative form, and argues that this thesis belongs at the centre of the philosophy of life. It grounds the thesis in the classical aporia of time — Augustine's distentio animi and Aristotle's muthos — and in Ricoeur's demonstration that narrative accomplishes in poetics what speculation cannot accomplish in the aporetics of time: through the threefold mimesis it configures the discordance of lived time into the "concordant discordance" of a followable story, and so yields narrative identity as the mediation of sameness (idem) and selfhood (ipse). Situated against both the substance theory of the self and the Lockean–Parfitian reductive view, narrative identity is shown to answer the "characterization" question that the personal-identity debate leaves open. The paper then reconstructs the philosophy-of-life lineage of the thesis (Dilthey, Bergson, Nietzsche) and its phenomenology of temporality, embodiment, and the life-world (Husserl, Heidegger, Bakhtin), before confronting its two strongest objections: Strawson's "Against Narrativity," which distinguishes Episodic from Diachronic selfhood and warns that narrative coherence falsifies a life, and the phenomenological claim (Zahavi, Gallagher) that a pre-narrative minimal self is more basic than any storied one. Conceding the force of both against strong narrativity, the paper develops an alternative position drawn from dialogism and organizational storytelling: the self as an answerable, unfinalizable, antenarrative process. Uniting Bakhtin's non-alibi in Being and unfinalizability with Boje's concept of antenarrative — the fragmentary, forward-"bet" story that precedes closure — it argues that a life is neither a finished plot nor a mere sequence of episodes but an open, prospective, co-authored storying-in-becoming. This position preserves the narrative constitution of meaning while dissolving the worry about false coherence, and it reframes the meaning of life, authenticity, and self-creation as achievements of an authorship that remains answerable and is never complete.
Keywords: narrative identity; antenarrative; philosophy of life; temporality; non-alibi in Being; unfinalizability; meaning of life; Ricoeur; Bakhtin; Strawson.
Life, Gender Performativity, and the Political: Rethinking Kurdish Women’s Resistance in Rojava
Bayan Karimi
Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Philosophy Department, University of Kurdistan,
Sanandaj, Iran.
karimi.bayan@uok.ac.ir
Abstract
Under conditions of war, ideological violence, and gendered domination, life becomes entangled with struggles over identity, agency, and political recognition. The experience of Kurdish women in Rojava, particularly those who took up arms against ISIS, provides a crucial lens for examining how women’s engagement with life can develop into resistance and political agency. Confronting an ideology that subjected women to systematic domination, these women challenged established gender norms through embodied action and entered a political sphere from which women had historically been excluded. Drawing on Judith Butler and Hannah Arendt, this article examines how this transformation unfolds. Butler’s account of gender performativity illuminates how gendered subjectivity is constituted through regulatory norms and how their disruption can open alternative possibilities for agency. Arendt’s conception of action and political appearance, in turn, clarifies how such embodied agency becomes political through women’s emergence as acting subjects. The experience of Kurdish women in Rojava thus reveals a movement from the contestation of gendered subjectivity to political agency: Butler clarifies the transformation of gendered subjectivity, while Arendt conceptualizes its emergence as political action. The article argues that their struggle against ISIS cannot be reduced to armed combat or women’s emancipation alone. Rather, it demonstrates how the contestation of gendered norms can transform embodied resistance into political appearance and action, reconfiguring the relationship among life, resistance, gender, and the political.
Keywords: Life; Gender Performativity; The Political; Kurdish Women; Rojava.
Science for Humanity
Mehdi Golshani
Distinguished Professor of Philosophy of Science, Sharif University of Technology
mehdigolshani@yahoo.com
Abstract
Scientific work is a human activity for understanding how the natural world works nd is structured. Why do human beings seek scientific knowledge? Science, by itself, cannot provide the answer. The response comes from a more comprehensive framework that defines, among other things, one’s goal for scientific activity.
Traditionally there have been two major responses to this question: ’science for the sake of science’ and ’science for the sake of understanding God’s handiwork and for taking care of humanity’s lawful physical and spiritual needs. A third view became dominant during the twentieth century, advocating science for its practical and material benefits. According to the first and third views there should be no limit on the kind of scientific research being done, but according to the second view scientific activity cannot have a free run.
Due to the miseries brought about by the abuse of science and its application, especially during the twentieth century, many eminent scholars throughout the world have been crying out for a new attitude toward the goal of scientific enterprise—an attitude that seeks scientific knowledge for the purpose of enriching the spiritual dimension of human beings and for securing human welfare, i.e. seeking knowledge for the sake of humanity, rather than ignoring humanity. Unless this is done there will be no hope for the future of the human race. It is the duty of all scientific academies and institutions to engage in a ’crusade’ for realizing this change of attitude toward the goal of science.
Key Words: Understanding universe, God’s creation, ethical values, Humanity’s concerns, , Limitations of empirical science, metaphysical assumptions, worldview
The Philosophy of Life in ۱۹۷۰s Iran:
A Narrative of an "Inside-Out Sheepskin Coat"
Dr. Reza Mahoozi
Professor of philosophy, Institute for Social and Cultural Studies
Mahoozi.reza@gmail.com
Abstract
From the late ۱۹۶۰s through the ۱۹۷۰s, the intellectual landscape of Iranian society was saturated with literature concerning critical philosophical and sociological schools, existentialism, socialism, and political Islam. Despite the prevailing division between Continental and analytic traditions, these currents shared a commonality: participation in a grand Iranian intellectual project. This project was driven by a desire for "authenticity" and a "return" to roots, alongside a fierce antagonism toward the camp represented by the entrepreneurial "new middle class" of the ۱۹۶۰s and ۷۰s—a camp associated with liberalism, free markets, and democracy, and frequently accused of promoting cultural secularism. Among these currents, the stances of socialism and political Islam were relatively clear-cut; they fundamentally offered society the vision of a bright future—which was, in reality, an idealized past characterized by class homogeneity and monotheism—and demanded self-sacrifice, action, and commitment from their adherents, even at the cost of their lives and the endurance of great hardship. The critical current, meanwhile, by gradually gravitating toward the New Left, echoed similar sentiments in a different guise; it offered a critique of mechanization and capitalism that closely paralleled the other two movements, differing primarily in that it did not advocate for a "return" to the past, yet- like them- placed a strong emphasis on "identity." In this context, existential philosophies in Iran- focusing on German and French existentialism- followed a trajectory quite the reverse of their origins under the influence of the aforementioned currents. French existentialism, emphasizing individual freedoms and the concept of responsibility, leaned toward critiquing capitalist-oriented rationalism and effectively fueled the fires of Marxism and anti-rationalist activism; meanwhile, German existentialism- with its emphasis on critiquing metaphysics and the Western rationalist tradition- presented a different manifestation of "Being" and an "authenticity rooted in return" to its adherents.
Both existentialist currents in Iran had their own distinct narratives within the broader intellectual landscape of the late ۱۹۶۰s and the entirety of the ۱۹۷۰s: the former found its primary foothold in the Iranian Writers' Association and various literary circles and gatherings, while the latter was most prominent in the Hosseinieh Ershad, religious seminaries, and traditionalist circles aligned with the state and government. What they shared was a critique of the status quo and a call for action based on a romanticized vision of an ideal state; the former advanced this demand through a critique of despotism and its intellectual and cultural toll on the individual and the collective, whereas the latter articulated it amidst the discourse of "returning to the self," critiquing the West, and reviving Shi'a heritage.
Another commonality between these two currents- despite their respective activist struggles against the manifestations of despotism or secular modernity- was their deep involvement in the political conflicts of the Iranian intelligentsia. An intellectualism that- aligning with and reinforcing its own agenda of political militancy- cherry-picked specific elements from French and German existentialism (such as ontological authenticity, political responsibility, and the nihilism born of rationalism) while either turning a blind eye to other facets- like freedom, uncertainty, tolerance, and individualism- or interpreting them through the lens of its own political ideology; a choice made either consciously or unconsciously.
Another facet of this political reading of existentialism- which drew more heavily on the German model, particularly that of Nietzsche and Heidegger, than on the French one- was a disregard for modern sciences and scientific methods, especially positivism. These sciences and methods failed to acknowledge claims of "authenticity" or the emergence of "Being" as a mysterious realm; instead, they prioritized reason, scholarly inquiry, universities, and classrooms over action rooted in a form of revelation. For this politicized current, the imagination held a noble superiority over understanding and reason- an imagination untainted by metaphysical conceptualism or historical rationality, capable of characterizing- more effectively than those two faculties- a form of zealous, committed action and bringing it into the present as a model of authentic conduct.
This intellectual selection of elements from French and German existentialism during the ۱۹۵۰s confronted Iranian society with a kind of "inverted existentialism." In this version, human freedoms were subordinated to a grand narrative—whether it was the narrative of "Return," the vision of establishing a classless, monotheistic society, or the revival of Islamic heritage as an "Asia versus the West" paradigm, and the like. Within this Iranian grand narrative, the concept of the "free, solitary individual" gave way to the idea of conscious masses who had attained self-awareness; these masses were now called upon to rise up under the framework of *Ummah* (community) and *Imamah* (leadership) and to establish a new order guided by a coordinating leader. "Conscious" masses- rallying behind a leader- were expected to dismantle manifestations of social injustice, intellectual and economic exploitation, political tyranny, and inauthenticity through *jihad* and struggle.
Thus, this mass-oriented approach, revolutionary training, and collective militant action- while ostensibly drawing upon the foundations of European existentialism- sacrificed the essence of lived experience, concrete existence, individualism, and personal freedoms for the sake of collective ideological ideals. This gave rise to a distinct form of "inverted existentialism" in Iran: the concept of individual agency- the capacity to choose and accept responsibility for the consequences- was supplanted by a subversive political mass movement. In the name of revolutionary self-awareness, the masses were compelled to choose precisely what the prescribed worldview and ideology dictated- a phenomenon akin to the inverted existentialism derived from interpretations of Heidegger’s thought.
Against the backdrop of this inversion, this article aims to examine how Iranian intellectuals and thinkers of the ۱۹۷۰s interpreted French and German existentialism through the prism of politics and militant ideologies- an interpretation largely alien to the philosophical principles of "life" inherent in those original frameworks.
Keywords: Existentialism, freedom, responsibility, the ۱۹۷۰s, ideology, politics, the masses.
From Suffering to Growth: The Role of Philosophical Meaning-Making in Post-Traumatic Growth
Seyed Mohammad Kazem Alavi
Associate Professor of Department of Islamic Philosophy and Wisdom, Research Core of Health Studies (RCHS), Hakim Sabzevari University
smk.alavi@hsu.ac.ir
Abstract:
Post-Traumatic Growth (PTG) refers to the positive psychological transformations experienced by individuals in the aftermath of a traumatic event. Every traumatic experience inherently precipitates stress and tension, thereby jeopardizing mental well-being and inducing profound suffering. In the post-trauma recovery process, while initial emotional responses are prevalent, the subsequent cognitive processing of the event often leads individuals to undergo significant transformations across various dimensions of life, including personal and spiritual development. This study investigates the potential role of philosophy in this transformative process and the mechanisms through which it operates. We argue that philosophy, serving as a catalyst for meaning-making, can act as a transformative force in an individual’s life. Meaning-making is conceptualized here as a process of cognitive restructuring and attributing significance to life events, functioning as both an attitude shift and an intervention for psychological and existential trauma. By fostering a comprehensive worldview—a hallmark of philosophy—individuals are empowered to confront adversity in a way that imbues life with purpose and reorients their experiences toward a meaningful trajectory. Ultimately, this integration facilitates the conversion of suffering into growth, mediated by a fundamental shift in one’s existential perspective.
Keywords: Philosophical Meaning-Making, Post-Traumatic Growth (PTG), Suffering, Philosophy of Life.
The Genealogy of Redemption and the Meaning of Life in Nietzsche’s Early Philosophy
Amir Hossein Farahinia
Assistant Professor, Department of Architecture and Urban Planning, Technical and Voctaional University, Tehran, IRAN
Abstract
The question of the “meaning of life” amid the pervasive crisis of nihilism and the decline of grand metaphysical narratives is one of the most fundamental existential challenges in contemporary thought. Friedrich Nietzsche was the first thinker to identify this civilizational crisis not as a passing historical aberration, but as the inevitable destiny of the Western intellectual tradition after the ascendancy of Platonism and Christian morality—a tradition that, by splitting the world in two and referring values to a supernatural realm, paved the way for the devaluation of earthly life. Drawing on a descriptive-analytical method and focusing on Nietzsche’s first seminal and influential work, The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music (۱۸۷۲), this study examines in depth his response to the abyss of existential absurdity. By revisiting the Greek myth of “the wisdom of Silenus,” Nietzsche lays bare the appalling, ruthless, and suffering-filled truth of earthly life. He shows that the metaphysical consolations of an afterlife and the theoretical optimism arising from Socratic rationalism cannot withstand this terrifying abyss.The central concern of this article is to explain how the meaning of living may be recovered by replacing an ethical-epistemological approach with an aesthetic one, and by advancing the idea of “art as the sole path to redemption.” The findings show that, for Nietzsche, redemption is an entirely this-worldly and immanent-transcendent concept, arising from the tension and complex dialectic between two fundamental forces of nature: the Apollonian, which embodies form, order, clarity, illusion, and salvific semblance; and the Dionysian, which expresses intoxication, unrestrained flux, the destruction of the principle of individuation, and ecstatic union with the primordial unity of existence. The union of these two principles in the masterpiece of ancient Greek tragedy—especially through the chorus and the spirit of music—creates an experience for the audience that Nietzsche calls “metaphysical consolation”: a profound faith that beyond the inevitable destruction of individual forms and the unavoidable suffering of appearance, the pulse of primordial life and the joy of existence continue to flow vigorously and imperishably beneath the surface of being. Thus, life becomes worthy of being lived not in anticipation of an otherworldly end, but in the present moment and in the light of the central principle of the “aesthetic justification of existence.” Ultimately, this early Nietzschean approach establishes the origins and essential foundations of themes in his mature philosophy, including “unconditional affirmation of life,” the will to power, eternal recurrence, and amor fati.
Keywords: meaning of life, redemption, The Birth of Tragedy, the wisdom of Silenus, Apollo and Dionysus, aesthetic justification, metaphysical consolation, nihilism.
The Meaning of Life and the Possibility of Happiness in Schopenhauer’s Philosophy
Kamran Ghayoom-Zadeh
Faculty Member, Shahid Madani University
Abstract
Can happiness be attained in life? Does the meaning of human existence contain any indication of purposiveness or teleology? In his philosophical system, the German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer offers one possible response to such questions. Grounded in the distinction between “the world as representation” (die Welt als Vorstellung) and “the world as will” (die Welt als Wille), his philosophy interprets human existence in terms of a blind, aimless, and insatiable will (Wille). According to Schopenhauer human beings are perpetually driven by desires and wants, the satisfaction of each of which merely gives rise to another desire. Consequently, life oscillates between the suffering arising from unfulfilled desires and the boredom (Langeweile) resulting from their satisfaction, and thus no objective or predetermined end can be identified as the ultimate purpose of life. Accordigly, the conventional conception of the meaning of life-as the attainment of happiness, progress, or the fulfillmentof an ultimate purpose-is an illusion arising from the structure of the will, Schopenhauer locates a relative liberation from this condition in the diminution of the will’s domination through aesthetic experience, compassion (Mitleid), and ultimately, the denial of the will to live (Verneinung des Willens zum Leben) and asceticism (Askese).
Nevertheles, Schopenhauer’s conception of the meaning of life faces several significant philosophical challenges. First, the absence of a cosmic or metaphysical telos does not necessarily entail the meaninglessness of life, since meaning may be understood as a human and intersubjective phenomenon. Second, although Schopenhauer’s argument concerning the primacy of suffering over pleasure and the inability of pleasure to provide lasting satisfaction captures an important dimension of human experience, its generalization to human life as a whole requires independent justification. Third, his doctrine of the denial of the will appears to generate internal tensions when considered alongside his simultaneous emphasis on compassion and the value of aesthetic experience. Accordingly, the central question in a critical assessment of Schopenhauer is not whether he is justified in taking human suffering seriously; but whether his pessimistic analysis of the structure of desire can legitimately support a general conclusion concerning the meaninglessness of life. By examining this inferential transition, the present article argues that Schopenhauer’s metaphysical pessimism, even if his analysis of suffering and desire is granted, constitutes only one possible interpretation of the problem of the meaning of life.
Keywords: Schopenhauer, meaning of life, pessimism, happiness, will
The Disappearance of the Problem of Life in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: An Internal Critique and Contemporary Reconsideration
Ali Shamsi
PhD Graduate in Philosophy of Science, Department of Philosophy, Science and Research Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran
ali.shamsi2167@iau.ac.ir
Abstract
In the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein distinguishes between what can be said and what can only be shown, thereby separating the question of the value and meaning of life from the domain of theoretical knowledge. Thus, even a complete answer to scientific questions about the world would not resolve the question of meaning. Yet if this question is not a factual question that can be put into words, can its disappearance be regarded as a solution? Focusing on the closing propositions of the Tractatus and employing an internal critique, this article argues that Wittgenstein’s response is intelligible within his theory of language but faces limitations in specifying precisely what this disappearance means and what its consequences are. First, the distinction between saying and showing requires an account of how one can speak philosophically about the limits of language, given the position of the Tractatus’s own propositions within that distinction. Second, if the disappearance of the problem of life involves a transformation in one’s outlook and way of living, the Tractatus provides no independent criterion for distinguishing such a transformation from merely setting the question aside. Consequently, the strength of the Tractatus lies less in offering a complete solution to the question of meaning than in revealing the limits of theoretical knowledge and opening a different horizon for understanding that question. From this perspective, the question of the meaning of life remains open: not merely as a question about a discoverable fact, but as a question about how one lives and how one relates to the world and to others.
Keywords: Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus; meaning of life; saying and showing; disappearance of the problem; Wittgenstein.
The Tragic Truth of Life: A Lacanian Reading of Kierkegaard
Hassan Fathzadeh
Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Zanjan
Nietzsche, by rejecting an ethics grounded in obedience, raises a question that would later assume a more radical form in Lacanian psychoanalysis: Can one take responsibility for one’s own life without taking refuge in a transcendent guarantee? Classical ethics, by transforming values into universal imperatives, fixes the subject within the symbolic order; yet this very stabilization can itself constitute a higher form of subjection. Nietzsche, by contrast, posits an affirmation of life: not a passive acceptance of what is, but the capacity to act and create values, even in a world that guarantees no ultimate meaning. From Nietzsche’s perspective, the truth of life does not take place in any Kantian “kingdom of ends,” since he regards the resultant of active forces not as the sum of those forces, but as their greatest, and the resultant of reactive forces as their smallest. Nietzsche’s tragic vision of life begins precisely here.
Kierkegaard brings this rupture to its extreme in the individual’s relation to the infinite God. At the moment of faith, the individual can no longer delegate his or her truth to the universal. Abraham, in the suspension of the universal ethical order, stands alone before God; a decision that not only cannot be guaranteed or justified by any universal rule, but in which the “universal” itself becomes the temptation. It is precisely at this point that a Lacanian reading becomes possible: the subject emerges when the Other cannot provide a final answer. As Lacan puts it, “There is no Other of the Other”; that is, there is no ultimate authority capable of guaranteeing, from outside, the validity of the law, meaning, or decision. Here, in Lacanian terms, we are dealing with the intervention of the phallic in the Logos. The phallus is a fissure within the symbolic order, through which signifiers acquire weight and are released from their futile circulation; it is something that has already been lost (castration), leaving the subject, in Derridean terms, caught in the perpetual deferral of meaning. In the encounter with the Father-God, symbolic castration, as a constitutive exception, is the condition of possibility of meaning—the universal.
From this perspective, Lacanian ethics is not an ethics of the law but an ethics of desire: “Do not give up on your desire!” Yet this statement by no means signifies the subject’s autonomy, since “desire is the desire of the Other.” Desire arises from language and the symbolic order, although it is never fully established within them. It is here that, in place of Abraham, Lacan introduces Antigone as the tragic heroine. Antigone is not merely the defender of one law against another; she embodies this very fissure. Her act is a failure from the standpoint of the public order, and no metaphysical guarantee ensures its success. She stands by her desire while knowing that such a stance may lead to the collapse of the public order, as well as to her own death. This is the tragic truth: the subject can remain faithful to his or her desire without triumphing. The tragic hero fails because, unlike Abraham’s God, there is no Other to guarantee his or her victory; yet it is precisely in this failure that the act distinguishes itself from obedience. Affirmation of life is not optimism about the world, but a refusal to betray one’s desire in a world in which no ultimate guarantee exists for it. Fidelity to desire may lead to failure, rejection, solitude, and even death; and it is precisely for this reason that Lacanian ethics is inherently tragic. Antigone does not simply choose between the “law of the city” and the “law of the family”; her act brings the subject to the point at which the very symbolic position of the subject is placed at risk. Life finds its truth in this tragic transgression of the ethical order—the universal.
Theology of Life
Dr. Masoud Omid
Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Tabriz
Abstract
In the field of theology, there are various concepts and approaches, such as metaphysical theology, existential theology, ethical theology, systematic theology, and even political theology. With the emergence of the philosophy of life, however, it is now possible to speak of a field or approach called the theology of life. This can be understood either as a theology grounded in the philosophy of life or as a life-centered theology.
The theology of life is a philosophical attempt to develop a different understanding of theology. From the late nineteenth century onward, the concept of life gradually became an explicit and immediate subject of philosophical reflection, entering the philosophical arena through thinkers such as Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Dilthey, and Bergson. In the twentieth century, after a brief interruption, this direct and explicit thematization of life receded somewhat into the background. Nevertheless, life continued to receive indirect attention, to varying degrees, in the works of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Arendt, Gadamer, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty, the later Wittgenstein, Nagel, Deleuze, and others. Toward the end of the twentieth century, a second wave of attempts to make life an explicit philosophical theme and to engage philosophically with the domain of life emerged, for example in the works of Michel Henry, Agamben, Kishik, and others.
These efforts indicate that the history of philosophy has witnessed an elevation of the concept of life from a biological, social, political, and even metaphorical meaning to a properly philosophical meaning. In philosophical terms, the concept of life has been elevated from the level of a first intelligible and conventional meaning—that is, a natural and practical meaning—to the level of a second-order philosophical intelligible, namely a theoretical concept.
The question, then, is this: If life has become a philosophical concept and capacity, and if studies such as the philosophy of life or philosophical inquiry into life have emerged over the past century, can we, along the same lines, speak of something called the theology of life? This article seeks to answer this question and attempts to offer possible images and descriptions of a philosophical capacity that may be called the theology of life.
The first step in describing this type of theology is to point to its negative dimension, namely, its general differences from classical forms of theology—whether in Greek, Christian, or Islamic metaphysics—and even from modern forms of theology found in the philosophical traditions of Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza, and others. These differences may be outlined as follows:
Unlike classical and modern philosophical theology, the theology of life is not an abstract theology but a concrete and embodied one.
It is primarily formed around, and grounded in, the divine attribute of life (ḥayy/ḥayāt).
The meaning attributed to this divine attribute does not remain at its conventional level, namely perception and the origination of action. Rather, it is understood on the basis of life as a philosophical concept and in accordance with the philosophies of life.
It is not a form of negative or apophatic theology. Rather, it is an affirmative theology, and indeed a concrete one, deeply involved in and intertwined with creation, particularly with human life.
The second step, constituting its positive dimension, consists in attempting to formulate possible meanings for the theology of life within the horizon of the philosophies of life. The most important issue in the theology of life concerns the meaning of God. From the perspective of the history of the philosophy of life, some possible philosophical conceptions of God, whose origins can be traced to different philosophies of life, may be formulated as follows:
Schopenhauer: the will, intertwined with the creation of human beings and the world, yet without consciousness.
Nietzsche: the distinction between the existing God and the living God, and further between the living God and the dead God.
Dilthey: truth as something lived historically and through lived experience in relation to religions.
Bergson: a dynamic, creative, continuously vital and conscious duration that encompasses all human durations.
Michel Henry: the divine as an immanent horizon of appearingness in relation to phenomena.
Wittgenstein and Kishik: God as the source of a form of life that is realized through religious language.
And so forth.
The third step is an attempt to formulate an idea within the theology of life based on a particular philosophy of life. This article considers two ideas and two general images within the framework of the theology of life.
First General Image
It is possible to understand God on the basis of the concept of life.
God is ḥayy, that is, God is life—not in the sense that ḥayy merely signifies the highest degree of cognition and the origination of action.
The world of life is a confluence of divine and human life.
God is involved in life with His creatures, rather than merely being the source of cognition and action with respect to them.
God's life with His creatures is not necessarily interventionist. Rather, it is fundamentally observational, concerned, and caring.
Perhaps the meanings of divine presence, care, and providence can be understood in terms of the shared and intertwined life of Creator and creature.
Second General Image
I am a life and a narrative of a life; the other and others are likewise.
Life is the source and horizon through which I understand myself, others, and the world.
The most important divine attribute is being alive, rather than being Being or a being. The fundamental theological proposition concerning God is not that “God is Being” or “God exists,” but that “God is life” and “God is one who lives with other lives and living beings.” Without the concrete attribute of life, the other divine attributes become abstract or meaningless.
Divine Being and divine existence considered in isolation are abstract, of limited significance, or meaningless for a life. God understood as life and as one who lives with a life or with lives is more meaningful than God understood merely as Being or as an existing entity. God cannot be meaningful apart from life, because otherwise God would resemble a galaxy in some distant part of the universe, unrelated to a life or to lives. God must be present in life and in lives.
In other words, the fundamental theological question is not simply whether God exists or does not exist. Rather, it is whether God is present within the horizon and context of a life, and whether one can live with God, or whether this is not the case.
In order to understand the foundation and character of theology and the knowledge of God, the most important and fundamental source is life itself, considered in terms of its manner, style, narrative, and so forth.
Conclusion: Theology is, ultimately, a theological perspective that constructs and opens up a life and a narrative of life for us. The theology of a life emerges in proportion to that life itself—in its measure, stature, quantity, and quality. It is the whatness, meaning, manner, style, and character of a life that prepares and determines the theology of that life. Theology takes on the form, structure, boundaries, and capacities of a life and manifests itself within the limits of that life.
Keywords: Philosophical Theology; Philosophy of Life; Theology of Life; Life-Centered Theology; Life as a Horizon for Understanding the Meaning of Theology.
From Text to a Philosophy of Life: A Methodology for Reconstructing Rumi’s Philosophy of Life
Yousef Rezapour
Assistant Professor, Department of Educational Sciences, Faculty of Educational Sciences and Psychology, University of Tabriz, Tabriz, Iran.
Abstract
This study addresses the possibility and methodology of reconstructing Rumi’s philosophy of life. The problem arises from the fact that Jalal al-Din Muhammad Rumi did not leave behind an independent treatise entitled Philosophy of Life, nor a philosophical system concerning life articulated through a unified terminology. At the same time, his works are replete with reflections, narratives, images, oppositions, and representations of lived experience that relate, in diverse ways, to human life and living. Therefore, reconstructing Rumi’s philosophy of life can neither be understood simply as the “discovery” of a pre-existing system nor as a license to impose contemporary philosophical, psychological, or educational concepts upon Rumi’s texts. The central question of this article is: What methodological principles make it possible to move from textual evidence and representations of lived experience in the five principal corpora of Rumi’s works—Masnavi-ye Ma‘navi, Divan-e Shams, Fihi Ma Fih, Majalis-e Sab‘a, and Maktubat—toward a conceptual network and subsequently a philosophical formulation concerning life, while preserving the distinction between text, interpretation, and reconstruction?
To address this question, the article proposes a text-centered, network-based, and hermeneutical approach that emphasizes the primacy of the text, conceptual suspension, contextual and genre-sensitive reading, comparison across the corpora, recording counter-evidence, independent testing of conceptual relations, differentiation among the three levels of text, interpretation, and reconstruction, and openness to revision. Within this framework, Gadamer’s account of hermeneutical understanding and its historical situatedness, together with Ricoeur’s notions of distanciation, the autonomy of the text, and the possibility of critical interpretation, are employed as methodological resources for engaging with the text rather than as theoretical systems for determining in advance the meaning of Rumi’s works. The proposed methodology is then demonstrated through two examples, “the mirror” and “wonder,” drawn from Rumi’s works. The article concludes that a controlled movement from textual evidence to a conceptual network, from the network to structural relations, and from tested relations to philosophical formulation can provide a basis for reconstructing a philosophy concerning life, without treating this reconstruction as identical to a system that Rumi himself necessarily formulated in the same language and conceptual architecture. The ultimate horizon of this inquiry is a philosophical dialogue concerning the philosophy of life and an examination of the educational implications of this reconstruction for education, within the framework of a research program.
Keywords: Rumi’s philosophy of life; philosophical reconstruction; interpretive methodology; text-centered reading; conceptual network; hermeneutics; lived experience; educational implications
Zoroaster and the view of life
Mohsen Mirzaei
Assistant professor, Department of Culture and Ancient Iranian Languages, University of Tabriz..
When we speak of Zoroaster and his teachings, we must distinguish between two relatively distinct conceptions: (a) Zoroaster as a historical figure, endowed with the ordinary characteristics of a human being; and (b) Zoroaster as a transcendent, sacred, and inaccessible being.
The historical Zoroaster and his teachings—although obscure and difficult to recover—are reflected chiefly in the Gathas, the hymns attributed to Zoroaster, as well as in certain prose passages known as the “Seven Chapters,” which, in all likelihood, are the product either of his teachings or of those of his earliest circle of followers.
Zoroaster’s manifesto rests upon a fundamental and definitive opposition between the two principles of Good and Evil. As he himself explicitly states in the Gathas, everything—including thought, teaching, perception, belief, speech, action, conscience, and the spirits of Spenta Mainyu and Angra Mainyu—is in complete opposition. Thus, every thought, word, and deed is either demonic or Ahuric. Moreover, the Gathas contain evidence for the existence of an ultimate Creator, and from this perspective, Spenta Mainyu and Angra Mainyu may perhaps be understood as twins originating from a single and common source. The crucial point, however, is that human beings are free to choose: there is only one path, and that path is Truth.
Over the course of history, and in the eyes of their followers, the human and historical identities of great figures and saints undergo such profound transformations that these eminent human beings come to attain divine or godlike status in hagiographies and legendary accounts. Such narratives are transmitted in various forms, sometimes through biographers or oral traditions, either in written form or through oral transmission, and continue from one generation to another for many successive generations. Zoroaster is no exception to this rule. In later centuries, shaped by distortions and myth-making on the part of the clergy, as well as by the influence of the diverse cultures of Western Asia, Zoroaster becomes increasingly removed from his historical human status, to the point that his birth, upbringing, life, and the miracles associated with him all become wholly sacred and extraordinary.
Thereafter, Zoroastrianism gradually emerges from its primitive state and develops into a highly ritualistic religion. Although every religion, from its very beginnings, develops its own particular customs or adopts and reshapes practices from other cultures, such rites naturally proliferate and become increasingly elaborate and complex over time. By a “ritualistic religion” is meant a body of teachings that makes individual and collective salvation contingent upon the proper performance of ritual acts and religious observances. Thus, Zoroastrianism leaves virtually no place for the famous hadith “Actions are judged by intentions” within its doctrinal system. This, in turn, had so greatly facilitated the unchecked expansion of ritual acts and religious observances—to the benefit of those who administered them—that, by the end of the Sasanian Empire, they spared not even the people’s meager piece of bread on their impoverished table. In fact, within the Zoroastrian religion—as with its adversaries, the Zandiks (the Manichaeans)—the common people were, in effect, customers of their own religious establishment.
In Zoroastrian belief, Ahura Mazda is a powerful god, but not an omnipotent one. Ahura Mazda is assisted by seven archangels, counting Spenta Mainyu among them, who may once have been attributes of Ahura Mazda but later acquired individual and independent personalities of their own. In addition, other groups of spiritual beings, known as Yazatas and Menog, assist Ahura Mazda in the ordering of the world. For example, the spirit Rapithwin is said to protect the springs and roots of plants from the evil cold throughout the “Great Winter,” and with his appearance at noon on the first day of Farvardin, Nowruz begins. Most of the major Zoroastrian Yazatas—such as Mithra, Anahita, and Tishtrya—are, in fact, redefined forms of deities worshipped by the Iranians before Zoroaster. Zoroaster may have rejected them, but these deities subsequently found their way back into Zoroastrianism under the influence of pre-Zoroastrian Iranian culture; alternatively, Zoroaster himself may have accepted and incorporated them into his own intellectual system.
Zoroastrians are not fire-worshippers, nor have they ever been. Fire is the son of Ahura Mazda, occupies a central place in ritual practice, and exists in several forms. The status of the “Atash Bahram” is such that Zoroastrians would not even look upon it; the care and tending of the sacred fire was the responsibility of the clergy. Zoroastrians are not “dual-worshippers” either. The term “dualism” does not mean that they worship Ahura Mazda and Ahriman; rather, it simply means that they recognize two principles, Good and Evil. In Zoroastrian culture, the idea of two fundamental principles has become so deeply rooted that, in addition to human beings, it extends even to the animal world and to words themselves: the wolf is demonic, whereas the sheep is Ahuric; and, in the realm of vocabulary, for example, sar (“head”) is Ahuric, whereas kalleh (“head/skull”) is Ahrimanic.
An Analysis of the Meaning of Life from the Perspective of Hakim Nizami Ganjavi
Mohammad Khakpour
Associate Professor, Department of Persian Literature, University of Tabriz
Hakim Nizami Ganjavi is one of the few Iranian poets who, through his unique worldview and distinctive perspective on the order of creation, consistently seeks to elucidate the meaning and concept of human life within this earthly realm. As evidenced by his *Panj Ganj* (The Five Treasures), he often appears in the guise of an elder—a sage—who, with fervent passion and uncompromising dedication, pursues an ideal vision of humanity and the world, a vision largely crafted by his own mind and inner consciousness. Since Nizami’s worldview is grounded in the twin pillars of love and asceticism, his perspective on human life is inevitably and inextricably linked to these fundamental concepts. In this context, one cannot overlook his leanings toward Ash'ari theology; indeed, the love and asceticism woven into his soul and worldview must be viewed through this specific lens. It is worth noting that while Nizami—a sage and mystic well-versed in wisdom—engages with profound questions regarding human identity, the cosmic order, and numerous other thought-provoking subjects, his reflections are not strictly philosophical in the conventional sense; rather, they align more closely with Ash'ari thought. In any case, Hakim Nizami views life primarily through its spiritual and idealistic dimensions; in his perspective, only love and asceticism can liberate the human being from the shackles of worldly existence—which he regards merely as a shadow of the afterlife—and elevate the individual to the highest levels of human perfection. Through a study of the *Khamsa* (Quintet) of Hakim Nizami Ganjavi, and by employing textual analysis and reasoned argumentation, the author of this essay seeks to explore the meaning of life as conceived by the poet.
Keywords: Nizami Ganjavi, *Khamsa* of Nizami, meaning of life, love and asceticism.
Disembodied Love: A Phenomenology of Romantic Relationships in the Age of AI
Yashar Karimi
Ph.D. Philosophy of art. Islamic Azad University. Central Tehran Branch
Abstract
This paper explores what happens to romantic love and intimacy in a world where technology increasingly detaches us from our bodies. Drawing on Edmund Husserl’s transcendental and genetic phenomenology, the study begins by distinguishing between the lived body (Leib)—the feeling, sensing self that makes all experience possible—and the physical body (Körper)—the material, measurable object studied by natural sciences. Using a phenomenological approach, it traces how romantic connection forms, moving from passive, felt sensations to an active, meaning-making intentionality. A key insight here is that bodily affection serves as the very foundation of romance, rooted in the passive synthesis of hyletic material that awakens the self to connection with another (Husserl, Analysen zur passiven Synthesis). This shared affective experience is what makes human love authentic, distinguishing it from purely mechanical or physiological acts.
Building on Husserl’s thought, the paper examines how modern digital technologies reduce the lived body (Leib) to an interchangeable, disposable tool (Körper), creating a new kind of digital Cartesianism. In the context of AI companions and synthetic partners, the analysis shows how these technologies challenge the essential qualities of genuine love—especially vulnerability, mutual giving, and selfless care. By offering artificial companions as frictionless, obedient partners designed to satisfy personal desires, digital platforms risk turning mutual commitment into one-sided consumerism. Ultimately, drawing on contemporary phenomenological thought, this paper argues that profound love cannot be separated from the shared vulnerability of the living body, calling for a return to embodiment as the true source of meaning and authenticity in human life.
Keywords: Lived Body (Leib), Embodied Love, Phenomenology of Intimacy, Artificial Intelligence, Edmund Husserl, Intersubjectivity.
Life on the Horizon of Philosophy: From Kant’s Moral Autonomy to Gadamer’s Hermeneutical Self-Understanding
Asghar Vaezi,
Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Shahid Beheshti University
Abstract
The relationship between philosophy and life is one of the most fundamental issues in the history of philosophy. In this relationship, philosophy is not merely an abstract and theoretical form of knowledge, but rather a way of thinking about the meaning and purpose of life. The central question of this article is whether philosophy can move beyond the level of theoretical reflection and establish a meaningful connection with human existence itself without sacrificing the independence and critical status of reason. To address this question, the article examines the relationship among reason, freedom, moral life, meaning, and human self-understanding, focusing first on Kant’s philosophy and then moving to Hegel’s absolute idealism and Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics.
In Kant’s philosophy, the limitation of the claims of theoretical reason creates the conditions under which practical reason and concepts such as freedom, autonomy, duty, dignity, and hope can assume a fundamental position. On this view, the human being is not merely a knowing subject but also a free and responsible agent. Autonomy in Kantian ethics and life within the Kingdom of Ends consist in obligating oneself to obey a law that one has legislated for oneself. According to this view, humanity, as an end in itself, possesses dignity rather than a price. From this perspective, human life, at a level beyond mere natural existence, becomes the arena for the realization of freedom and moral responsibility.
The article then shows that Hegel extends the question of freedom from the level of the individual moral agent to the domains of history and social institutions. The concept of “ethical life” in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right encompasses the family, civil society, and the state as objective forms in which freedom is realized. Thus, freedom is not merely an internal condition of the individual; it must also be actualized in social relations and institutions within which the individual can recognize himself or herself as a free being.
The article next turns to Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics. From Gadamer’s perspective, human beings are always situated within language, history, and tradition, and their understanding of themselves and of the world in which they live is shaped by their historical pre-understandings and prejudices. These pre-understandings are not merely obstacles to understanding; they are also conditions of its possibility. The concept of the “fusion of horizons” demonstrates that understanding is a dialogical process that takes shape within the world of subjects.
On the basis of this analysis, the article’s central claim is that philosophy establishes an authentic relationship with life when it neither dissolves into life nor distances itself from it through conceptual abstraction. Kant highlights the possibility of rational critique, freedom, and responsibility; Hegel demonstrates the social and historical realization of freedom; and Gadamer reveals the historical and dialogical character of understanding and, consequently, of self-understanding. Philosophy can therefore be understood as an endeavor toward “critical self-understanding of the human being in the world”, a form of self-understanding through which human beings seek to clarify their relationship to themselves, others, society, tradition, and the future.
Keywords: Philosophy and life; Kant; autonomy; freedom; human dignity; Hegel; ethical life; Gadamer; self-understanding.
A Philosophical Analysis of the Relationship between "Life" and "Individuality" in Islamic Wisdom; with Emphasis on Sadrian Foundations
Mohsen Taghizadeh
Academic Officer of Imam Khomeini Seminary (RA), Mashhad, Level ۳ Seminary, Equivalent to Master's, Jurisprudence and Principles
Khorasan Seminary, Mashhad, Iran
MT۱۳۵۶۸۸۵@GMAIL.COM
۰۹۱۰۴۶۹۳۱۷۹
Abstract
The issue of the relationship between life and individuality in Islamic wisdom, despite its importance for understanding human individuality, has been less examined independently; existing studies either pursue individuality and personal identity without analyzing the concept of life, or explore life from the perspective of meaning and authenticity. This article attempts, on the basis of the foundations of Transcendent Wisdom, to clarify whether and how a philosophical relationship can be established between life and individuality. The research method is analytical-descriptive, and conceptual analysis and argumentative reconstruction have been used to arrive at the relationship between the two concepts. First, the concepts of life, vitality, soul, individuality, and identity are distinguished from one another, and then the Peripatetic, Illuminationist, and Sadrian approaches to individuality are compared. The main finding is that the primacy of existence, gradation, substantial motion, the bodily origination of the soul, and connective unity together make possible a six-premise argument on the basis of which life is the gradual ground for the realization and deepening of individuality. The innovation of the research is the distinction between "foundational individuality" and "graduated individuation" and the reconstruction of this very argument. Its main conclusion is that life is not constitutive of foundational individuality, but it plays a role in graduated individuation; this conclusion depends on a non-extended reading of substantial motion and remains limited in the face of the challenge of identifying identity in the afterlife, and a final resolution of the problem is not claimed.
Keywords: Life, Individuality, Personal Identity, Soul, Substantial Motion, Transcendent Wisdom
Life as Seeking and Creation: Reconstructing the Relationship between Love and Creativity in the Islamic Tradition
Morteza Shojari, Professor, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Letters and Humanities, University of Tabriz.
Zahra Gozali, Ph.D. Graduate in Philosophy, University of Tabriz.
Abstract
This article examines the relationship between life, love, and creativity in selected philosophical and mystical accounts within the Islamic tradition. The central question is how love transforms the mode of human being and living, and how this transformation manifests itself in creativity. Employing an analytical method and conceptual reconstruction, the study examines the views of Ibn Sīnā, Suhrawardī, Ibn ʿArabī, Rūmī, and Mullā Ṣadrā, without attributing to them a unified theory under the title of "philosophy of life." The findings indicate that, in the accounts examined, love is understood in connection with the perception of the good, beauty, and perfection, and in relation to ṭalab (seeking) and movement toward perfection. Accordingly, the relationship between love and creativity is not a simple, direct causal one; rather, it can be explained through the interplay of ṭalab, imagination, form-giving, will, and human action. On this reconstruction, human life can be understood as a process of seeking, transformation, and form-giving, of which creativity is one mode of manifestation. Art, in turn, is one of the most evident domains in which this creative mode of life becomes manifest, without implying that the human being, as a creative agent, is the absolute creator of the self or of the world.
Keywords: life, love, ṭalab, creativity, imagination, perfection.
Religion as a Form of Life in Later Wittgenstein
Abdurrazzaq Hesamifar
Professor of Philosophy at Imam Khomeini International Philosophy
Abstract
In the philosophy of the early Wittgenstein, religion is reflected more in his life than in his written works. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus mentions God in only a few propositions, whereas prominent religious elements are evident in Wittgenstein’s life, particularly during his early period of thought. Carrying Tolstoy’s The Gospel in Brief during the time of his participating in war and referring to religious concepts in his correspondence with Russell shows his distinctive approach to religion. Although not a conventionally religious person, he stated that he was unable to avoid viewing matters from a religious perspective. Admittedly, the early Wittgenstein’s epistemological approach to religion—at a theoretical level—consisted of relegating it to the realm of the unspeakables, specifically the domains of feeling and mysticism. However, the later Wittgenstein, in line with his use-theory of meaning—and particularly the theory of language-games—links religion to human existence and regards it as a "form of life." From this perspective, religion and religious propositions should not be considered in isolation from human life and the role they play within it. The use of religious concepts within a religious society constitutes a type of language-game, and grasping the meaning of these concepts depends on familiarity with the religious form of life. Thus, the meaning of religious propositions is entirely contingent upon the form of life of believers—a concept distinct from that of "lifestyle." By the concept of "form of life," Wittgenstein refers to the dependence of the meaning of religious terms on the beliefs of believers, as reflected in their form of life. The concept of "lifestyle" refers to the customs and rituals inherent in various modes of living; for instance, lifestyles differ between rural and urban areas, and the observance of specific events—such as a wedding—varies across cities with distinct cultures. This study aims to examine the perspective of the later Wittgenstein regarding religion and its connection to human life.
Keywords: religion, mysticism, form of life, use theory of meaning, language-game theory, lifestyle.
Life as Possibility: A Philosophical Introduction to Ontological Possibility
Kaveh Haji-Allahverdipoor
Department of Sociology, Faculty of Social Sciences, Allameh Tabataba’i University, Tehran,
Kaveh.Allahverdipoor@atu.ac.ir
Abstract
This article develops Ontological Possibility (OP) as a philosophical foundation for understanding life. Its central question is whether possibility is merely something a living being possesses, or whether it is constitutive of life itself. Drawing on Henri Bergson’s philosophy of life, especially his concepts of duration, becoming, creativity, and novelty, the article argues that life cannot be reduced to its actual state. Life unfolds through a temporal continuity in which the past remains present while the future is never fully determined in advance. This openness makes the emergence of the new possible.
The article distinguishes between mere biological life and human life. By mere biological life, or living, we mean the animal and vegetal processes of existence and survival. By life, we mean human existence as a mode of being that is intrinsically open to possibility. On this basis, the article proposes that possibility is not an accidental or secondary feature of life. It is an immanent dimension of its mode of being. Life is not only what is actual; it is also the capacity to exceed its present actuality. Possibility, therefore, should not be understood simply as a set of future options, a probability, or a potential awaiting realization. It is the constitutive openness through which life can become otherwise.
The article further argues that actuality never exhausts life. A living being is always more than its present state because its mode of being remains open to what has not yet become actual. From this perspective, the loss of possibility is not merely a reduction in freedom or choice. It marks a deeper ontological transformation. When the openness to possibility disappears, life is reduced to mere biological existence. OP thus advances a fundamental claim: life is intrinsically possible, and possibility belongs to the essence of life rather than being added to it from outside. This formulation establishes the philosophical foundation for further inquiries into the social and cultural conditions under which this ontological possibility may later be limited, determined, or exhausted.
Love, the Foundation of Life; Peace, Its Ultimate End.
Hedayat Rashidi
Faculty Member of Islamic Azad University, Shushtar Branch
The present study seeks to formulate the anthropological foundation of "love" as the "voluntary acceptance of binding responsibility," and to redefine "peace" not as the absence of war, but as the ultimate end of love and life, namely survival, protection, and flourishing. Employing a review-analytical approach, the study analyzes population-genetic data (the Y-chromosome bottleneck), archaeological evidence, and pre-Christian legal corpora (Ur-Nammu, Hammurabi, the Hittites, and the Torah)
۱. The post-Neolithic Y-chromosome bottleneck is evidence of the monopolization of reproduction by propertied men and the exclusion of the majority of ordinary men from marriage.
. ۲. The ancient legal systems, by binding the young man to financial and multiyear commitments, created a mechanism for testing the sincerity of his affection and the durability of the union: accepting this weighty condition was at once proof of the lover's sincerity and a guarantee of the young couple's stability in truth, the foundation of life was laid upon pure love.
۳. Society itself was built upon this same basis: trust, assurance, and empathy in meeting one another's needs were rooted in that same pure and sincere love.
. ۴. Peace, not merely the absence of war, but a form of human life — signifies survival, protection, and flourishing, and constitutes the ultimate end of this journey: an end that responsible love inaugurates within the family hearth, and which society extends to the horizon of civilization.
Authentic love is a proposition proven only by the act of responsibility: "Love is the foundation of life, and peace is its ultimate end."* Societies that build the family upon love tested through responsibility have, in truth, reached their final destination — some positive peace rich in survival, protection, and flourishing: not a temporary treaty, but the ultimate purpose of their philosophy of life.
Love is the foundation of life, for only that love is authentic which, in the trial of marriage, voluntarily accepts multi-year responsibility. And peace is the ultimate end of this love, for true peace is not the absence of war, but survival, protection, and flourishing and these three are the final destination of that same responsible love, which was founded within the family hearth and shall reach its perfection across the domain of society.
Keywords:Responsible Love, Dominant-Male Exclusivity, Y-Chromosome Bottleneck, Marriage Trials in Ancient Civilizations, Positive Peace, Peace as the Ultimate End, Social Empathy
The Crisis of Meaning in Life among Teachers and the Role of Educational Leadership in Reconstructing the Existential Horizons of the School
Mahdi Namdari-Pejman
Department of Educational Administration, Farhangian University, P.O. Box ۱۴۶۶۵-۸۸۹, Tehran, Iran. Email: m.namdari@cfu.ac.ir
This review examines the crisis of meaning among teachers as an existential and multidimensional phenomenon that extends beyond ordinary occupational stress and burnout. Drawing on Frankl’s logotherapy, existential-phenomenological perspectives on teacher identity, and contemporary empirical research on teachers’ well-being and professional identity, the article argues that existential frustration arises when teachers’ “will to meaning” is persistently blocked by bureaucratic demands, value–practice misalignment, erosion of professional agency, diminished experienced significance, and the fragmentation of a shared educational purpose. These conditions may coalesce into a broader existential crisis of the school—a state in which the school remains administratively functional yet becomes existentially fragmented. The review advances a multilevel framework that reconceptualizes meaningfulness as an organizational and collective condition rather than a purely individual experience, and refigures teacher professional identity as an ongoing existential project of “becoming.” On this basis, the concept of existential leadership is developed as a complementary perspective within educational leadership that concerns the creation of organizational conditions in which teachers can exercise agency, reconnect with educational purposes, experience recognition and belonging, maintain professional authenticity, and reconstruct a shared horizon of possibility. Integrating evidence on servant leadership, leadership for teacher flourishing, and school climate, the article proposes that meaningful teachers and meaningful schools are mutually constitutive. A research agenda is outlined for operationalizing constructs such as teachers’ existential meaning, the school’s existential climate, and existential leadership, and for testing their relationships through quantitative, qualitative, and multilevel designs.
Keywords:Existential Vacuum,Teacher Professional Identity, Educational Leadership, Meaning in Life, School Existential Crisis
The Philosophy of Life in Light of Unhappy Consciousness in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit "
Saeed Eslamee
Associate Professor of Political Science, Department of Political Science, Faculty of Law and Political Science, Chalus Branch, Islamic Azad University, Chalus, Iran
Unhappy consciousness, or what Hegel characterizes as “self-divided” or “self-alienated” consciousness, constitutes a crucial stage in the dialectical development of self-consciousness in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. It emerges following the stages of Stoicism and Skepticism.. Unhappy consciousness is characterized by a profound internal division: on the one hand, consciousness experiences itself as a finite, mutable, and contingent being embedded in the sensible world; on the other hand, it aspires toward an infinite, immutable, and absolute truth.
The significance of unhappy consciousness lies in the fact that its suffering cannot be reduced merely to the difficulties and contingencies of human existence. Rather, its distress arises from a deeper sense that the truth and meaning of existence are located beyond the self. Consequently, the individual may seek authentic meaning in a realm transcending ordinary, finite existence. Yet the more consciousness separates the truth it seeks from its concrete, lived existence, the more deeply its experience of alienation may become entrenched. At this point, a crisis of the meaning of life emerges when the individual is unable to establish a meaningful relation between the truth being sought and concrete existence.
From a Hegelian perspective, unhappy consciousness cannot attain truth simply by negating its own finitude. The problem, therefore, is not to abolish human finitude, but to attain a form of self-consciousness in which finitude is no longer understood as an absolute separation from truth. The relationship between the finite and the infinite must instead be comprehended dialectically, such that the finite is understood as belonging to the very process through which the infinite comes to actuality.
It is precisely at this point that a significant connection can be established between unhappy consciousness and the philosophy of life. If human beings seek the meaning of life exclusively in the infinite and locate truth beyond the finite world, their concrete existence may come to appear deficient, insignificant, or devoid of intrinsic meaning. Conversely, if the relationship between the finite and the infinite is reconsidered dialectically, a new possibility for understanding human life emerges—one in which finite existence is not simply opposed to truth but participates in its realization.
In the Phenomenology of Spirit, unhappy consciousness initially posits truth as something external to itself and experiences itself as separated from that truth. Its relation to truth is consequently characterized by dependence, distance, and separation. The movement of consciousness, however, gradually reveals the inadequacy of this opposition. The truth that consciousness initially confronts as an external and transcendent reality must ultimately be recognized as related to consciousness itself.
This movement acquires a further dimension in Hegel’s Elements of the Philosophy of Right, where the question of freedom is situated within the structures of ethical and social life. For Hegel, freedom cannot be reduced to individual choice or the arbitrary fulfillment of subjective desires. Rather, freedom becomes actual within ethical life (Sittlichkeit) and through the institutions in which individual and universal interests are mediated, including the family, civil society, and the state. Thus, the reconciliation between the individual and the universal does not require an escape from finite social existence; rather, it is achieved through the transformation and rational organization of that existence.
Against this background, the present study examines the philosophy of life in light of unhappy consciousness in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit at three interconnected levels: the existential, the dialectical, and the liberatory. At the existential level, the study investigates the experience of division, finitude, suffering, and the crisis of meaning characteristic of unhappy consciousness. At the dialectical level, it analyzes the movement through which the opposition between the finite self and the infinite truth is progressively transformed. Finally, at the level of liberation, it examines how the overcoming of alienation becomes possible through a transformation in consciousness and through the recognition of the unity of individual freedom and the universal.
The central question of the study is how the dialectical movement of unhappy consciousness makes possible the overcoming of alienation and the emergence of a form of reconciliation between the human being and truth. More specifically, the study asks why, in Hegel’s philosophy—particularly in the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Elements of the Philosophy of Right—the meaning of human life should not be sought in an escape from suffering and finitude, but rather in the individual’s relation to the totality of Spirit (Geist).
The transition from unhappy consciousness to Reason is particularly significant in this regard. Through this transition, consciousness undergoes a transformation in its relation to truth. It gradually comes to recognize that the self-consciousness that seeks truth and the truth being sought are not absolutely alien to one another. The overcoming of alienation therefore does not consist in the simple disappearance of difference, but in the achievement of a higher form of unity in which difference and identity are mediated within the movement of Spirit.
Accordingly, the study argues that the Hegelian philosophy of life should be understood neither as an affirmation of passive resignation to suffering nor as an attempt to escape finite existence in favor of an abstract infinite. Rather, it is grounded in the dialectical transformation of the individual’s relation to finitude, universality, and Spirit. From this perspective, the experience of unhappy consciousness, despite its inherent suffering and alienation, constitutes a necessary moment in the development of self-consciousness toward a more comprehensive form of freedom and reconciliation.
Keywords: Consciousness; Unhappy Consciousness; Self-Consciousness; Hegel; Phenomenology of Spirit; Philosophy of Life; Alienation; Reconciliation; Spirit; Freedom
Philosophy and the Meaning of Life in Philosophical Theories
Heydar Bagheriasl
Professor of Law, Faculty of Law and Social Sciences, University of Tabriz
Abstract
The philosophy of life addresses some of the most fundamental questions in human thought: Why do we live? What makes a life meaningful? What constitutes human flourishing? What is the relationship between happiness, virtue, freedom, suffering, and death? Although the expression “meaning of life” became more explicit in modern philosophy, its underlying questions can be traced to Socratic reflections on the examined life, Aristotle’s account of eudaimonia, religious accounts of humanity’s ultimate end, and modern and existentialist discussions of freedom and responsibility. This study employs a descriptive-analytical and library-based methodology to examine major philosophical approaches to the philosophy of life. It discusses the views of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, the Stoics, Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Kant, Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Sartre, Camus, and Viktor Frankl. It also considers contemporary debates concerning supernaturalist, naturalist, subjectivist, objectivist, and hybrid theories of meaning in life. The study argues that a meaningful life cannot be reduced to pleasure, wealth, social success, or subjective happiness. Across different philosophical traditions, self-knowledge, virtue, rationality, freedom, responsibility, love, creativity, truth, relationships, and a conscious confrontation with mortality repeatedly appear as important dimensions of meaningful existence. Contemporary philosophy likewise offers competing accounts of whether meaning requires a transcendent source or can arise within a naturalistic worldview. The study concludes that philosophy of life is best understood not as a single doctrine providing one final answer, but as a rational and critical inquiry into the values, purposes, and forms of living that make human existence intelligible and worthwhile.
Keywords: Philosophy of life, meaning in life, good life, happiness, virtue, freedom, absurdity, nihilism, existentialism, suffering, death.
English Title: The City as an Arena for Self-Creation: From Supporting Life to Enabling Ways of Living
Bita Shafaei
Assistant Professor, Department of Urban Planning Engineering, Faculty of Architecture and Urban Planning, Tabriz Islamic Art University.
Nahideh Rezaei
Assistant Professor, Department of Architectural Engineering, Faculty of Architecture and Urban Planning, Tabriz Islamic Art University.
Abstract
The city is one of the primary arenas in which everyday human life unfolds. Nevertheless, a considerable body of urban design approaches has conceptualized the relationship between space and life mainly in terms of supporting activities, facilitating behavior, promoting vitality, and improving environmental quality. Within this framework, the prevailing question is often “How does space support life?”, a question that may reduce life to a set of observable activities and behaviors. This paper shifts the focus of inquiry by asking a different question: “How can space enable people to find, construct, and recreate their own ways of living?” Adopting a qualitative approach and a conceptual-interpretive method, the study draws on theoretical literature concerning life, everyday life, self-creation, subjectivity, and urban design. The paper argues that life should not be understood merely as a given condition or a set of repetitive practices; rather, within social, cultural, economic, and spatial conditions, individuals continuously shape, interpret, and redefine their ways of living. The findings suggest that spatial qualities such as flexibility, choice, appropriation, plurality, adaptability, and openness to unforeseen uses can expand the possibilities for human action and agency. Accordingly, the role of urban design can be reframed from supporting existing forms of life toward designing the conditions of possibility for the emergence and recreation of plural ways of living.
Keywords: Everyday Life; Self-Creation; Ways of Living; Urban Design; Urban Space; Agency.
Life as an Ethical Matter
Reconstructing the Concept of “Life” in Wittgenstein’s Philosophy
Mohammad Saeed Abdollahi
Ph.D. in Moral Philosophy
Faculty Member, Research Institute for Women and Family
Email: m.saied.abdollahi@ut.ac.ir
Abstract
The concept of life in the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein cannot be reduced merely to a biological phenomenon or to an isolated question concerning the meaning of life. Rather, this concept emerges in connection with the human being’s mode of encountering the world, the experience of value, and ways of living. The central aim of this paper is to elucidate the relationship between life and the ethical in Wittgenstein’s thought and to examine the possibility of reconstructing this relationship in light of his works. The main thesis is that life, within Wittgenstein’s philosophy, can be reconstructed as a horizon for understanding the ethical—a horizon in which ethics is not conceived as a set of theoretical principles and propositions, but is fundamentally intertwined with ways of living and with human beings’ relations to the world and to others. To develop this account, in addition to examining Wittgenstein’s principal works, we draw on three interpretive approaches developed by Cora Diamond, Stanley Cavell, and Anne-Marie Christensen. We first analyze the relationship among life, the world, and value in Wittgenstein’s early philosophy. We then examine concepts such as the use of language, practical context, and the form of life in his later philosophy in order to assess the possibility of understanding ethics in relation to ways of living. Finally, we argue that reconstructing the concept of life in Wittgenstein’s thought can yield an understanding of ethics in which ethical reflection is not detached from human beings’ concrete lives, but rather acquires its meaning through the ways in which they live and through their relations to the world and to others.
Keywords
Wittgenstein; ethical life; meaning of life; value; form of life; moral philosophy
Life in the Thought of Allamah Tabataba’i
Abbas Abbaszadeh
Associate Professor, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, University of Tabriz
aabaszadeh@tabrizu.ac.ir
Among biologists, life is defined in terms of respiration, nutrition, growth, and reproduction, phenomena that are common to human beings, animals, and plants. Such characteristics, however, pertain more to mere survival than to life in its fuller sense. In the field of educational sciences, life has been defined as a movement from deficiency toward perfection, involving the gradual flourishing of innate potentials and the actualization of one’s faculties. Although such definitions are applicable to human beings, animals, and plants, they do not encompass God Almighty, whom we likewise affirm to be living. As a philosopher concerned with Being in its absolute sense, however, Allamah Tabataba’i defines life in terms of perception and action (idrak wa fi‘l). He argues that since God Almighty possesses the highest degree of perception and performs the greatest, most extensive, and most perfect acts—namely, the creation of beings—it follows that the highest degree of life belongs to Him. Employing a descriptive-analytical and library-based methodology, this study seeks to elucidate and present Allamah Tabataba’i’s position on the question of life. According to Allamah Tabataba’i, the Qur’anic concepts of faith and righteous action (iman wa ‘amal salih) constitute a more comprehensive expression of perception and action, and their integrated manifestation is referred to as “the good life” (al-hayat al-tayyibah). From this perspective, the theoretical and practical felicity of the human being consists in strengthening the two wings of knowledge and volition. It should be noted that, just as faith and righteous action must coexist, perception and action likewise constitute life only when they are realized together rather than independently of one another. Allamah Tabataba’i divides the stages of human existence into six periods, which he designates as the Six Existential Realms (al-akwān al-sittah): the Realm of the Primordial Covenant (‘Ālam al-Dharr); the Paternal or Procreative Stage (‘Ālam al-Aslāb); the Maternal/Womb Stage (‘Ālam al-Arhām); the Worldly Life (al-Dunyā); the Intermediate Realm (‘Ālam al-Barzakh), namely, the realm after death; and the Hereafter, namely, the realm of Resurrection, gathering, and final reconstitution. In Allamah Tabataba’i’s view, the first five realms or stages function for the human being as a path and a succession of stations along the journey, whereas only the sixth realm can be regarded as the ultimate end toward which the preceding stages are directed. The worldly realm (al-Dunyā), by virtue of the human being’s conscious exercise of free choice, constitutes the most important and critical stage of human life. This freedom of choice is manifested in an implicit and primordial form in the Realm of the Primordial Covenant, where the human being responded affirmatively to the divine question, “Am I not your Lord?” (A-lastu bi-rabbikum?). It is then manifested explicitly and concretely in the worldly realm, where the human being’s fidelity to that primordial covenant is put to the test. From Allamah Tabataba’i’s perspective, life encompasses multiple levels and degrees. It begins with material life and progresses toward the realization of the human being as an “intellective and God-oriented living being” (hayy muta’allih).
Keywords: Ḥayy, Life, Material Life, Spiritual Life, Allamah Tabataba’i
Is Living More Than Being?
A Reflection on the Metaphysics of Life
Soraya Abbasi Gheidari
Assistant Professor, Department of History Education, Farhangian University, Tehran, Iran
Email: ir.ac.cfu@abbasi.s
Abstract
The question of “life” is not merely a question of how a living being continues to exist; rather, it goes back to one of the most fundamental questions in philosophy: the relationship between being, living, and meaning. Adopting an analytical-critical approach, this article seeks to demonstrate that reducing life to mere biological existence overlooks an essential dimension of the reality of living. The central question of the study is whether a philosophical distinction can be established between “being alive” and “living” and, if such a distinction is possible, what its ontological component consists in. Accordingly, through a critical re-examination of selected discussions in metaphysics, phenomenology, and existential philosophy, the article considers the concept of living not merely as a biological condition, but as a mode of the realization of existence in relation to consciousness, time, possibility, choice, and meaning.
The argument of the article is based on the premise that “being” may refer to the actualization of existence, whereas “living” entails a particular mode of relating to oneself, the world, and the possibilities lying ahead. From this perspective, meaning is neither merely a pre-given feature of the world nor solely a product of individual will; rather, it emerges through the relation between the lived being and the horizon of the world. Ultimately, the article proposes that the metaphysics of life cannot be understood without moving beyond simplistic dichotomies such as life/meaning, necessity/freedom, and being/becoming. The conclusion is that the fundamental question of life may be not “Why is a living being alive?” but rather “How does being become living?”—a question that may open up the possibility of redefining the concept of life within contemporary philosophy.
Keywords: Metaphysics of Life, Living, Ontology, Meaning, Consciousness, Becoming, Existential Philosophy
From Wet Ontology to Hydro-Ontology: Rethinking Life as Relational Becoming
Elmira Bazregarzadeh
Assistant Professor, Department of English Language and Literature, Faculty of Persian Literature and Foreign Languages, University of Tabriz, Tabriz, Iran
e.bazregar@tabrizu.ac.r & bazregarzadeh.elmira@gmail.com
Abstract
What does it mean to live? This question grows urgent when life is seen not as an autonomous property of bounded organisms but as a material, relational, and continuously unfolding process. This paper proposes hydro-ontology as a philosophical framework for rethinking life through the material dynamics of water. Bringing Steve Mentz’s wet ontology into dialogue with Sidney I. Dobrin’s blue ecocriticism, Astrida Neimanis’s hydrofeminism, Stacy Alaimo’s trans-corporeality, and Karen Barad’s agential realism, it argues that water is more than an environmental object or metaphor: it offers a material paradigm for reconceiving the conditions and modes of living. Hydro-ontology identifies five interconnected characteristics of life: fluidity, permeability, relationality, processualism, and generativity. From this view, life is not a fixed state but an ongoing process of becoming; living bodies are porous formations constituted through continuous material exchanges rather than autonomous entities; and life itself emerges relationally through interactions among human, nonhuman, and ecological forces. Water thus becomes both a condition of life and a philosophical model for understanding what it means to live. The paper also considers the ethical implications of this aqueous conception, arguing that recognizing our watery constitution demands an ethics of responsiveness, vulnerability, and care. Finally, through a reading of Alice Oswald’s Dart, it shows how literature can enact life as fluid, relational, embodied, temporal, and generative. Hydro-ontology reframes the philosophy of life as a philosophy of relational becoming, challenging the distinction between being alive and living and proposing that to live is fundamentally to exist in relation.
Keywords: Blue Humanities, Generativity, Hydro-Ontology, Permeability, Relational Becoming, Terrestrial Bias
Life is beautiful
Ahad Hosseini
An artist and sculptor from Tabriz
ahad.hosseini.museum@gmail.com
Abstract
I have thought a great deal about what life is like, and in this regard, I asked myself this question: Is life beautiful? I found no answer that seemed more logical than this: SINCE I DO NOT COMMIT SUICIDE, LIFE IS BEAUTIFUL. But what is the beauty of life? Knowing that the knowledge and feelings of every man are different, each will have a different vision of beauty. However, I believe that the beauty of life is a pleasure or a joy that each man can find in his own actions as well as in his relations with the world.
It is clear that one can enjoy this pleasure as long as it does not hinder the pleasure of others. Let us not forget that the Declaration of the Rights of Man proclaims that "liberty consists in the power to do anything that does not injure others: accordingly, the exercise of the natural rights of each man has no limits except those that secure to the other members of society the enjoyment of these same rights. These limits can only be determined by law." Music, dance, singing, poetry, love, friendship, and others still, constitute the apparent beauty of the world. I think that among all these appearances, three are "essential beauties": GREAT LOVE, EFFORT, and REASON. It is evident that only a small number attain these three beauties. We cannot hide the fact that they are normally and intimately accompanied by a sort of asceticism, of sacrifice, where resides a passion difficult to explain. Indeed, perseverance in love, the suffering of the mountaineer to reach the summit, or that of the scientist to always go further, are forms of asceticism.The admiration that we hold for these men comes from the numerous difficulties they endure. For this reason, without a doubt, Greek philosophy thinks that among all things, the most difficult is the best. The bringing of a child into the world would be, in this case, another "essential beauty" exceptionally reserved for women. Between great love, science, and effort, it is impossible for me to say which of these three beauties is the best.
Finally, the fusion of the three gives me, for my part, the perfection that I would call: THE PASSION FOR LIFE, and which I would define as follows: a great effort, accompanied by love and directed by reason.
Lived Time versus Spatialized Time: The Meaning of Life and Death
Ali Hosseini,
Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Yasouj University
a.hoseini@yu.ac.ir
Abstract
Socrates, by stating that "life is a rehearsal for death," has established a fundamental opposition between two experiences of time: one that narrates lived time as a phenomenological quality, inner and dependent on human consciousness and embodiment, and the other, spatialized time, conceived as a measurable, linear, and external quantity. The central question is how this duality shapes our understanding of the meaning of life and death. In the phenomenological tradition, lived time is not an empty container, but rather the context of human existential experience in which past, present, and future are intertwined. Death in this framework is revealed not merely as a biological event at the end of the timeline, but as a fundamental possibility and being-toward-death (Heidegger), which bestows authenticity upon life. In contrast, spatialized time, which is the legacy of modern science and the mathematical conception of time, reduces death to a point on the calendar and life to a collection of qualityless moments. Qualitative research on terminally ill patients shows how, in the face of temporal limitation, lived time is experienced as a pendulum movement between opposing dimensions (fast/slow, safe/unsafe, full/empty), and it is in this very experience that the existential meaning of life and death is revealed to the subject. The conclusion is that the question of time is an ontological question: the choice between lived time and spatialized time is in fact a choice between two attitudes toward life and death; one in which death strips life of meaning, and another in which the awareness of death is itself the founder of the authentic meaning of life.
Keywords: lived time, spatialized time, phenomenology, death, meaning of life, Heidegger
New Existentialism and the Return of Old Questions from Colin Wilson's Perspective
Sosan Ghasemi Heydari,
MA in Political Science, Tarbiat Modares University, and PhD in Post-Islamic Iranian History
Ali Hosseini,
Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Yasouj University
Abstract
New existentialism, chiefly associated with the name of Colin Wilson and his book "Introduction to the New Existentialism," is a response to the nihilistic and absurdist dead end to which old existentialism (represented by Sartre and Camus) led. This intellectual current seeks, by returning to the fundamental questions of existence—but this time with an optimistic and evolutionist outlook—to find a way to give meaning to the life of modern man. Traditional existentialism, especially in its Sartrean reading, emphasized the contingency of existence and the priority of existence over essence; the logical consequence of this view was the emptiness and meaninglessness of the world. In The Myth of Sisyphus, Camus accepted this emptiness and called on man to rebel against it, but he offered no final answer to why one should live. Heidegger, too, spoke of the existential homelessness of modern man—a condition in which man no longer encounters his own essence and the question of the meaning of being has been forgotten.
Colin Wilson examines existentialism from two perspectives: old (pessimistic) and new (optimistic). Wilson's new existentialism, unlike the Sartrean version that halts at absurdity, is based on "the intentionality of consciousness." This concept, borrowed from Husserl, means that consciousness is always directed toward something and can be used as a tool for discovering values and meaning. Wilson regards Nietzsche as the true pioneer of this current, because by introducing the Superman and criticizing passivity and herd-following, he opened a path for overcoming nihilism.
The central axis of new existentialism is the return to the same eternal and old questions with which man has always been grappling: What is the meaning of existence? "How should one live?" And are values merely human affairs, or do they have a foundation in the structure of being?
The difference is that these questions no longer lead to predetermined metaphysical answers or to absolute absurdity, but are regarded as an intellectual adventure and a science of happiness. Wilson suggests that by expanding consciousness and employing will and attention, every day can become a arena for realizing human capacities and discovering new values.
The conclusion is that new existentialism is an attempt to save existential philosophy from the trap of the nihilism to which it itself had contributed. Nevertheless, critics believe that Wilson's optimism may lead to a kind of simplification or neglect of the tragic aspects of human existence. Nonetheless, raising anew the fundamental questions about meaning, value, and human destiny, in an age when the forgetting of being and homelessness have become the dominant discourse, remains an undeniable necessity.
Keywords: New Existentialism, Colin Wilson, Old Questions and Existential Philosophy